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Abstract (Zusammenfassung)
Digital signatures were introduced to guarantee the authenticity and integrity of the underlying
messages. A digital signature scheme comprises the key generation, the signature, and the verifi-
cation algorithms. The key generation algorithm creates the signing and the verifying keys, called
also the signer’s private and public keys respectively. The signature algorithm, which is run by the
signer, produces a signature on the input message. Finally, the verification algorithm, run by any-
one who knows the signer’s public key, checks whether a purported signature on some message is
valid or not. The last property, namely the universal verification of digital signatures is undesirable
in situations where the signed data is commercially or personally sensitive. Therefore, mechanisms
which share most properties with digital signatures except for the universal verification were in-
vented to respond to the aforementioned need; we call such mechanisms “opaque signatures”. In
this thesis, we study the signatures where the verification cannot be achieved without the cooper-
ation of a specific entity, namely the signer in case of undeniable signatures, or the confirmer in
case of confirmer signatures; we make three main contributions.
We first study the relationship between two security properties important for public key en-
cryption, namely data privacy and key privacy. Our study is motivated by the fact that opaque
signatures involve always an encryption layer that ensures their opacity. The properties required
for this encryption vary according to whether we want to protect the identity (i.e. the key) of the
signer or hide the validity of the signature. Therefore, it would be convenient to use existing work
about the encryption scheme in order to derive one notion from the other.
Next, we delve into the generic constructions of confirmer signatures from basic cryptographic
primitives, e.g. digital signatures, encryption, or commitment schemes. In fact, generic con-
structions give easy-to-understand and easy-to-prove schemes, however, this convenience is of-
ten achieved at the expense of efficiency. In this contribution, which constitutes the core of this
thesis, we first analyze the already existing constructions; our study concludes that the popular
generic constructions of confirmer signatures necessitate strong security assumptions on the build-
ing blocks, which impacts negatively the efficiency of the resulting signatures. Next, we show that
a small change in these constructions makes these assumptions drop drastically, allowing as a result
constructions with instantiations that compete with the dedicated realizations of these signatures.
Finally, we revisit two early undeniable signatures which were proposed with a conjectural
security. We disprove the claimed security of the first scheme, and we provide a fix to it in order
to achieve strong security properties. Next, we upgrade the second scheme so that it supports a
iii
desirable feature, and we provide a formal security treatment of the new scheme: we prove that it
is secure assuming new reasonable assumptions on the underlying constituents.
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Preface
This thesis presents the ensemble of my PhD results obtained in the area of “opaque” signatures,
namely [El Aimani & Vergnaud, 2007; El Aimani, 2008, 2009a,b, 2010]1.
A digital signature is a mechanism that captures most properties satisfied by a “traditional”
signature in the paper world. In fact, digital signatures guarantee that the signed message has not
been altered in transit, and that it comes from the source that claims to be its provenance, namely
the signer. More formally, a digital signature consists of three algorithms: (1) the key generation
algorithm which creates the signing and the verifying keys, (2) the signing algorithm which takes
on input the signing key and a message, and outputs a signature on the input message, (3) and
the verification algorithm which checks the validity of an alleged signature on a given message
using the verifying key. An important feature in digital signatures is the universal verification,
i.e. anyone who knows the verifying key, called also the signer’s public key, can verify signatures
issued by this signer. However, such a property can be undesirable in some applications and needs
to be controlled or limited; we talk then about obscure or opaque signatures. In this document, we
will focus on confirmer and undeniable signatures. Let us then specify the context.
Consider for example the case of inter-organizational electronic messages; signatures on these
messages are indispensable to resolve disputes as they ensure integrity and authenticity of the
underlying messages, however, self-authentication of these signatures will make the messages vul-
nerable to industrial spy or extortionist. Undeniable signatures come to rescue in this situation
as they: (1) cannot be verified without cooperation with the signer via the confirmation/denial
protocols, (2) are non-transferable since a verifier cannot transfer his conviction, to a third party,
about the validity/invalidity of a signature he has just verified, (3) are binding in the sense that a
signer cannot deny a signature he has actually issued. Unfortunately, the very virtue of undeni-
able signatures (verification with only the signer’s help) became their major shortcoming for many
practical applications since absence of the signer obstructs the entire verification process. There-
fore, the concept of undeniable signatures was upgraded to designated confirmer signatures where
the verification is delegated to a designated confirmer.
Building complicated systems upon simple and basic primitives is customary in cryptography
as it allows to re-use existing work about the primitives, and it achieves easy-to-understand and
1The works [El Aimani & von zur Gathen, 2007; El Aimani & Raekow, 2009, 2010] are not reported in this
document as they do not accord with the general theme of the thesis.
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easy-to-prove systems. However, monolithic or dedicated schemes better often, in terms of effi-
ciency, those obtained from instantiating generic constructions with concrete primitives. This is
mainly due to the fact that generic constructions cannot in general use the specific properties of
their underlying components in order to optimize the resulting structure. A tantalizing challenge
will be the design of generic constructions of undeniable/confirmer signatures which find practical
instantiations with the popular cryptographic primitives. This is the main purpose of this thesis.
Contributions and organization of the document
Apart from the first chapter on the cryptographic tools that will be used throughout the document,
we can group the contributions of this thesis in the following classes:
1. Public key encryption. In this contribution, detailed in Chapter 2, we study the relationship
between two security notions important for public key encryption, namely data privacy or
indistinguishability, which refers to the hardness of distinguishing ciphertexts based on the
underlying data, and key privacy or anonymity, which denotes the hardness of distinguishing
ciphertexts based on the underlying (public) key. We also define the anonymity notion for
two popular structures used to build public key encryption schemes, that are key and data
encapsulation mechanisms, and we study similarly the connection between this new notion
and indistinguishability in these mechanisms. Our work was inspired from a similar work on
undeniable signatures, and it is motivated by the fact that opaque signatures involve always
an encryption layer to ensure their opacity. The properties that this encryption layer should
meet vary according to whether we want to hide the identity of the signer or the validity of
the signature. Hence, the need for such a study which specifies easy-to-check properties on
any encryption so that data privacy yields key privacy and vice versa, allowing consequently
to use existing results about the system instead of doing the work from scratch.
2. Generic constructions of confirmer signatures. This contribution constitutes the core of
this thesis, and it is described in Part II. More precisely:
• In Chapter 3, we define the model (syntax of confirmer signatures and security proper-
ties) we adhere to in our work. Moreover, we survey the different generic constructions
of confirmer signatures found in the literature. Most such proposals follow either the
sign-then-encrypt or the commit-then-sign paradigms. We also re-write some of the
security proofs of these constructions so that they stay resilient against some malicious
adversaries, and we provide other proofs which were due to appear in forthcoming
papers of the corresponding authors but were not given so far.
• In Chapter 4, we analyze and improve the confirmer signatures obtained from the sign-
then-encrypt technique. In a nutshell, this method consists in first producing a digital
signature on the message to be signed, then encrypting the resulting signature. This
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method originally required the constituents, that are the underlying signature and en-
cryption schemes, to meet the highest notions of security. In this chapter, we show
that the requirement on the signature scheme is also necessary for the security of the
construction, whilst the condition on the encryption could be weakened. However, we
prove also the necessity of this weakened condition, which translates in excluding a
useful type of encryption. Next, we circumvent this problem by modifying slightly
the paradigm so that it accepts a cheap and useful type of encryption, namely homo-
morphic encryption. We demonstrate the efficiency of the resulting construction by
explicitly describing the confirmation and denial protocols, a task which has not been
addressed in all generic constructions of confirmer signatures which implement the
sign-then-encrypt principle.
• In Chapter 5, we analyze the second popular method used to devise confirmer sig-
natures, namely the commit-then-sign paradigm which consists in first producing a
commitment on the message to be signed, encrypting the string used for the commit-
ment, and finally signing the latter. Similarly to the previous chapter, we show that
the paradigm, when used in its basic form, necessitates a strong encryption which ren-
ders the construction inefficient or accept very limited instantiations. However, a small
change of the basic paradigm makes the assumption on the encryption drop drastically,
allowing as a result many practical instantiations. Finally, we shed light on a sub-
case of the paradigm, that is the encrypt-then-sign paradigm. Such a method provides
very efficient confirmer signatures provided there exist efficient non-interactive vari-
ants of the underlying confirmation protocol; this is not a problem nowadays due to the
progress made recently in this area.
3. Undeniable signatures. This part comprises three chapters namely:
• Chapter 6, where we browse through the different realizations of undeniable signatures.
In fact, while the literature on confirmer signatures was more focused on how to ob-
tain them from basic cryptographic primitives, the literature on undeniable signatures
was very diverse. We chose to give this survey in order to better situate our work on
undeniable signatures that comes in the following two chapters.
• Chapter 7, where we revisit the undeniable signatures of Damga˚rd and Pedersen. These
signatures were proposed in 1996 with a conjectured security that was reported a
decade later in a construction of undeniable signatures following the same spirit. In this
chapter, we disprove the conjectured security of Damga˚rd and Pedersen’s undeniable
signatures, and we propose a repair to the scheme which turns out to be an instantiation
of the construction proposed earlier in Chapter 4.
• Chapter 8, where we revisit the undeniable signatures of Michels, Petersen, and Horster
that were proposed in 1996, and had also a speculative security. We first modify slightly
these signatures so that they support an additional feature, called gradual conversion,
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which informally means the possibility of converting a set of undeniable signatures
pertained to a given event to publicly verifiable ones. Next, we formally prove that the
security of our recast rests on new reasonable assumptions that we introduce for the
underlying hash function family.
Before ending this preamble, we wish to alert the reader to the importance of carefully check-
ing the security model in which the systems presented in this document are proclaimed to be
secure/insecure. In fact, security models can differ very slightly in their definitions, but the reper-
cussions of these smallish differences can be huge; a system secure in one model can be be totally
broken in another. Also, a security property which is impossible to reach for a scheme in a model
can be easily met in another. This actually reflects one of the main challenges in nowadays cryptog-
raphy: proposing efficient schemes which achieve strong security properties based on the hardness
of well-studied problems .
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Notations
General
|a| absolute value of the real number a
maxA Exp maximum of the expression Exp when the variable A ranges all the
possible values
minA Exp minimum of the expression Exp when the variable A ranges all the
possible values
log x logarithm of x with respect to some unspecified base
lnn logarithm of x in the base e =
∑∞
n=0 1/n!
x← y (for variables2 x, y) assigning the value of y to x
[a, b] closed interval, i.e. the set of real numbers x in the range a ≤ x ≤ b
(a, b) open interval, i.e. the set of real numbers x in the range a < x < b
[[a, b]] the set of integers x in the range a ≤ x ≤ b
⌊x⌋ floor of the real number x
a << b a is strictly of smaller order than b
a >> b a is strictly of larger order than b
Bit strings
ǫ empty string
a bit complement of the string a
a‖b concatenation of the strings a and b
{0, 1}n set of n-bit strings
{0, 1}∗ set of all finite binary strings
Sets
∅ empty set
#A cardinality of the set A
a ∈ A a is an element of the set A
a /∈ A a is not an element of the set A
2the symbol← has different interpretations according to the context
xi
A ⊂ B set A is contained in set B
A ⊆ B set A is contained in or equal to set B
A ∪ B union of sets A and B
A ∩ B intersection of sets A and B
A\B difference of sets A and B
A× B Cartesian product of sets A and B
N set of natural numbers
Z set of integers
Q set of rational numbers
R set of real numbers
ZN set of integers modulo N (denoted also the set Z/NZ)
Z×N group of units in ZN
Fq finite field of cardinality q
Fq algebraic closure of Fq
F×q multiplicative group of Fq
Groups
(G,+) group G is denoted additively
(G, ·) group G is denoted multiplicatively
0G identity in (G,+)
1G identity in (G, ·)
a−1 inverse of element a in a group denoted multiplicatively
〈g〉 group generated by the element g
DLg(y) discrete logarithm of the group element y in the base g
Functions
f : A→ B f is function from set A to set B
a 7→ b a is mapped to b (by some function)
f−1 inverse of bijective function f
poly polynomial function
negl negligible function, i.e. a function of order smaller than the inverse
of any polynomial function
Integers
a rem b remainder of the Euclidian division of a by b (b 6= 0)
a|b a divides b
gcd(a, b) greatest common divisor of integers a and b
a = b mod n a is congruent to b modulo n
xii
a−1 mod n multiplicative inverse of a modulo n
Φ(n) Euler’s totient function
Events, probabilities, and statistics
¬E complement of event E
E1 ∧ E2 intersection of event E1 and event E2
E1 ∨ E2 union of event E1 and event E2
Pr[E] probability of event E
Pr[E1|E2] probability of event E1 given event E2
a← D (for a distribution D) a is sampled from distribution D
a
R←− S (for a finite set S) (denoted also a ∈R S) a is selected uniformly at random from set S
Acronyms
ANO anonymity
CCA chosen ciphertext attack
CDCS convertible designated confirmer signature
CDH computational Diffie-Hellman
CMA chosen message attack
CPA chosen plaintext attack
DDH decisional Diffie-Hellman
DEM data encapsulation mechanism
EUF existential unforgeability
FDH full domain hash
GDH gap Diffie-Hellman
HVZK honest verifier zero-knowledge
IND indistinguishability
INV invisibility
KEM key encapsulation mechanism
NIZK non-interactive zero-knowledge
NM non-malleability
OW one wayness
PCA plaintext checking attack
PoK proof of knowledge
PPTM probabilistic polynomial Turing machine
ROM random oracle model
SEUF strong existential unforgeability
SINV strong invisibility
SRSA Strong RSA
WHPOK witness hiding proof of knowledge
xiii
ZK zero-knowledge
ZKIP zero-knowledge interactive proof
Computability
AO A has access to the oracle O
O : a 7−→ b the oracle O gets a as a query and responds with b
a← A(x) A outputs the value a on input x
I state information
(P, V )(x) two-party protocol (pair of interactive Turing machines) with com-
mon input x
P
c−→ V P sends c to V
P
c←− V P gets c from V
P
PoK←−→ V P and V run the interactive proof PoK
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Chapter 1
The Theory of Cryptography
Abstract. Cryptology evolved from a crossing where branches of mathematics,
computer science, and electrical engineering deposit their contributions, to an au-
tonomic and mature science. In fact, cryptology inherited techniques from various
sciences, successfully reshaped and merged them with new concepts to result in a
self-contained science, capable of constructing and analyzing systems meeting the
imperishable trilogy of requirements: confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity.
In this chapter, we recall aspects of the theory of cryptography that are necessary
for this thesis. We start by reminding some important results from complexity the-
ory, a branch of theoretical computer science where cryptography has scooped up
many concepts. Next, we recite the basic primitives upon which are based more so-
phisticated cryptographic systems. Then, we proceed to the description of three of
the theoretical pillars that found modern cryptography, namely reductionist security,
zero knowledge, and bilinear maps.
1.1 Reminders in complexity theory
Complexity theory is a branch of computer science concerned with the study of fundamental prin-
ciples of computation. It is a vibrant area of research due to its ubiquity in many different fields:
biologists studying models for neuron nets or evolution, electrical engineers developing switching
theory to improve hardware design, mathematicians working on foundations of logics and arith-
metics, linguists investigating grammars for natural languages, physicists studying the feasibility
of building quantum computers, and of course computer scientists seeking efficient algorithms to
solve important problems.
In this section, we recall some basics of complexity theory. We refer to the book [Papadim-
itriou, 1994] for a comprehensive study of this theory.
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1.1.1 Symbols, alphabets, languages and problems
A symbol is an atomic entity. Examples of frequently used symbols are letters or digits. A string is
a finite sequence of juxtaposed symbols. The length of a string s is often denoted |s|, and consists
of the number of symbols composing the string. One special string is the string consisting of zero
symbols; it is denoted ǫ and is called the empty string. A string is said to be the concatenation of
two strings s and t if it is formed by writing s followed by t.
An alphabet is a finite set of symbols. A language is a set of strings of symbols from some
alphabet. For instance, if Σ is a given alphabet, Σ⋆ denotes the language consisting of all possible
strings composed of symbols in Σ. One alphabet that will occur often in this document is the
alphabet {0, 1}.
A problem is intrinsically associated to a certain question; for example computing the greatest
common divisor of two integers. Once one specifies values for the input, one obtains an instance
of the problem to which corresponds some values forming the solutions to the input. Therefore,
if we formulate the possible inputs and outputs of a given problem as strings over some alphabet
Σ, a problem can be viewed as a subset of Σ⋆ × Σ⋆. In fact, we assume that for every input
question q ∈ Σ⋆, there exists an output answer r ∈ Σ⋆, for instance we consider “no solution”
also a possible answer. An important category of problems is that consisting of problems that
accept only two possible answers {“yes”, “no”}, i.e. the so-called decision problems. We can
simplify the representation of decision problems by considering only the “language” consisting
of questions that have “yes”-answers. We say that a system, e.g. computer, decides a decision
problem if it identifies successfully the positive instances, i.e. the questions having “yes”-answers.
Finally, decision problems arise very often in complexity theory, and one is especially interested
in knowing whether a given decision problem can be decided by some computer or not. To answer
such a question, one needs to introduce a formal and universal model of computer.
1.1.2 Computability & Turing machines
A computation is informally speaking a process by which one obtains an answer to a certain ques-
tion. A computation requires a system which performs the computation. This system or “com-
puter” will move from an initial state, which is independent of the question, to a final state where
it outputs the answer, if any. A fundamental problem has been the universalization of the compu-
tation model. i.e. provide a model for every “computable” function that computes an answer (if it
exists) to any question from the set of possible questions. The non-trivial part of this task lies in
having to define a model of a “computer”, restricted by known physical laws, to perform any kind
of computations. Nevertheless, all computational models that have been developed so far, were
shown to be equivalent to a very simple model, the so-called Turing machine. This lead Church
and Turing to conjecture in 1936 that every computable function can be computed by a Turing
machine.
The basic Turing machine has an input tape comprised of infinitely many cells, and a tape head
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which scans one cell of the tape at a time. Each cell contains a symbol from a finite alphabet
intrinsic to the machine. Initially, the tape contains only the input of the problem (the question),
the rest of the tape being blank. Throughout the computations, the configuration of the machine
ranges a finite set of states. Finally, if the machine halts (reaches one of the final states), it writes
the output on its tape. The machine operates sequentially: as long as it does not reach the final
state, it performs one operation, at a time, which depends solely on the current state and the symbol
pointed to by its head. An operation of the machine can be either a change of the current state, a
writing/overwriting of a symbol on the scanned cell or a move (in both directions) of the head. The
function that maps a pair consisting of a symbol and a state to an operation is called the program of
the machine. Finally, a language accepted or decided by a Turing machine TM is the set of strings,
composed from symbols of the machine alphabet, which cause the TM to enter a final state.
1.1.3 Extended Turing machines
Multi-tape Turing machines
A multi-tape Turing machine is comprised of k tape heads and k tapes, each has an infinite number
of cells. A configuration of the machine at some time point consists of the current state and of
the positions of the k tape heads. Similarly to single-tape Turing machines, one operation of a
multi-tape Turing machine depends only on the current configuration, and can be either a change
of the current state, a print of a new symbol on each of the cells scanned by the heads, or a move
of the heads independently in both directions. Initially, all the tapes are blank except the first one
where the input is written. When the machine halts, one recovers the output in the last tape.
Probabilistic Turing machines
A probabilistic (single or multi-tape) Turing machine has an extra tape consisting of symbols form-
ing a support for the uniform distribution. This induces a probability distribution on the outcome
corresponding to a given input. In fact, oppositely to a deterministic Turing machine, to a given
input correspond several computation paths in a probabilistic Turing machine. Therefore, it may
well be that for some input x, there are computations which halt and others which don’t.
Non-deterministic Turing machines
A non-deterministic Turing machine is a probabilistic Turing machine which accepts strings if
at least one computation path, started on these strings, leads to one final state of the machine.
Similarly, a language L is accepted (decided) by a non-deterministic Turing machine if the latter
accepts all strings x ∈ L.
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Oracle Turing machines
An oracle Turing machine is a Turing machine with an extra tape called the oracle tape, and two
additional states called the “oracle invocation” and the “oracle appeared” respectively. The con-
figuration of the machine at some time point with state different from the state “oracle invocation”
is defined as usual. If a configuration involves the state “oracle invocation” and the string q on
the oracle tape, then the next configuration of the machine is identical to the previous one with
the exception of moving to the state “oracle appeared” and having on the oracle tape the string r
instead. q is called the oracle query and r is the oracle reply. The introduction of such types of
machines is motivated by the need to capture the notion of reducibility, which we will see later in
this section.
1.1.4 Complexity classes: P, PSPACE, NP, and co-NP
Let DTM be a deterministic Turing machine. If for every input word of length n, the machine
halts after at most t(n) moves, then TM is said to have a time complexity t(n), and the language
accepted by DTM is said to be of time complexity t(n). The family of languages of deterministic
time complexity O(t(n)) forms a complexity class which we denote DTIME(t(n)). One important
complexity class is the class
P = ∪k≥1DTIME(nk)
consisting of languages which can be decided efficiently by a deterministic polynomial Turing
machine.
Similarly, if DTM is a deterministic Turing machine that, for every input string of length n, vis-
its at most s(n) cells before halting, then DTM is said to be of space complexity s(n), and so is the
language accepted by DTM. The family of languages of (deterministic) space complexity O(s(n))
forms a complexity class denoted DSPACE(s(n)). The class PSPACE consists of languages that
can be decided using a polynomial amount of space .
PSPACE = ∪k≥1DSPACE(nk).
Let now NTM be a non-deterministic Turing machine. If for every n-length string, NTM
halts after at most t(n) moves, regardless of the selected computational path, then NTM is said to
have a time complexity t(n). We define similarly NTIME(t(n)) to be the class of languages that
can be decided non-deterministically in time O(t(n)). The most important non-deterministic time
complexity class is the class
NP = ∪k≥1NTIME(nk)
consisting of languages that can be decided efficiently by a non deterministic polynomial Turing
machine.
Finally, to define the class co-NP, one needs to define the complement of a language. According
to Subsection 1.1.1, we defined a language L to be the set of positive instances to its underlying
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decision problem P. The complement of L, which we denote L, consists of the negative instances
of the problem P. In this way, co-NP is the class comprised of languages whose complements are
in NP.
It is not hard to see that P is a subset of NP and co-NP, which are both subsets of PSPACE.
The most important question in complexity, which is also called the million dollar question, is to
prove/disprove that P is different from NP.
1.1.5 Reductions and completeness
A reduction is a transformation of a problem to another. Informally speaking, we say that problem
A reduces to problem B if one can solve A given an oracle that solves B. In this case, we say
that B is at least as hard as A, and we write A ≤ B or A ⇐ B. Such a reduction is known in
the literature as a Turing reduction, where multiple calls to the oracle solving the harder problem
are allowed. In case of decision problems, we often use the notion of many-one reduction which
corresponds to a Turing reduction where one call to the oracle is allowed. More precisely, a many-
one reduction maps an instance x of problem A, to an instance R(x) of the harder problem B such
that x is a positive instance of A if and only if R(x) is a positive instance of B. Finally, reductions
must be efficient to compute in order to have coherent results. The appropriate notion of efficiency
depends on the problems we are studying, for instance, in case of problems/languages in NP, it is
convenient to talk about reductions computable in polynomial time.
Let C be a complexity class and L be a given language. We say that L is C-complete if L ∈ C,
and every language in C is reducible to it. In case L /∈ C, but still every language in C is reducible
to L, we say that L is C-hard. Complete problems are important as they are considered to be
representatives of the class. In fact, any solution to the complete problem can be used to solve
problems in the underlying class. This explains why reductions should be efficient to compute; it
would be absurd to have a solution to a complete problem derive a difficult to compute solution to
an easier problem.
1.1.6 One way functions and indistinguishability
The bright side of the conjecture P 6= NP consists in suggesting different levels of hardness. The
most notable ones are the hardness of computing some given values and the hardness of comparing
two different entities.
A one way function is map which is easy to compute but hard to invert. More precisely, a one
way function f is a map from Σ⋆ to itself, Σ being some alphabet, such that the following holds:
1. for all x ∈ Σ⋆, f(x) is at most polynomially longer or shorter than x,
2. there exists a polynomial time Turing machine that, on the input x, outputs f(x).
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3. given a uniformly chosen element y from Σ⋆, there exists no polynomial time Turing ma-
chine that returns, with non-negligible probability, x such that f(x) = y if such an x exists,
or “no” otherwise.
A trapdoor one way function is a one way function such that the knowledge of an additional
information (the trapdoor) allows an efficient (polynomial time) computation of its inverse.
Equivalence of two entities varies according to the situations and applications. For exam-
ple, in some applications, two objects are considered to be equivalent if there exists no efficient
procedure that differentiates them. This motivates the definition of the different notions of indis-
tinguishability. Let p and q be two probability distributions, over some countable probability space
E ⊆ {0, 1}n, that are considered at the security parameter k ∈ N.
1. p and q are perfectly indistinguishable if they are equal.
2. p and q are statistically indistinguishable if their statistical difference is negligible in n. We
define the statistical difference (or variation distance) of p and q as follows:
∆(n) =
∑
e∈E
|p(e)− q(e)|
3. p and q are computationally indistinguishable if for every probabilistic polynomial time
Turing machine M , the following holds:∣∣∣∣ Prx←p[M(x) = 1]− Prx←q[M(x) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1nk
where the expression x ← p denotes that x has been sampled according to the probability
distribution p.
1.1.7 Examples of one way functions
One way functions arise abundantly in cryptography as they offer the possibility of being easy to
compute in one way and hard in the other. In fact, this duality easiness/difficulty translates in cryp-
tography into efficiency/security that a cryptographic system should have, since we naturally want
the latter to be easy to implement for the honest players but difficult to obstruct by the opponents.
Public key cryptography rests heavily upon two one way functions related to two number the-
oretic hard problems, namely factoring integers and computing discrete logarithms. Both decision
variants of those two problems happen to be in NP, but without being proven to be NP-complete.
In fact, one of the main differences between complexity theory and cryptography is that the former
considers the worst-case complexity analysis whereas the latter is interested in the average-case
analysis. The knapsack problem is one illustration of this difference since it is proven to be NP-
complete, however most instances that were used in cryptography have been broken. The upshot
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is that one needs an efficient generation of difficult instances of problems in order to be able to use
them in cryptography. In this sense, factoring integers and computing discrete logarithms proved
to be good candidates for use, which explains the massive design of cryptographic systems based
on those problems, or the important mathematic ingenuity spent to solve them.
Factoring
Factoring an integer consists in finding its prime factors. A prime is naturally defined to have only
1 and itself as divisors. Factoring can be easily seen as a one way function since the operation
consisting in building an integer from its prime factors, i.e. the multiplication, can be efficiently
performed whilst the reverse does not seem to have an efficient algorithmic solution. We summa-
rize in the table below the most known methods to factor an n-bit integer. For a comprehensive
and exhaustive list, we refer for example to [Cohen, 1996].
method year time
trial division −∞ O(2n/2)
Pollard’s p− 1 method 1974 O(2n/4)
Pollard’s ρ method 1975 O(2n/4)
Dixon’s random squares 1981 exp(O(n1/2))
Lenstra’s elliptic curves 1987 exp(O(n1/2))
Number Field Sieve 1991 exp(O(n1/3))
The biggest integer of general form that has been factored so far is the 768-bits RSA challenge
using the number field sieve method. An RSA challenge is product of two primes of the same bit
size. We refer to [Kleinjung et al., 2010] for details about the factorization of this challenge.
Discrete logarithm
Let (G, ·) be a multiplicative cyclic group generated by some element, say g. The discrete loga-
rithm problem consists in, given an element y ∈ G = 〈g〉, computing x such that y = gx.
It can be easily proven that solving the discrete logarithm problem in a group of order d, with
known factorization, can be efficiently reduced to solving the same problem in groups whose orders
are the prime factors of d (see for example [Stinson, 2006, Chapter 6]). This explains why we
consider in the literature only groups of prime order.
The discrete logarithm problem is proven to be difficult for generic group algorithms. In fact,
in [Shoup, 1997], it is proven that algorithms that use no special properties of the considered group
need at least O(
√
d) group operations to solve the discrete logarithm problem, where d is the group
order. A popular illustration of groups without special properties is given by the group of points
of an elliptic curve over a finite field. However, as soon as one considers multiplicative groups
of a finite field Z×q (for a prime q), the cost of solving the discrete logarithm drops drastically to
exp(O(n1/3)) using the number field sieve, where n is the bit-size of the considered group order.
9
On that account, elliptic-curve-cryptography betters finite-field or ring-cryptography as it achieves
the same level of security at shorter size parameters. However, we should point that elliptic curves
still lose in efficiency when compared to finite fields as it is known that group operations in elliptic
curves are much more expensive than their similars in finite fields.
Finally, we note that both factoring and discrete logarithm possess an efficient algorithmic
solution using a quantum computer [Shor, 1994]. However, the progress in this area is still not
threatening as the largest integer that has been factored so far using this algorithm is 15. Neverthe-
less, there is a recent trend in cryptography that encourages looking for hard problems that remain
hard even in the presence of quantum computers, e.g. lattice or codes-related problems.
1.2 Basic cryptographic primitives
Cryptography was historically associated with the design of systems ensuring confidentiality, namely
encryption schemes. However and throughout the years, cryptography evolved to include more sys-
tems that serve further purposes. In fact, the digital era gave birth to new applications that require
special mechanisms to protect against misuse. Thus, the most appropriate definition of cryptog-
raphy is, according to [Goldreich, 2001], a science “concerned with construction of schemes that
should be able to withstand any abuse. Such schemes are constructed as to maintain a desired
functionality, even under malicious attempts aimed at making them deviate from their prescribed
functionality”.
In this section, we first present the axioms assumed in any cryptographic system, then pro-
ceed to a brief description of the most important cryptographic primitives that we will encounter
throughout this thesis.
1.2.1 Kerckhoffs’ principles
In 1883, Auguste Kerckhoffs formulated in [Kerckhoffs, 1883] the laws or axioms that one should
assume about any encryption scheme:
1. The system must be practically, if not mathematically, indecipherable;
2. It must not be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall into the hands of the enemy
without inconvenience;
3. Its key must be communicable and retainable without the help of written notes, and change-
able or modifiable at the will of the correspondents;
4. It must be applicable to telegraphic correspondence;
5. It must be portable, and its usage and function must not require the concourse of several
people;
10
6. Finally, it is necessary, given the circumstances that command its application, that the system
be easy to use, requiring neither mental strain nor the knowledge of a long series of rules to
observe.
The most famous law that cryptography owes to Kerckhoffs is stated in the second item, that is,
a system should remain secure even if everything except its key is publicly known. This law was
reformulated by Claude Shannon by “the enemy knows the system”, and later universally adopted
in cryptography and in all the subsequent related disciplines, for instance steganography.
1.2.2 Encryption
An encryption scheme is given by the following three algorithms:
Key generation (keygen). This is a probabilistic algorithm which returns pairs of encryption and
decryption keys (ke, kd) depending on the security parameter k.
Encryption (encrypt). This is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input an encryption key
ke and a plaintext m, runs on a random tape u and returns a ciphertext c.
Decryption (decrypt).This is a deterministic algorithm which takes on input a decryption key kd,
a ciphertext c and returns the corresponding plaintext m or the symbol ⊥. We require that if
(ke, kd) is a valid key pair, then
∀m : decryptkd
(
encryptke(m)
)
= m.
Since the antiquity, encryption schemes were conceived such that the keys used for encryption
and decryption are the same, which forces the protagonists to meet physically or discuss through a
secure channel in order to agree on the key. It is worth noting that such a type of encryption, called
symmetric or conventional encryption, was mostly practiced in secret service or military chambers
in order to protect state and military communications.
In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [Diffie & Hellman, 1976] invented public key
encryption, called also asymmetric encryption, where the sender and receiver do not have to agree
on the same key to exchange encrypted messages. In fact, the receiver generates a pair of keys
ke and kd that will be used for encryption and decryption respectively. The receiver will publish
the encryption key and store privately the decryption key. With this mechanism, it is obvious that
anyone can encrypt a message using ke, whilst only the receiver can decrypt a ciphertext (obtained
using ke) using the private key kd. The repercussions of inventing public key cryptography are
huge. First it motivated the design of new mechanisms and the introduction of new analysis tools.
Then and most importantly, it gave cryptography a scientific shape by allowing more individuals or
institutions to participate; cryptography is no longer the workings of some people locked in highly
secret military cells, but a production of a whole community that is constantly designing/analyzing
systems and publishing the results in well established conferences or journals.
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Despite its attractive feature, namely flexibility of the key management, public key encryption
did not overwrite symmetric encryption. In fact, the latter compares much better than the former in
terms of efficiency. Thus, in most practical applications, both disciplines cohabit under the name
“hybrid encryption”: public key encryption is first used to communicate a short key, that will be
later used to decrypt a huge document, e.g. movie.
Security notions for encryption schemes
Encryption schemes should satisfy a certain security level which clearly identifies the security goal
the scheme should attain, and the adversarial power the attacker against the scheme has. The pair
consisting of the security goal and the adversarial power defines what is called the security notion
for the encryption scheme.
The typical security goals a public key encryption scheme should attain are:
1. Unbreakability (UBK): it is difficult to recover the private key from the public key of the
encryption scheme.
2. One wayness (OW): without the private key, it is computationally impossible to recover the
plaintext.
3. Indistinguishability (IND): the ciphertext reveals no information about the plaintext to a
polynomial adversary.
4. Non-Malleability (NM): no polynomial adversary can derive from a given ciphertext another
ciphertext such that the underlying plaintexts are meaningfully related.
The typical scenario attacks for public key encryption schemes are:
1. Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA): the adversary can encrypt any message of his choice. This
is inevitable in public key settings.
2. Plaintext Checking Attack (PCA): the adversary is allowed to query an oracle on pairs (m, c)
and gets answers whether m is really encrypted in c or not. There is the natural restriction
of not querying the oracle on pairs which will help the attacker solving his challenge.
3. Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA): the adversary is allowed to query a decryption oracle for
ciphertexts of his choice. There is again the restriction of not querying the oracle on cipher-
texts that will help the attacker solving his challenge.
Remark 1.1. In the literature, the scenario attack CCA is referred to as CCA2, and is called
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. This is due to the presence of the non-adaptive chosen ciphertext
attack or the lunch time attack scenario, which is denoted CCA1 and where the adversary has the
liberty to request the decryption of any ciphertext of his choice up to the challenge phase.
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It is obvious that the CCA attack model is stronger than the PCA attack model which is stronger
than the CPA one. We summarize in Figure 1.1 the relations among the different security notions
obtained from pairing a security goal GOAL ∈ {OW, IND,NM} and an attack model ATK ∈
{CPA, PCA,CCA}. The notation Notion1 → Notion2 indicates that if an encryption scheme is
secure in the sense Notion1, then it is also secure in the sense Notion2; we say that Notion1 implies
Notion2. The notation Notion1 ↔ Notion2 means that both Notion1 and Notion2 imply each other.
Details about the formal definitions of the notions or the proofs underlying Figure 1.1 can be found
in [Bellare et al., 1998]. Actually, this work gives also some separation results which we do not
report in Figure 1.1 as they are either obtained under some strong assumptions, or they involve
notions we do not consider in the thesis (IND− CCA1 or NM− CCA1). Finally, we will provide
in Subsection 1.3.1 the formal definitions of the security notions (for public key encryption or for
signature schemes) that we will encounter throughout this thesis.
CPA PCA CCA
UBK
OW
IND
NM
Figure 1.1: Relations among security notions for PKE
Examples of encryption schemes
The most famous public key encryption scheme dates back to 1978 [Rivest et al., 1978]. It is
named RSA, which refers to the initials of its inventors, and is depicted in Figure 1.2. The RSA
encryption scheme is OW-CPA (one way against a chosen plaintext attack) under the RSA assump-
tion, which posits the difficulty of extracting e-th modular roots. However, it is not IND-CPA
(indistinguishable against a chosen plaintext attack) since it reveals information about the plain-
text, namely me mod N . Less it is NM-CPA (non-malleable against a chosen plaintext attack) as
one can compute, given a ciphertext c, another ciphertext, say c′ = 2ec mod N , whose plaintext
m′ is meaningfully related to the plaintext m underlying c; m′ = 2m.
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Key generation Choose two equally-sized primes p, q and compute the modulus N = pq,
choose e R←− Z×φ(N), where φ is the Euler totient function,
compute d = e−1 mod φ(N),
set the public key pk to (e,N) and the private key sk to (d,N).
Encryption For a message m ∈ Z×N , compute its encryption as c = me mod N .
Decryption given a ciphertext c, compute the plaintext as m = cd mod N .
Figure 1.2: The RSA encryption scheme
Setup Choose a group (G, ·) generated by g with prime order d.
Key generation Choose x R←− Zd and compute y ← gx,
set pk← (d, g, y) and sk← (d, g, x).
Encryption For a message m ∈ G, choose t R←− Zd,
compute c1 ← gt and c2 ← myt,
set the ciphertext to (c1, c2).
Decryption Given a ciphertext (c1, c2), compute the corresponding plaintext as m← c2c−x1 .
Figure 1.3: The El Gamal encryption scheme
The second famous encryption is due to El Gamal [El Gamal, 1985] and is depicted in Figure
1.3. It was invented in 1985, and it uses the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. El Gamal’s
encryption is OW-CPA if the problem, that consists in computing gxt from gx and gt, is difficult.
Moreover, it is IND-CPA if the problem consisting in distinguishing gxt, given gx and gt, from
random elements in G, is difficult. We will give in Subsection 1.3.2 a precise definition of these
problems.
Encryption with labels Encryption with labels was first introduced in [Shoup & Gennaro, 2002].
In these schemes, the encryption algorithm takes as input, in addition to the public key pk and
the message m intended to be encrypted, a label L which specifies information related to the
message m and its encryption context. Similarly, the decryption algorithm takes additionally to
the ciphertext and private key the label under which the ciphertext was created. Security notions
are then defined as usual except that the adversary specifies to his challenger the label to be used in
the challenge ciphertext, and in case he (the adversary) is allowed to query oracles, then he cannot
query them on the pair formed by the challenge ciphertext and the label used to form it.
1.2.3 Signatures
A signature scheme is given by the following three algorithms:
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Key generation (keygen). This is a probabilistic algorithm which returns random pairs of private
and public keys (sk, pk) according to the security parameter k.
Signature (sign). This is a probabilistic algorithm that takes on input a private key sk and a
plaintext m and returns a signature σ.
Verification (verify). This is a deterministic algorithm that takes on input a public key pk, a
signature σ and outputs 1 if the signature is valid and 0 otherwise. We require that if (sk, pk)
is a valid key pair derived from the algorithm keygen, then for all m, the following holds
verifypk (signsk(m), m) = 1.
Security notions for signature schemes
Similarly, a signature scheme must meet certain security goals which we list below:
1. Unbreakability (UBK): it is difficult to recover the signing key from the verification key.
2. Universal Unforgeability (UUF): it is difficult for a polynomial time attacker to obtain a valid
signature, without necessarily recovering the private key, on every message in the message
space.
3. Selective Unforgeability (SUF): it is difficult for a polynomial time attacker to produce a
valid signature on a message he committed to prior to knowing the public key.
4. Existential Unforgeability (EUF): no polynomial time adversary can come up with a valid
pair of message and corresponding signature.
It is obvious that existential unforgeability implies universal unforgeability which implies unbreak-
ability.
Moreover, the typical scenario attacks in signature schemes are:
1. Key Only Attack (KOA): the adversary has only access to the public key of the scheme, which
is unavoidable in the public key scenario.
2. Known Message Attack (KMA): the adversary has access to signatures for a set of known
messages that he committed to prior to knowing the public key of the scheme.
3. Chosen Message Attack (CMA): the adversary can use the signer as an oracle (full access),
and may request signatures on any message of his choice.
Remark 1.2. There exist two further attack scenarios which are weaker than the CMA attack,
namely the Directed Chosen Message Attack (DCMA) and the Single Occurrence Chosen-Message
Attack (SOCMA). In the first attack, the adversary chooses non-adaptively a set of messages {mi}i
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and is given the corresponding signatures {σi}i. Whereas in the second attack, the adversary has
full access to the signing oracle with the restriction of not querying more than once the same
message for signature.
Likewise, pairing the above security goals and the above scenario attacks results in twelve
security notions which we describe in Figure 1.4 along with the relations they satisfy. We will
provide in Subsection 1.3.1 the formal definitions of the security notions that we will need in this
thesis.
KOA KMA CMA
UBK
UUF
SUF
EUF
Figure 1.4: Relations among security notion for signature schemes
The RSA signature scheme
One popular signature scheme is the analogous of the RSA encryption scheme which was also
described in [Rivest et al., 1978]; we depict it in Figure 1.5. It is obvious that the RSA signature
is not existentially unforgeable since one can first choose a signature s ∈R ZN , then compute its
corresponding message as m = se mod N .
1.2.4 Commitment schemes
A commitment scheme [Brassard et al., 1988] consists of the following algorithms:
Setup (setup). This is the algorithm that, on input a certain security parameter k, generates the
public parameters of the system.
Key generation (keygen). This algorithm generates probabilistically a public commitment key
pk.
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Key generation Choose two equally-sized primes p, q and compute the modulus N = pq,
choose e R←− Z×φ(N), where φ is the Euler totient function,
compute d = e−1 mod φ(N),
set the public key pk to (e,N) and the private key sk to (d,N).
Signature The signature on a message m ∈ Z×N is computed as s = md mod N .
Verification For an alleged signature s on m, check whether m ?= se mod N .
Figure 1.5: The RSA signature
Commitment (commit). This is a probabilistic algorithm that, on input a public key pk and a
message m, produces a pair (c, r): c serves as the commitment value (locked box), and r as
the opening value.
Opening (open). This is a deterministic algorithm that given a pair (c, r) along with a public key
pk and an alleged message m, checks whether (c, r) ?= commitpk(m).
The algorithm open must succeed if the commitment was correctly formed (correctness). More-
over, we require the following security properties:
1. Hiding. It is hard for an adversary to generate two messages m0, m1 such that he can dis-
tinguish between their corresponding locked boxes c0, c1. That is, c reveals no information
about m. Actually, this notion can be formally described through the following random
experiment, for b R←− {0, 1}, where Ω = (keygen, commit, open) denotes a commitment
scheme with security parameter some κ ∈ N, and A denotes a PPTM.
Experiment Exphid−bΩ,A (κ)
pk← Ω.keygen(κ),
(m⋆0, m
⋆
1, I)← A(find, pk)
(c⋆, r⋆)← Ω.commitpk(m⋆b)
d← A(guess, I, c⋆)
Return d
We define the advantage of A via:
AdvhidΩ,A(κ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Exphid−bΩ,A (κ) = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Given t ∈ N and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε)-hiding adversary against Ω if, running in
time t, A has AdvhidΩ,A(κ) ≥ ε. The scheme Ω is said to be (t, ε)-hiding if no (t, ε)-hiding
adversary against it exists.
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Setup Choose a group (G, ·) generated by g with prime order d.
Key generation Choose y R←− G of unknown discrete logarithm w.r.t. g,
The public commitment key is y.
Commitment Compute the commitment (c, r) on a message m ∈ Zd such that
r
R←− Zd and c = grym.
Opening Given an alleged commitment (c, r) on a message m:
check whether c ?= grym.
Figure 1.6: Pedersen’s commitment scheme
2. Binding. It is hard for an adversary to come up with a collision (c, r, r′) such that (c, r) =
commitpk(m) and (c, r′) = commitpk(m′) where pk is a public commitment key, and m 6=
m′.
3. Injective. Given a message m, for any two pairs (c, r) and (c′, r′) produced using the commit
algorithm w.r.t. a public commitment key pk on m such that r 6= r′, we have c 6= c′.
We call a commitment scheme secure if it meets the previous properties.
It is not hard to note the similarity between public key encryption and commitment schemes.
In fact, one can check that indistinguishable encryption implies a secure commitment scheme. The
main difference between encryption and commitment is that the former requires the decryption
algorithm to be based on a “universal” secret key (independent of the message) whilst the latter
allows to decrypt with a “message-dependent” secret key, namely the opening value r of the mes-
sage in question. Another difference is that in encryption, the message is always derived from the
ciphertext. This is not always the case in commitments as shows the example depicted in Figure
1.6; it is easy to check that this commitment is correct. Moreover it is statistically hiding because
r is random in Zd and so is c = grym, regardless of m. Besides, the biding property is achieved
under the discrete logarithm assumption in G.
1.2.5 Hash functions
A hash function is used to distill a small amount of information out of large messages. Such
an action can ensure integrity of the data in question. In fact, suppose that one maintains a data
base in North America and its mirror image in Europe. In order to check that both data bases are
identical after for instance an update of both bases, one can compute a so-called message digest
or fingerprint of each data base using the hash function and compare the results; if the data bases
are identical then the resulting fingerprints will agree. The converse is not always true since we
are mapping a set of large messages to a smaller set of typically 160-bit length strings. However,
the event corresponding to having two different data bases mapping to the same fingerprint is very
unlikely if the hash function is properly chosen as we will show later in this subsection.
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In the rest of this subsection, Σ will denote the set {0, 1}, whereas n will denote a non-negative
integer and ℓ(l) an integer such that ℓ(n) > n. We would like also to note that most material
presented in this subsection comes from a course on the topic by Bart Preneel during the summer
school “crypt@b-it 2009”.
Formal definition
In the discussion above, we considered a fixed hash function, however in more practical situations,
it is useful to consider families of hash functions parameterized by keys.
Definition 1.1. A family of hash functions is a 4-tuple (D,R,K,H) such that:
1. D = Σℓ(n), is the set of possible messages, called also the domain of the hash functions
family,
2. R = Σn is the finite set of possible fingerprints, called also the range of the hash functions
family,
3. K is the finite set of possible keys,
4. H is the set of hash functions hk ∈ H , where k ∈ K and hk maps messages from D to R.
Security properties
The most important security properties required in a cryptographic hash function are:
One wayness. Let h be a function with domain D = Σℓ(n) and range R = Σn. h is one-way if it
meets the following conditions:
• Preimage resistance: let x be selected uniformly inD and letM be an adversary that on
the input h(x) outputs, in polynomial time, M(h(x)) ∈ D. For each such an adversary,
we require that:
Pr
x∈RD
[h(M(h(x))) = h(x)] < ǫ,
where the probability is taken over the input to M as well as on his random tosses, and
ǫ is a negligible function in the security parameter.
• Second preimage resistance: let x be selected uniformly at random from D and let M
be an adversary that on the input x ∈ D outputs, in polynomial time x′ ∈ D such that
x′ 6= x. For each such an adversary, we require that:
Pr
x∈RD
[h(M(h(x))) = h(x)] < ǫ,
where the probability is taken over the input to M as well as on his random tosses, and
ǫ is a negligible function in the security parameter.
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Collision resistance. Let (D,R,K,H) be a function family with domain D = Σℓ(n) and range
R = Σn. Let F be a collision string finder that on input k ∈ K outputs in polynomial time
either ? or a pair x, x′ ∈ D such that x 6= x′ and hk(x) = hk(x′). We require for each such
an F the following:
Pr
k∈RK
[F (H) 6= ”?”] < ǫ,
where the probability is taken over the random choices of F and of its input k ∈ K.
The work [Rogaway & Shrimpton, 2004] studies the relations (implications and separations) be-
tween these properties and further security notions known for hash functions.
Finally, we finish this list with a property required in many cryptographic applications, that is
the random oracle model, introduced by Bellare and Rogaway in [Bellare & Rogaway, 1996]. In
this model, a hash function h : D → R is chosen uniformly at random from the set of functions
from D to R. Moreover, h is not given by a formula or algorithm to compute its outputs. Thus, the
only way to compute the value h(x) of some x ∈ D is through a call to the function oracle. This
can be assimilated to looking up a huge codebook consisting of values in D and corresponding
values in R such that for each possible x ∈ D, there exists a completely random value h(x) ∈ R.
Constructions and issues
The design of cryptographic hash functions started with the iterated structure proposed by Damga˚rd
in [Damga˚rd, 1989]. The basic idea of this structure consisted in splitting the message to be
hashed into blocks of fixed length, and hashing them block by block with a compression function.
The idea was efficient and elegant and has inspired a growing study of the relations between the
compression function and the resulting hash function. Moreover, this structure was the origin
of two series of celebrated hash functions which are massively used in cryptography that are:
MDx (x=4,5) and SHA-y (y=0,1). In fact, the first series of iterated hash functions was due to
Rivest and appeared under the name MD4 in 1990, and was later replaced by MD5 due to some
weaknesses in the previous version. The next series is called SHA-y (Secure Hash Algorithm)
and was conceived by NIST in 1992 (SHA-0) and 1994 (SHA-1). Other constructions of hash
functions are based on block ciphers or on algebraic structures, for instance elliptic curves. The
advantage of such constructions resides in benefiting from the comprehensive study furnished by
their underlying structures, for instance in case of algebraic constructions, one can even come up
with formal security proofs, however these constructions remain slow compared to dedicated hash
functions.
The current state-of-the-art in hash functions is that all the practical proposals have been bro-
ken. Starting from MD4, this algorithm was first shown to have collisions in 1996 by Hans Dob-
bertin in [Dobbertin, 1996]. A more efficient collision attack was found by the Chinese team of
Wang in [Wang et al., 2005]. Generating collisions now in MD4 is as fast as verifying it. MD5
was similarly partially cryptanalyzed by Dobbertin in [Dobbertin, 1996] and later fully broken in
[Wang & Yu, 2005] by the same Chinese team. Besides, SHA-0 and SHA-1 had the same fate and
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were identified to have weaknesses which argue against keeping them in use. SHA-2 (a set of four
hash algorithms, namely SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512)was intact so far however
it is algorithmically close to SHA-1 which means that efforts are underway to break it. This has
motivated seeking a new hash standard SHA-3 which will be selected via an open competition
running between falls 2008 and 2012.
1.2.6 Pseudo random number generators (PRNGs)
Random numbers are of central importance in cryptography. This need manifests for instance
when setting up key pairs for cryptographic systems or in probabilistic encryption. Although
there seem to be many techniques to obtain random numbers, e.g. system clocks, key strokes
or mouse movements etc, most such techniques remain expensive compared to the amount of
randomness that needs to be extracted. An illustrative example (from a course on cryptography by
Joachim von zur Gathen) is that a 1 GHZ computer running uninterrupted for a year moves through
365 · 24 · 60 · 60 · 109 or 254.8 cycles, and thus can only provide 54 random bits (if we take these
cycles as random). These bits are certainly not enough for any reasonable protocol, for instance El
Gamal’s encryption which needs at least a thousand random bits.
To remediate to this problem, cryptographers invented the notion of pseudo random number
generators (PRNGs). A PRNG is a deterministic algorithm which inputs strings from a small set
X and outputs strings in a larger set Y . The idea consists in starting from a truly random string in
X , which would serve as a seed for the PRNG, and outputting a string in Y which is indistinguish-
able from a truly random string in Y . Note that a truly random string in a finite set S is a string
which has probability of occurrence 1
#S
. In Subsection 1.1.6, we discussed many notions of indis-
tinguishability ranging from perfect indistinguishability to computational indistinguishability. In
cryptography, as the protagonists are polynomial time algorithms, PRNGs thrive on computational
indistinguishability.
PRNGs are proven to exist under the assumption that one way functions exist, and there are
many constructions based on any one way function or permutation. We refer to [Goldreich, 2001,
Chapter 3] for more details. Finally, PRNGs are massively used in practice and there exists a good
number of efficient PRNGs which enjoy a strong security, for instance the Blum Blum Shub PRNG
[Blum et al., 1986] based on factoring.
1.3 Reductionist security
We are now able to start a quick browse through a branch of cryptography concerned with gaining
confidence on cryptographic schemes, namely reductionist security. In fact, assertions that a sys-
tem is secure because no one has broken it so far are no longer valid, since experience proved that
these systems are broken sooner than later. This is explained by the fact that usually the malicious
adversary’s view transcends the designer’s one. Hence, a new formalism was needed to procure
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trust in cryptographic schemes. The following steps have been adopted by designers in the last
decade to prove security of their systems:
1. Define clearly the security notion the system needs to meet, by combining the security goal
the system should attain and the adversarial power the attacker has access to.
2. Describe a well studied problem P upon which the security of the system will rest.
3. Provide a security reduction from the studied problem to breaking the scheme in question.
That is, provide a polynomial time algorithm R that solves the problem P given access to
an algorithm A breaking the security of the system in the sense defined in Step 1. Such a
security proof will guarantee the security of the system if the problem P is believed to be
hard.
Hence, with such a formalism, a system is secure because it captures a high level of security
in a strong adversarial model under the reasonable assumption that some well studied problem is
hard.
In the rest of this section, we will expand in this topic by defining formally the standard secu-
rity notions for signature and encryption schemes that will be used later in this thesis. Then, we
describe some celebrated assumed “hard” problems. We illustrate afterwards this notion with a
small example, and we finish by tackling some advanced topics like idealized proof methodologies
or meta-reductions. We wish to note that most material provided in this section comes from two
courses on the topic by Pascal Paillier and Marc Joye during the summer schools “crypt@bit 2007”
and “crypt@bit 2009” resp.
1.3.1 Notions of security
The standard security notion for digital signatures is the existential unforgeability under a chosen
message attack (EUF-CMA), introduced in [Goldwasser et al., 1988]. It is defined through a game
between a challenger R and an adversary A. During this game, A can obtain signatures on any
message of his choice, and at the end, he must output a valid pair message/signature where the
output message has not been queried before for signature. The signature scheme is said to be
existentially unforgeable if any such an adversary A has a negligible probability of success in the
aforementioned game.
Definition 1.2 (Existential Unforgeability - EUF-CMA). Let Σ = (keygen, sign, verify) be a digital
signature scheme, and let A be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiment, where κ
is a security parameter:
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Experiment Expeuf−cmaΣ,A (κ)
(pk, sk)← Σ.keygen(κ)
(m⋆, σ⋆)← AS(pk)
S : m 7−→ Σ.signsk(m)
return 1 if and only if the following properties are satisfied:
- Σ.verifypk[σ
⋆, m⋆] = {1}
- m was not queried to S
We define the success of A via:
Succeuf-cmaΣ,A (κ) = Pr
[
Expeuf-cmaΣ,A (κ) = 1
]
.
Given (t, qs) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is said to be a (t, ε, qs)-EUF-CMA adversary against the
scheme Σ if, running in time t and issuing qs signing queries, A has Succeuf-cmaΣ,A (κ) ≥ ε. The
scheme Σ is called (t, ε, qs)-EUF-CMA secure if no (t, ε, qs)-EUF-CMA adversary against it ex-
ists. Finally, we consider a digital signature scheme Σ with security parameter κ ∈ N; Σ(κ) is
said to be EUF-CMA secure if, for any polynomial functions t, qs : N→ N and any non-negligible
function ε : N→ [0, 1], it is (t(κ), ε(κ), qs(κ))-EUF-CMA secure.
Remark 1.3. (SEUF-CMA) In case A is allowed to output a message already queried to S, yet
not with a signature obtained from S, and still does not win the game, the scheme is called SEUF-
CMA secure (S stands for “strongly”).
In the rest of this subsection, we will define the notions for assymetric encryption that we will
encounter later in this thesis, namely NM-CPA, OW-CCA and IND-ATK, for ATK ∈ {CPA, PCA,-
CCA}.
The fist notion that we will present is called non-malleability under a chosen plaintext attack
(NM-CPA). It was introduced by Dolev, Dwork, and Naor in 1991 [Dolev et al., 1991], and is
defined similarly through a game between a challenger and an adversary A. During this game, A
can only encrypt messages of his choice (inevitable in public key cryptography), and at some point,
he outputs to his challenger a distribution D from which messages can be drawn. The challenger
picks a message m from D, encrypts it in c and hands it to A. A continues encrypting messages
of his choice, and at the end of the game outputs a binary relation R and a ciphertext c′. A wins
the game if the decryption of c′ is related to m via the relation R, and the encryption scheme is
proclaimed non-malleable if the success of A in this game is negligible.
Definition 1.3 (Non-Malleability - NM-CPA). Let Γ = (keygen, encrypt, decrypt) be a public key
encryption scheme, and let A be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiment, where κ
is a security parameter:
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Experiment Expnm−cpaΓ,A (κ)
(pk, sk)← Γ.keygen(κ)
D ← AE(pk)∣∣ E : m 7−→ Γ.encryptpk(m)
m
R←− D
c← Γ.encryptpk(m)
(c′, R)← AE(pk, c)
return (D,R, c, c′)
We define the success of A via:
Succ
nm-cpa
Γ,A (κ) = Pr[R(m,m
′)]− Pr[R(m⋆, m′)]
where Expnm-cpaΓ,A (κ) = (D,R, c, c′), m′ = Γ.decryptsk(c′) , and m⋆
R←− D.
Given t ∈ N and ε ∈ [0, 1],A is said to be a (t, ε)-NM-CPA adversary against Γ if, running in time
t, A has Succnm-cpaΓ,A (κ) ≥ ε. The scheme Γ is called (t, ε)-NM-CPA secure if no (t, ε)-NM-CPA
adversary against it exists. Finally, we consider an encryption scheme Γ with security parameter
κ ∈ N; Γ(κ) is said to be NM-CPA secure if, for any polynomial function t : N → N and any
non-negligible function ε : N→ [0, 1], it is (t(κ), ε(κ))-NM-CPA secure.
The next notion that we consider is called one wayness under a chosen ciphertext attack (OW-
CCA). One wayness is the oldest and most natural notion public key encryption should satisfy. It
was introduced in the seminal work of Diffie and Hellman in [Diffie & Hellman, 1976] to denote
the hardness of recovering plaintexts from their corresponding ciphertexts in a given encryption
scheme. One wayness under a chosen ciphertext attack refers to the hardness of inverting cipher-
texts even in presence of a decryption oracle the adversary can query for any ciphertext except of
course on the challenge.
Definition 1.4 (One Wayness - OW-CCA). Let Γ = (keygen, encrypt, decrypt) be a public key
encryption scheme with message space M, and let A be a PPTM. We consider the following
random experiment, where κ is a security parameter:
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Experiment Expow−ccaΓ,A (κ)
(pk, sk)← Γ.keygen(κ)
I ← AD(pk)∣∣ D : c 7−→ Γ.decryptsk(c)
m⋆
R←−M
c⋆ ← Γ.encryptpk(m⋆)
m˜← AD(pk, c⋆)∣∣ D : c ( 6= c⋆) 7−→ Γ.decryptsk(c)
return 1 if m˜ = m⋆
We define the success of A via:
Succow-ccaΓ,A (κ) = Pr
[
Expow-ccaΓ,A (κ) = 1
]
.
Given (t, qd) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1],A is called a (t, ε, qd)-OW-CCA adversary against Γ if, running
in time t and issuing qd decryption queries, A has Succow-ccaΓ,A (κ) ≥ ε. The scheme Γ is said
to be (t, ε, qd)-OW-CCA secure if no (t, ε, qd)-OW-CCA adversary against it exists. Finally, we
consider an encryption scheme Γ with security parameter κ ∈ N; Γ(κ) is said to be OW-CCA
secure if, for any polynomial functions t, qd : N → N and any non-negligible function ε : N →
[0, 1], it is (t(κ), ε(κ), qd(κ))-OW-CCA secure.
The last security notion we consider for public key encryption is called indistinguishability or
sematic security. It was introduced by Goldwasser and Micali in [Goldwasser & Micali, 1984]
and informally denotes the hardness of distinguishing ciphertexts based on their underlying mes-
sages. The formal definition of this notion is again through a game between an adversary A and a
challenger. The game runs in three phases; in the first phase, A has access to the oracles allowed
by the given attack model, and eventually outputs two messages m⋆0, m⋆1 from the message space
considered by the given encryption scheme. In the second or challenge phase, the challenger picks
uniformly at random one of the messages, encrypts it and gives the result toA. In the last phase,A
continues querying the oracles he had access to in the first phase, which now reject queries made
w.r.t. the challenge ciphertext. At the end of the last phase, A outputs his guess for the message
underlying the challenge, and is considered successful if the guess is correct.
Definition 1.5 (Indistinguishability - IND-ATK). Let Γ = (keygen, encrypt, decrypt) be a public
key encryption scheme with message space M, and let A be a PPTM. We consider the following
random experiment, for b R←− {0, 1}, where κ is a security parameter:
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Experiment Expind-atk−bΓ,A (κ)
(pk, sk)← Γ.keygen(κ),
(m⋆0, m
⋆
1, I)← AO(find, pk)∣∣∣∣∣∣
if atk = cpa then O = empty
if atk = pca then O : (m, c) 7−→ m ?= Γ.decryptsk(c)
if atk = cca then O : c 7−→ Γ.decryptsk(c)
c⋆ ← Γ.encryptpk(m⋆b)
d← AO(guess, I, c⋆)∣∣∣∣∣∣
if atk = cpa then O = empty
if atk = pca then O : (m, c)( 6= (m⋆i , c⋆), i = 0, 1) 7−→ m ?= Γ.decryptsk(c)
if atk = cca then O : c( 6= c⋆) 7−→ Γ.decryptsk(c)
Return d
We define the advantage of A via:
Advind−atkΓ,A (κ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expind−atk−bΓ,A (κ) = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Given (t, q) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε, q)-IND-ATK adversary against Γ if,
running in time t and issuing q queries (to the allowed oracle), A has Advind−atkΓ,A (κ) ≥ ε. The
scheme Γ is said to be (t, ε, q)-IND-ATK secure if no (t, ε, q)-IND-ATK adversary against it exists.
Finally, we consider an encryption scheme Γ with security parameter κ ∈ N; Γ(κ) is said to be
IND-ATK secure if, for any polynomial functions t, q : N → N and any non-negligible function
ε : N→ [0, 1], it is (t(κ), ε(κ), q(κ))-IND-ATK secure.
1.3.2 More hard problems
In Subsection 1.2.2, we presented two encryption schemes, namely RSA [Rivest et al., 1978]
and El Gamal [El Gamal, 1985] that are OW-CPA secure if some problems, that are easier than
factoring and discrete logarithm respectively, are difficult. In this paragraph, we give a formal
description of both problems as well as some of their variants.
RSA-like problems
Definition 1.6. The RSA Problem [Rivest et al., 1978]. Let N be a product of two equally sized
primes p and q (p and q are κ-bit integers). Let further y be an integer in Z×N and e > 1 be an
integer co-prime with φ(N). The task of an RSA adversaryA is to compute the unique integer x in
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Z×N such that xe = y mod N . The advantage of such an adversary is defined by:
Adv(A) = Pr

(p, q, N, e)← keygen(1κ),
y
R←− Z×N ,
x
τ operations←−−−−−−− A(N, e, y),
xe = y mod N.

where the probability is taken over the random generation of the RSA instance as well as on all the
random choices of the RSA adversary.
Finally, we say that the RSA assumption holds if we have the following implication:
τ = poly(κ)⇒ Adv(A) = negl(κ).
Definition 1.7. The Flexible RSA Problem [Baric´ & Pfitzmann, 1997]. Let N be a product of
two equally sized safe primes, i.e. primes of the form 2p+ 1, where p is itself a prime. Let further
y denote an integer in Z×N . The task of a Flexible RSA adversary A is to output an integer x ∈ Z×N
and an integer e > 1 such that xe = y mod N . The advantage of such an adversary is defined by:
Adv(A) = Pr

(p′, q′, N)← keygen(1κ),
y
R←− Z×N ,
(x, e)
τ operations←−−−−−−− A(N, y),
xe = y mod N ∧ (x, e) 6= (y, 1).

where the probability is taken over the random generation of the Flexible RSA instance as well as
on all the random choices of A.
Finally, we say that the Strong RSA (SRSA) assumption holds if:
τ = poly(κ)⇒ Adv(A) = negl(κ).
It is easy to see that the RSA problem and its flexible variant are easier than factoring. The
reverse is still unclear. Actually, the only results we have about the relation between RSA and
factoring are the work [Boneh & Venkatesan, 1998] on the impossibility of reducing algebraically
factoring to RSA, and the recent proof by Aggarwal and Maurer in [Aggarwal & Maurer, 2009] of
the equivalence between factoring and RSA with respect to general ring algorithms.
Diffie-Hellman-like problems
In Subsection 1.2.2, we briefly mentioned that the El Gamal encryption scheme meets different
levels of security under the hardness of different problems. We give in the present paragraph a
formal description of these problems.
Let (G = 〈g〉, ·) be a multiplicative group of order d, generated by g.
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Definition 1.8. The Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH). The input to this problem
consists ofA = ga and B = gb, where a, b are chosen uniformly at random from Zd. The adversary
A is then requested to compute a C such that C = gab. The advantage of such an adversary is
given by:
Adv(A) = Pr

(G, d, g)← keygen(1κ),
(a, b)
R←− Z×d ,
gab
τ operations←−−−−−−− A(ga, gb).

where the probability is taken over the generation of the CDH instance as well as on the random
choices of A.
Similarly, we say that the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption holds if:
τ = poly(κ)⇒ Adv(A) = negl(κ).
Definition 1.9. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH). The input to this problem con-
sists of A = ga, B = gb, and C = gc, where a, b are chosen uniformly at random from Zd and c is
either ab mod d or a random element in Zd. The polynomial time adversary A is then requested
to decide whether c = ab mod d or not. Let b be the output of such an adversary, we define its
advantage as:
Adv(A) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr

(G, d, g)← keygen(1κ),
(a, b)
R←− Z×d ,
b
R←− {0, 1}
if b = 1 then c← ab mod d else c R←− Z×d ,
d
τ operations←−−−−−−− A(ga, gb, gc),
b = d.

− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where the probability is taken over the generation of the DDH instance and on the random choices
of A.
Similarly, we say that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds if:
τ = poly(κ)⇒ Adv(A) = negl(κ).
Definition 1.10. The Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem (GDH). The input and output of this problem
are similar to those of the CDH problem, with the exception of supporting the adversary A with a
DDH oracle that he can query on any DDH instance of his choice.
Adv(A) = Pr

(G, d, g)← keygen(1κ),
(a, b)
R←− Z×d ,
gab
τ operations←−−−−−−− ADDH(ga, gb).

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Key generation Select two primes p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1, where p′ and q′ are primes,
compute the safe RSA modulus N = pq,
select a random s ∈R Z×N ,
consider a collision-resistant hash function Ψ : {0, 1}ℓ → Primes ≥ 3 (ℓ ≈ 30),
set the public key pk to (N, s) and the private key to (p, q).
Signature A signature on a message m ∈ {0, 1}ℓ is computed as σ = s1/Ψ(m) mod N .
Verification For an alleged signature σ on m, check whether σΨ(m) ?= s mod N .
Figure 1.7: The GHR signature
where DDH : (ga, gb, gc) 7−→ c ?= ab mod d, and the probability is taken over the generation of
the GDH instance and on the random choices of A.
Similarly, we say that the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption holds if:
τ = poly(κ)⇒ Adv(A) = negl(κ).
Remark 1.4. The CDH, DDH, and GDH problems are random-self reducible, i.e. one can gen-
erate from a specific instance a random one. Thus, the average case and worst case of all these
problems are equivalent.
Remark 1.5. The CDH problem is obviously harder than the DDH and GDH problems. There is
actually a clear separation between the CDH and the DDH problems in some groups which we
will see in Section 1.5.
We are now able to state that the El Gamal encryption scheme is:
1. OW-CPA secure if the CDH problem is hard, i.e. the CDH assumption holds.
2. IND-CPA secure if the DDH problem is hard, i.e. the DDH assumption holds.
3. OW-PCA secure if the GDH problem is hard, i.e. the GDH assumption holds.
1.3.3 Example: The GHR [Gennaro et al., 1999] signature scheme
We illustrate the principle of reductionist or provable security by one of the simplest security
reductions known in the literature: the security proof of the GHR [Gennaro et al., 1999] signature
scheme.
Theorem 1.1. The GHR signature, depicted in Figure 1.7, is EUF-CMA secure if the SRSA as-
sumption holds.
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Proof. Let R be the Flexible RSA adversary. R is given the Flexible RSA instance, say (N, y),
in addition to an EUF-CMA attacker A, and is requested to come up with a pair (x, e) such that
e > 1 and xe = y mod N . R needs to generate properly the parameters of the GHR scheme for A
in order to be able to answer the signature queries A may request. Thus, R should feed A with a
key pk = (N, s) such that s allowsR to easily extract Ψ(mi)-th roots of s, where mi correspond to
the messages queried by A for signature. At the same time, s should be cleverly chosen such that
it allows exploitation of the existential forgery output by A to solve the Flexible RSA instance.
R will then behave as follows:
Key generation.
• Choose uniformly at random i R←− [[1, 2ℓ]].
• For each mj ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, compute Ψ(mj) and set E =
∏
j 6=iΨ(mj).
• Set s = yE mod N and set the GHR public key to (N, s).
Since the provenance of (N, y) is the Flexible RSA instance, thus external to A, and the function
f : y 7→ yE is one-to-one (E is coprime to Φ(N)), then (N, s = yE) is perfectly indistinguishable
from a random GHR public key.
Signatures simulation. We distinguish two types of messages mj A can request for signature:
• either j 6= i, in this case R answers with yE/Ψ(mj),
• or j = i in which case R will abort the experiment.
The difference between the simulation provided above and the real execution of the GHR signing
algorithm is when A requests mi for a signature. Since i is chosen uniformly at random from
[[1, 2ℓ]], then the probability that mi does not belong to the set of queried messages {mi1 , . . . , miq}
is 2ℓ−q
2ℓ
= 1− q
2ℓ
.
Exploitation of A’s forgery. At some point, A outputs his forgery σ on m /∈ {mi1 , . . . , miq},
where {mi1 , . . . , miq} is the set of messages queried by A. Assume that m = mi, then the forgery
satisfies the following equation:
σΨ(mi) = s = yE mod N.
Since E is a product of primes different from the prime Ψ(mi), thenR can compute integers a
and b such that a ·Ψ(mi) + b · E = 1. Hence the following holds:
y = yaΨ(mi) · ybE = yaΨ(mi)σbΨ(mi) = (yaσb)Ψ(mi) .
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R will then output to his challenger the pair (x = yaσb, e = Ψ(mi)). R solves his RSA
challenge ifA produces a forgery on the messagemi. This event occurs with probability 1/(2ℓ−q).
Now, if ǫA is the advantage of the attacker A, then the advantage ǫR of R can be computed as:
ǫR = ǫA · 2
ℓ − q
2ℓ
· 1
2ℓ − q =
ǫA
2ℓ
.
Remark 1.6. The factor 2ℓ is called the reduction loss. A tight security reduction is characterized
by a small reduction loss. The importance of this factor manifests when we consider concrete
security instead of asymptotic security. In fact, asymptotic security guarantees only that a scheme
is asymptotically secure, i.e. all attacks vanish asymptotically if the reduction loss is polynomial in
the security parameter and the underlying problem is believed to be asymptotically hard. Concrete
security helps to tune the security parameter so that the scheme has a desired concrete security.
For example, if the modulus needs to be at least of size 1024 so that the advantage of the Flexible
RSA attacker is at most ǫ = 2−80, then with the above reduction, the advantage of the GHR attacker
is only smaller than ǫA = 2−80+ℓ = 2−50. To have a GHR security about 2−80, one has to increase
the size of the modulus.
Remark 1.7. There exists a long-message variant of the GHR signature scheme which is proven
EUF-CMA secure under the SRSA assumption with a security loss about q, where q is the number
of allowed queries. This proof, provided in [Coron, 2002], is shown to be optimal, i.e. there exists
no tighter reduction from the Flexible RSA problem to EUF-CMA breaking this variant of GHR.
1.3.4 Ideal proof models
In Subsection 1.3.3, we provided a security reduction from the Flexible RSA problem to EUF-
CMA breaking the GHR signature scheme without making any assumptions on the ingredients of
the scheme (group Z×N , the hash function Ψ, etc...); we say that the provided security reduction
stands in the standard model. Such proofs are usually difficult to obtain even when the design is
extremely simple, e.g. RSA-FDH [Bellare & Rogaway, 1996]. This explains why cryptographers
resort to idealizing some components of the scheme in question and providing a security proof
from the presumed hard problem to breaking the scheme with respect to a generic adversary, i.e.
an adversary accessing the idealized object through an oracle. Such proofs do not provide any
insights about the real security of the scheme in the standard model as there exist many designs
that are proven secure in idealized settings but insecure in the standard model. However, they
provide strong evidence that the scheme in question is secure provided the underlying problem is
hard or the adversary does not exploit special properties of the idealized setting.
The popular idealized settings in cryptography are:
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The random oracle model (ROM). This is a mathematical abstraction used to model a random
hash function. It consists of a theoretical black box that responds to every query with a
uniformly chosen random string from the output domain, with the exception of giving the
same answer to the same query. A way of simulating the random oracle can be achieved
by picking a random element y from the given range for every query x, and storing the pair
(x, y) in a history list Hist so that if the same query x is solicited, the reply would be y.
Random oracles proved useful in cryptography and they were first considered by Fiat and
Shamir in [Fiat & Shamir, 1986] to remove interaction from 3-round public-coin identifi-
cation schemes. Later, they were used by Bellare and Rogaway in [Bellare & Rogaway,
1993] to provide generic constructions of encryption and signature schemes. As previously
mentioned, there are schemes that are proven secure in the ROM but insecure in the stan-
dard model. We note for instance the result of Goldwasser and Tauman Kalai [Goldwasser
& Tauman Kalai, 2003] that exhibit secure 3-round public-coin identification schemes for
which the transformation of Fiat and Shamir in [Fiat & Shamir, 1986] yields insecure digital
signature schemes for any hash function used in the transformation. This contrasts the work
of Pointcheval and Stern [Pointcheval & Stern, 2000] which proved that the Fiat-Shamir
methodology always produces EUF-CMA secure digital signatures in the ROM. The result
in [Goldwasser & Tauman Kalai, 2003] is strengthened by the work of Paillier and Vergnaud
[Paillier & Vergnaud, 2005] which show that some signatures from the Fiat-Shamir paradigm
cannot even be UUF-KOA secure in the standard model. Finally, we finish this paragraph by
citing a recent positive result about ROM, namely an implementation of a hash function into
elliptic curves which is indifferentiable from a random oracle. We refer to [Coron & Icart,
2009] for further details.
The generic group model. A generic model of a group was first introduced by Nechaev [Nechaev,
1994]. Shoup [Shoup, 1997] later improved these results and applied this model to cryptog-
raphy. In this model, one assumes that operations in a group can be performed only by
means of an oracle. More specifically, suppose that G is an (additive) group of prime order
q. Then G is isomorphic to the additive group Zq and for any non-identity element P ∈ G,
one can construct an efficient isomorphism sending i ∈ Zq to iP , using some version of the
repeated squaring algorithm to perform the scalar multiplication in polynomial time. In a
generic group, one assumes that instead of having explicit formulas for the group element
iP , we rather have an “encoding” σ(i) ∈ S ⊂ {0, 1}∗ that represents the element iP . A
generic algorithmA will then consult the oracle for two types of queries:
1. Given an integer i ∈ Zq , A requests the encoding of iP : the oracle will then select
randomly a value σ(i), to represent the element iP , from the given set of bit strings.
2. Given two encodings σ(i) and σ(j), A requests (without knowing necessarily i and j)
the encoding of σ(i± j). Again the oracle responds with a randomly chosen bit-string.
The only condition on the oracle responses is that if the same group element is queried a
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second time, the same corresponding encoding must be returned.
One of the important results of this model is the analysis of complexity assumptions in group-
based cryptography. For instance, Shoup gave in [Shoup, 1997] lower bounds for solving
the discrete logarithm problem and some other related problems. Finally, a security proof
in this model assures the absence of an adversary who behaves generically with respect to
the given group. However, it does not rule out the existence of a successful adversary for a
specific group [Dent, 2002; Stern et al., 2002].
The ideal cipher model. It consists in considering a block cipher as a random permutation. A
random permutation E takes a pair (k, x) and returns y = E(k, x) which is random in the
considered range. Of course x = E−1(k, y). To simulate such a permutation, one proceeds
as follows. For any new pair (k, x), pick y at random from the output domain such that
(k, x, y) /∈ Hist[E], set E(k, x) = y and return y, and finally update the history Hist[E] with
the record (k, x, y). Such a simulation looks similar to the random oracle model simulation.
In fact, equivalence between the ROM and the ideal cipher was left as an open problem
until recently where Coron et al. [Coron et al., 2005] showed that security in the ROM
implies security in the ideal cipher model; namely they showed that a random oracle can
be replaced by a block cipher-based construction, and the resulting scheme remains secure
in the ideal cipher model. The other direction was solved three years later in [Coron et al.,
2008], however recent works regard the paper in question as incorrect.
1.3.5 Meta-reductions
Meta-reductions are probabilistic oracle (single or multi-oracle) Turing machines, where one or-
acle tape consists of an efficient reduction from some problem to another. Meta-reductions have
been successfully used in a number of important cryptographic results, e.g. the result in [Boneh
& Venkatesan, 1998] which proves the impossibility of reducing algebraically factoring to RSA,
or the results in [Paillier & Vergnaud, 2005; Paillier, 2007] which show that some well known
signatures, which are proven secure in the random oracle, cannot conserve the same security in the
standard model. Although most meta-reductions (used in cryptography) apply only to a category of
reductions, e.g. key preserving reductions [Paillier & Villar, 2006; Paillier, 2007] or algebraic re-
ductions [Boneh & Venkatesan, 1998; Paillier & Vergnaud, 2005], they constitute an efficient tool
to separate cryptographic problems ([Boneh & Venkatesan, 1998]) or to disprove that the security
of some cryptographic scheme rests on the hardness of some problem.
Figure 1.8 depicts the typical use of a meta-reduction in disproving that a given problem P
reduces to breaking a given signature scheme Σ. Actually, let R be an algorithm that solves an
instance of the problem P , using an attacker A against the signature scheme. Naturally, R needs
to simulate to A the key generation, the signature, and the verification algorithms of Σ. If one can
build an efficient algorithm M that uses R to solve an instance of the same problem P (note that
such an algorithm needs to simulate toR the adversaryA), then one can conclude the impossibility
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Figure 1.8: Example of a Meta-Reduction
of the existence ofR. In fact, existence ofM indicates that under the hardness of P , the algorithm
R does not exist; otherwise, if P is easy, then R might exist, however its work is useless (solving
a problem known to be easy).
1.3.6 Trends in reductionist security
Far from pretending to be exhaustive, this paragraph is confined to shed light on some of the
important trends in reductionist security.
Alleviation/removal of idealized models. As previously mentioned, separation results between
the standard model and idealized models become more and more popular in cryptography.
An interpretation to this is that proofs in these idealized models leave unfair advantage to
proofs in the standard model as they modify the adversary’s computations in a way that
cannot be justified in practice. Thus the need for schemes provably secure in the standard
model. There is quite a good number of signature/encryption schemes that are secure in the
standard model, however the underlying assumptions are either strong, e.g. [Gennaro et al.,
1999; Cramer & Shoup, 2000] or the security reduction is very loose, e.g. [Waters, 2005;
Hofheinz & Kiltz, 2009] or the scheme is very inefficient [Hohenberger & Waters, 2009].
Convergence of complexity assumptions. Since the introduction of modern cryptography, many
complexity assumptions emerged, most of them were shoveled up from number theory. To
name but a few, factoring, RSA, SRSA, discrete logarithm, CDH, DDH, GDH, and many
more. A considerable effort in provable security was deployed to study the relation between
these assumptions [Maurer & Wolf, 1998; Shoup, 1997; Aggarwal & Maurer, 2009].
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Impossibility/optimality proofs. One important issue in security proofs is to spot weaknesses
in a design when it fails to exhibit a real attack. In this sense, impossibility proofs aim at
showing that a security level cannot be attained by a scheme which suffers some inherent
flaws, e.g. [Paillier & Vergnaud, 2005; Paillier & Villar, 2006; Paillier, 2007]. Additionally,
optimality proofs, i.e. proofs showing a security reduction to be optimal, gained a lot of
popularity in cryptography as the reduction tightness represents an important measure for
the concrete security met by a scheme, e.g. [Coron, 2002].
Automatic verification/generation of proofs. Motivated by the tools at the disposal of logicians
to verify proofs, e.g. pvs or coq, cryptographers started to check the possibility of auto-
matically verifying and even generating security proofs for their schemes. However, this
area remains still unexplored since the only work in this direction is due to Blanchet and
Pointcheval [Blanchet & Pointcheval, 2006].
Physical security. So far, the considered security notions defined for cryptographic schemes
assume only a black box access of the adversary against the scheme to the allowed oracles.
This is not very realistic since the adversary might observe the energy consumed by the
device while performing the computations, he might also inject faults in these computations.
This triggered the crypto community to take into consideration this potential gray box access
to the oracles in question, and define new security notions accordingly. The state-of-the art
in this area is still very modest (see for instance [Goldwasser, 2009] for a survey).
1.4 Zero knowledge (ZK)
A basic problem in cryptography consists of a two-party game where one party tries to prove to
the distrustful other party that a statement holds true, without revealing more information other
than the validity of the statement in question. We illustrate this situation with the example from
[Goldreich, 2001]: suppose that all users in a system keep encrypted backups (using their public
keys) of their entire file system in a publicly accessible storage medium. Suppose that at some
point, a user Alice wishes to reveal to another user Bob the content of one of her files. One trivial
solution consists in decrypting the file in question (using her own private key) and sending it to
Bob. The problem with this solution lies in the inability of Bob to check whether the revealed
information is really the decryption of the public record. Alice can circumvent the problem by
disclosing her private key to Bob, however this will give the latter the possibility of getting hold of
her entire file system, which is certainly not desired by Alice.
Such a problem has motivated cryptographers to invent a mechanism allowing Alice to conduct
a proof with Bob such that at the end of this proof:
1. Alice is ensured that Bob will not gain any information other than the validity of the state-
ment she tried to prove. Moreover, Bob cannot convince a third party with the validity of the
statement in question.
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2. Bob accepts the proof only if the statement holds true with a high probability, that is, Alice
cannot convince Bob with the validity of an invalid statement.
In this section, we will recall such a mechanism, called zero knowledge proofs of knowledge
(ZKPoK). We will first establish the model of computation, namely the model of an interactive
proof system, then define the different notions related to this mechanism and that are relevant for
the thesis.
1.4.1 Interactive proofs
A model of computation of an interactive proof system was first introduced by Goldwasser, Micali
and Rackoff [Goldwasser et al., 1989]. It informally consists of a prover P trying to convince
a verifier V that an instance x belongs to a language L. x refers to the common input whereas
(P, V )(x) denotes the proof instance carried between P and V at the end of which V is (not)
convinced with the membership of the alleged instance x to L:
(P, V )(x) ∈ {Accept,Reject}
P is modeled by a probabilistic Turing machine whereas V is modeled by a polynomial proba-
bilistic Turing machine. During (P, V )(x), the parties exchange a sequence of messages called the
proof transcript. These messages sizes are polynomial in the size of x. Moreover, (P, V )(x) must
terminate in time polynomial in the size of x. The output value (P, V )(x) is a random variable of
the common input x, the private input of P and the random coins of both P and V (both P and
V are probabilistic Turing machines). We naturally want to have (P, V )(x) = Accept with high
probability for all positive instances (x ∈ L), and with small probability for all negative instances
(x /∈ L). This translates into the following definition (from [Mao, 2008]):
Definition 1.11. Let L be a language over a given alphabet. We say that a protocol (P, V ) is an
interactive proof (IP) system for L if:
Pr [(P, V )(x) = Accept| x ∈ L] ≥ ǫ, (1.1)
and
Pr
[
(P˜ , V )(x) = Accept| x /∈ L
]
≤ δ (1.2)
for every probabilistic Turing machine P˜ , where ǫ and δ are constants satisfying
ǫ ∈ (1
2
, 1], δ ∈ [0, 1
2
),
where the probability is over all the common input values to (P, V ) and all random input values of
P , P˜ , and V .
Equation 1.1 characterizes the completeness notion for an IP protocol, whereas Equation 1.2
characterizes the soundness notion which captures the inability of a cheating prover P to convince
the verifier V with an invalid statement.
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1.4.2 Zero knowledge interactive proofs (ZKIPs)
In the previous subsection, we exhibited a proof mechanism capable of convincing the verifier
with the validity of a valid statement. However, we did not address the question of the additional
knowledge the verifier will gain aside from the validity of the statement in question. Ideally, we
would like this additional knowledge to be zero, thus the name zero knowledge. We define formally
this notion as follows (from [Mao, 2008]):
Definition 1.12. Let (P, V ) be an interactive proof system for some language L. We say that
(P, V ) is zero knowledge if for every x ∈ L, the proof transcript (P, V )(x) can be produced
by a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm (in the size of the input) S with indistinguishable
probability distributions:
• if the probability distributions of (P, V )(x) and S(x) are the same, then the protocol (P, V )
is said to be perfectly zero-knowledge.
• if the probability distributions of (P, V )(x) and S(x) are statistically indistinguishable, then
(P, V ) is called a statistical zero knowledge protocol,
• finally, if the distributions of (P, V )(x) and S(x) are computationally indistinguishable, then
(P, V ) provides only computational zero-knowledgeness.
Conventionally, the algorithm S is named a simulator for the ZK protocol since it provides a
simulation of the proof transcript. However, in case of perfect ZK protocols, S is called often the
equator as it provides a perfect simulation.
Remark 1.8 (Honest-verifier zero knowledge (HVZK)). A protocol (P, V ) is said to provide only
an honest-verifier zero knowledgeness if it is zero knowledge (perfect, statistical or computational)
only when the verifier follows honestly the protocol instructions. It may well leak knowledge in
the presence of a malicious verifier who does not behave as prescribed. However, it can be shown
that every honest-verifier statistical (computational) ZK can be turned efficiently into a statistical
(computational) ZK protocol [Goldreich et al., 1998].
Remark 1.9 (Simulatability of ZKIP). According to the above definition, a ZKIP assumes the
existence of an efficient algorithm capable of producing transcripts indistinguishable from those
obtained from the interaction with the real prover. For instance, this simulator is not required to
interact with the verifier. However, most ZK (and not only HVZK) proofs in the literature have sim-
ulators which interact with the verifier; the idea consists in rewinding the verifier until he produces
an output that agrees with what the simulator generated beforehand. The example provided later
in this section illustrates such a technique which works fine as long as the universe from which the
verifier chooses his outputs is polynomially bounded (in the security parameter).
Finally, throughout this thesis, when we refer to the simulatability of a ZKIP, we mean the
existence of a simulator which interacts with the verifier and produces transcripts that are indis-
tinguishable from those obtained from the interaction with the real prover.
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A complexity theoretic result: NP (co-NP) ⊂ ZK
An important result in complexity theory shows that every language in NP accepts a zero knowl-
edge proof system. This result has been proven in a constructive manner by first constructing a
ZK proof system (P, V ) for an NP-complete problem L, e.g. Graph 3-colorability by Goldreich,
Micali and Wigderson in [Goldreich et al., 1991] or boolean satisfiability by Brassard, Chaum and
Cre´peau [Brassard et al., 1988], then propagating this property to the other languages L′ in NP as
follows:
1. each party computes x = f(x′), an instance of the NP-complete language L. It is worth
noting that f can by definition be computed and inverted efficiently.
2. P conducts a ZK proof with V to prove that x ∈ L.
It is obvious that the above construction of a ZK proof system for any language in NP constitutes
only a theoretic result. In fact, a practical ZK protocol should have the number of interactions
between P and V bounded by a linear function in the security parameter. This cannot be achieved
by the above construction since we do not know any linear transformation (reduction) of an NP
language to an NP-complete one.
Finally, proving that co-NP languages accept also ZK proof systems is done in a more general
frame; the above result concerning NP is extended to the class of interactive protocols, namely the
class IP, and it is known that this class equals the class PSPACE which contains the class co-NP.
1.4.3 Example of a ZKIP: Schnorr’s [Schnorr, 1991] identification protocol
The Schnorr identification protocol was proposed by Schnorr in [Schnorr, 1991] for a real-world
(smart card-based) application. This protocol operates in a cyclic group (G, ·) of prime order d
which is generated by some element g. The common input of the prover P and verifier V is an
element y of unknown discrete logarithm in base g, and the private input of the prover is this very
discrete logarithm, say x. That is, P proves to V that he knows x. This protocol is depicted in
Figure 1.9. Note that ℓ is a parameter that will be tuned later in the analysis.
Completeness. The completeness of the protocol is trivially achieved with probability ǫ = 1.
Soundness. Suppose that the cheating prover P˜ is able to successfully carry out the above proto-
col without knowing x. That is, P˜ , after having committed to a t, is able to answer the challenge
c with a response r satisfying gr = tyc. Note that, for a fixed t, the last equation corresponds
each challenge c to a unique response r. Thus, provided the discrete logarithm problem is hard in
G, P˜ needs to guess c correctly beforehand in order to provide an accepting answer; P˜ will first
choose r R←− Zd, then computes t = gry−c and sends it as a commitment in the first step of the
protocol. In this way, when P˜ receives the correctly guessed c, he will simply answer with r. This
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Prover P Verifier V
Choose k R←− Zd
Compute t = gk t−−−−−−−−−−→
c←−−−−−−−−−− Choose c R←− {0, 1}ℓ(c ∈ N)
r = k + cx mod d−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify that gr = tyc
Figure 1.9: Proof system for {ga : a ∈ Zd} Common input: (y, g) and Private input: x : y = gx
results in a soundness error equal to 2−ℓ, which corresponds to the probability of correctly guess-
ing the challenge c. As a consequence, the higher the parameter ℓ, the better for the soundness of
the protocol. However, we will see in the next paragraph that we cannot increase this parameter
indefinitely since this would compromise the zero knowledgeness of the protocol.
Zero knowledge. For this property, we change sides. We want now to prohibit the verifier from
learning anything from the prover apart from the validity of the membership of y to L. For this,
we provide the following simulator:
1. Generate uniformly a random challenge c′ R←− {0, 1}ℓ. Choose a random r R←− Zd, compute
t = gry−c
′
, then sends it to the verifier.
2. Get c from the verifier.
3. If c = c′, the simulator sends back r. Otherwise, it goes to Step 2 (rewinds the verifier).
Let us now analyze the adequacy of this simulator. The prover’s first message in the protocol is a
random value t in G, and so is the simulator’s. Moreover, the distributions of the responses of the
prover and of the simulator resp. are again identical. Finally, we observe that the simulator runs in
expected time 2ℓ since the probability of not rewinding the verifier is:
Pr[c = c′] =
∑
ci∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr[c = ci, c
′ = ci]
=
∑
ci∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr[c = ci] Pr[c
′ = ci]
= 2−ℓ
∑
ci∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr[c = ci]
= 2−ℓ
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Adjusting ℓ to a factor logarithmic in the security parameter ensures that the simulator will run
in expected polynomial time.
1.4.4 More on zero knowledge
Since zero knowledge was invented in the mid-eighties, the literature about it was so abundant that
it exceeded 400 publications. In this subsection, we will concentrate on the aspects of this notion
that are relevant for this thesis.
Further definitions (Σ protocols)
A public-coin protocol is a protocol in which the verifier chooses all its messages randomly from
publicly known sets. A three-move protocol can be written in a canonical form in which the
messages sent in the three moves are often called commitment, challenge, and response. The
protocol is said to have the honest-verifier zero-knowledge property (HVZK) if there exists an
algorithm that is able, provided the verifier behaves as prescribed by the protocol, to produce,
without the knowledge of the secret, transcripts that are indistinguishable from those of the real
protocol. The protocol is said to have the special soundness property (SSp) if there exists an
algorithm that is able to extract the secret from two accepting transcripts of the protocol with the
same commitment and different challenges. Finally, a three-move public-coin protocol with both
the HVZK and SSp properties is called a Σ protocol.
Round efficiency
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the soundness error in Schnorr’s identification protocol
amounts to 2−ℓ, where ℓ is a factor logarithmic in the security parameter log d. In order to reduce
this error probability to a negligibly small quantity, i.e. a quantity smaller than 1/log dc for all
constants c, we can repeat the protocol log d many times. Such a protocol is then called a log-
round protocol which is characterized by a number of rounds linear in the security parameter.
There exists also the category of protocols which need to be repeated a polynomial factor (in
the security parameter log d) of rounds. We talk then about poly-round protocols. Examples of
these protocols are for instance those proving the validity of a general NP statement via a general
polynomial reduction to a NP-complete problem.
Sequential vs concurrent zero knowledge
We addressed in the previous paragraph the possibility of repeating many times a proof of knowl-
edge in order to reduce its soundness error. This repetition can be sequential or in parallel. The
natural question to ask is whether the zero knowledge feature is preserved or not. The good news
is that zero knowledge is closed under sequential repetition of the protocol (see [Goldreich, 2001,
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Chapter 4, Paragraph 4.3.4] for the proof), which means that we can indefinitely reduce the sound-
ness error of a protocol without compromising its zero knowledgeness. Parallel composition is
not however guaranteed to preserve zero knowledge. Less is the concurrent composition which
generalizes both sequential and parallel composition; in this composition, many instances of the
protocol are invoked at arbitrary times and proceed at arbitrary pace. This composition turns out
to be of significant importance in many real life applications. Fortunately, there exists a result
[Damga˚rd, 2000] that shows that a wide range of known zero knowledge protocols, e.g. Σ pro-
tocols, can be modified with negligible loss of efficiency to preserve zero knowledgeness under
concurrent composition.
Non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK)
This notion, introduced in [Blum et al., 1988], consists of a prover who tries to convince a verifier
of the validity of some assertion in one move, i.e. without interaction with the verifier. The basic
zero knowledge requirement for such proofs consists in exhibiting an efficient simulator outputting
messages indistinguishable from the prover’s. It is worth noting here that the definition of the zero
knowledge requirement for these proofs is simplified because the verifier cannot affect the prover’s
actions.
The most famous technique to obtain NIZK from their interactive variants is known as the
Fiat-Shamir paradigm [Fiat & Shamir, 1986]. It consists of letting the prover compute the ver-
ifier’s challenge himself as a hash of the statement to be proved and of the first message. The
security of this construction is provided only in the random oracle model, which constitutes its
major shortcoming. In fact, it is not in general possible to instantiate the random oracle with a
concrete function and have the security properties preserved.
A recent method is due to Damga˚rd et al. [Damga˚rd et al., 2006]. It transforms a 3-move
interactive ZK protocol P with linear answer to a non-interactive ZK one (NIZK) using a homo-
morphic encryption scheme in a registered key model, i.e. in a model where the verifier registers
his key. More precisely, let a be the first message computed by the prover in P , c ∈ N be the
challenge sent by the verifier, and finally let z = u + cv be the answer computed by the prover
in the third step, where u, v ∈ N. Let further Γ denote a homomorphic encryption scheme such
that Γ.encrypt(m + m′) = Γ.encrypt(m) · Γ.encrypt(m′), where m and m′ are integer values
in a suitable range. If the verifier chooses a key pair (Γ.pk,Γ.sk) and publishes an encryption e
of the challenge c, then the prover can compute a as usual, Γ.encrypt(z) as Γ.encrypt(u)ev, and
sends these quantities to the verifier in one pass. The verifier decrypts Γ.encrypt(z) to obtain z
and checks whether (a, c, z) is an accepting transcript. The authors in [Damga˚rd et al., 2006] pro-
posed an efficient illustration using Paillier’s encryption and the proof of equality of two discrete
logarithms.
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1.5 Bilinear maps
Bilinear maps are essential in today’s cryptography. They are used in constructing many crypto-
graphic schemes ranging from short digital signatures to efficient public key encryption schemes.
A bilinear map is nothing but an efficient computable function mapping pairs of group elements to
elements in a third group. This function has two properties, namely it is bilinear and it is different
from the constant function. More precisely, let (G1,+) and (G2,+) be two groups with order
d, generated by P and Q respectively. Let (G3, ·) be another group with the same group order.
A bilinear map e is an efficiently computable function from G1 × G2 → G3 with the following
properties:
• Bilinear: ∀a, b ∈ Zd : e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab.
• Non-degenerate: e(P,Q) 6= 1G3 .
So far, there seems nothing new since the concept of bilinear functions is already known in math-
ematics. However, the contribution of cryptographers in this area consists in building efficiently
these maps from special and nice groups, i.e. the group of points of an elliptic curve.
In this section, we give a short survey on one popular pairing used in cryptography, namely the
Weil pairing. The working of this pairing is not needed in understanding the thesis since bilinear
maps are used as black boxes when designing cryptographic schemes. However, we chose to give
this short panorama in order to help evaluate the efficiency of systems using such a map. We will
first give a short introduction to elliptic curves, then describe how to construct such a pairing.
1.5.1 Introduction to elliptic curves
Let Fq be a finite field of characteristic p ≥ 5. A smooth (non-singular) elliptic curve is defined by
the Weierstrass equation:
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6, ai ∈ Fq
or
y2 = x3 + Ax+B, A,B ∈ Fq, 4A3 + 27B2 6= 0.
We define the group of points of an elliptic curve given by one of the two above equations as
follows:
E(Fq) = {(x, y) ∈ Fq × Fq : y2 = x3 + Ax+B} ∪ {∞}
The additional point∞ is called the point at infinity on the elliptic curve. Similarly, we can define
E(Fqk), where Fqk is an extension of the field Fq, by taking the points with coordinates in this
extension.
The group operation, which we will denote + in the group E(Fq), is defined as follows:
• ∀ P ∈ E(Fq) : P +∞ = P and ∞+∞ =∞,
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• if P and Q are the intersection of E with a vertical line then P +Q =∞,
• otherwise, if P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) then P + Q = (x3, y3) such that x3 =
m2 − x1 − x2 and y3 = m(x1 − x3)− y1 with
m =
{
y2−y1
x2−x1
if x1 6= x2
3x21+A
2y1
if x1 = x2 and y1 = y2 6= 0
It is easy to check that with the above definition of the operation +, E(Fq,+) is a finite
Abelian group with neutral element ∞. Moreover, we define the order of an element P ∈
E(Fq,+) to be the least positive integer m such that mP = P + P + ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
=∞.
Definition 1.13 (m-torsion points). The group of m-torsion points of E is
E[m] = {P ∈ E(Fq) : mP =∞}.
Fact 1.2. E[m] ∼= Zm × Zm if p ∤ m.
1.5.2 The Weil pairing
The Weil pairing is a map e : E[m] × E[m] → µm = {ζ ∈ Fq|ζm = 1} ⊆ F×qk , where k is called
the embedding degree, which satisfies the following properties:
1. ∀ P,Q,R ∈ E[m] : e(P +Q,R) = e(P,R) · e(Q,R) and e(P,Q +R) = e(P,Q) · e(P,R)
(bilinearity).
2. e(P,Q) = 1 ∀ Q ∈ E[m]⇔ P =∞ (non-degeneracy)
3. ∀P ∈ E[m] : e(P, P ) = 1.
The last property of the Weil pairing can be avoided using a distortion map Ψ : E[m] → E[m]
such that P and Ψ(P ) belong to disjoint cyclic groups of order m. With this map, we are able to
define a modified Weil pairing eˆ such that eˆ(P, P ) = e(P,Ψ(P )).
So far, we have presented the most popular pairing in cryptography along with its properties.
We will show in the rest of this section how one can efficiently construct such a pairing. We need
to first recall the notion of rational functions and their divisors, then proceed to the description of
the algorithm computing this pairing.
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Rational functions and divisors
A rational function is a ratio of polynomials, e.g.
f(x, y) =
f1(x, y)
f2(x, y)
P = (x, y) is called a zero of the function f if f1(P ) = 0, and is called a pole of f if f2(P ) = 0.
A rational function f(x, y) = f1(x,y)
f2(x,y)
, where fˆ1 and fˆ2 denote the top degree parts of f1 and f2
respectively, can be evaluated at the special point∞ as follows
1. if f1 and f2 have the same degree, then f(∞) = fˆ1(0,1)fˆ2(0,1) ,
2. if f1 has larger degree, then f(∞) = fˆ1(0,1)0 ,
3. if f2 has larger degree, then f(∞) = 0fˆ2(0,1) .
Given an elliptic curve E, we can define a rational function on it by simply mapping each of its
points P = (x, y) ∈ E to f(P ) = f(x, y). It easy to see that we can write (using the Weierstrass
equation that defines the curve E):
f(x, y) = uP (x, y)
rg(x, y)
where P is a zero of the rational function f , r ∈ Z and P is neither a zero nor a pole of g.
uP is called a uniformizer at P , whereas r is called the order of f at P (r = ordP (f)) which
satisfies the following properties:
• if P is neither a zero nor a pole of f , then ordP (f) = 0,
• if P is zero of f , then ordP (f) > 0,
• if P is a pole of f , then ordP (f) < 0.
Finally, a divisor div of a rational function f is defined as follows:
div(f) =
∑
P
ordP (f)(P ),
which means that div(f) evaluates to ord(P ) on the point P . Actually, the notion of a divisor
is more general. In fact, a divisor is a map from the points of some curve to the set of integers
which is equal to zero except on a finite set of points, called its support. To represent this map, it
is traditional to write it as a formal sum
∑
D(P )(P ), where D(P ) is the value of the divisor at the
point P . The degree of a divisor D is simply the (finite) sum of its values at all points. Whereas
the sum of a divisor
∑
D(P )(P ) is simply the sum
∑
D(P )P . Moreover, a divisor is called
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principal if it can be written as the divisor of a rational function on the elliptic curve. Finally, if f
is an arbitrary function in the function field of an elliptic curve E, and D is an arbitrary divisor of
E whose support does not contain any of the zeros or poles of f , then, writing D =
∑
D(P )(P ),
we define:
f(D) =
∏
f(P )D(P )
Fact 1.3. Any degree zero divisor D can be written as D = (P )− (∞) + div(f) for some point P
of the elliptic curve and some rational function f .
Theorem 1.4 (Weil’s reciprocity). Let f and g be two functions in the function field of an elliptic
curve. If the zeros and poles of f and g do not intersect, then :
f(div(g)) = g(div(f))
A proof of this theorem can be found for instance in [Blake et al., 2005, pages 212-213].
Computing the Weil pairing on m-torsion points
We are now able to show how one can compute the Weil pairing on m-torsion points. Let P be an
m-torsion point on an elliptic curve E, i.e. mP = ∞. To define em(P,Q), the Weil pairing for P
and Q, we choose two arbitrary divisors DP and DQ with distinct support which sum to P and Q
respectively. Then we define the two functions fP and fQ such that div(fP ) = m(P )−m(∞) and
div(fQ) = m(Q)−m(∞). em(P,Q) is defined as follows:
em(P,Q) =
fP (DQ)
fQ(DP )
With this definition, it is easy to check, thanks to Weil’s reciprocity law that this map is well de-
fined, i.e. is independent of the choice of DP and DQ. Moreover, it is bilinear and non-degenerate.
We refer for example to [Joux, 2009b, pages 430-431] for the proof of this claim.
Now, we would like to evaluate the computability of such a map. From the discussion above,
it seems mandatory to have an algorithm that efficiently evaluates a function fP at a point Q.
Miller’s algorithm [Miller, 2004] (Algorithm 1 ) does this fairly well. This algorithm considers
intermediate functions f (i)P :
div(f
(i)
P ) = i(P )− (iP )− (i− 1)(∞)
with f (0)P = f
(1)
P = 1.
It is easy to check that f (m)P = fP and that
div(f
(i+j)
P ) = div(f
(i)
P ) + div(f
(j)
P ) + (iP ) + (jP )− ((i+ j)P )− (∞).
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It can be shown that there exists a linear polynomial L(x, y) such that:
L(x, y) = (iP ) + (jP ) + (−(i+ j)P )− 2(∞).
Moreover, if x0 is the x coordinate of (i+ j)P , we have:
div(x− x0) = ((i+ j)P ) + (−(i+ j)P )− 2(∞).
It follows that:
div(f
(i+j)
P ) = div(f
(i)
P ) + div(f
(j)
P ) + divL(x, y)− div(x− x0).
As consequence, we can choose:
f
(i+j)
P = f
(i)
P · f (j)P ·
L(x, y)
x− x0
Algorithm 1 Miller’s algorithm
Require: An integer m ≥ 0, m-torsion points P and Q.
Ensure: The value of fP (Q).
Write m in binary m =
∑k−1
i=0 mi2
i
R← P
y ← 1
for i from k − 1 down to 0 do
Let L be the tangent line at R
Let R← 2R
Let y ← y2 · L(Q)/(xQ − xR) in Fq
if mi = 1 then
L be the line through P and R
Let R← R+ P
Let y ← y · L(Q)/(xQ − xR) in Fq
end if
end for
output y
It is easy to see that that Miller’s algorithm resembles the repeated squaring algorithm which
computes powers of group elements. Optimization of this algorithm can be found in [Cohen &
Frey, 2005, pages 417, 424, 432].
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Chapter 2
Public Key Encryption Revisited
Abstract. The classical security notion an encryption scheme must fulfill is data
privacy or indistinguishability. This notion captures the inability of an attacker to
distinguish pairs of ciphertexts based on the messages they encrypt. In [Bellare
et al., 2001], the authors propose an additional notion, called anonymity, which for-
malizes the property of key privacy. As a matter of fact, an adversary, in possession
of two public keys and a ciphertext formed by encrypting some data under one of
the two keys, should not be able to tell under which key the ciphertext was created.
In this chapter, we show that anonymity and indistinguishability are not as orthog-
onal to each other (i.e. independent) as previously believed. In fact, they are equiv-
alent under certain circumstances. Consequently, we confirm the results of [Bellare
et al., 2001] on the anonymity of El Gamal’s and of Cramer-Shoup’s schemes, based
on existing work about their indistinguishability. Finally, we define the notion of
anonymity for key and data encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs and DEMs), and we
provide a similar study to that of public key encryption on the equivalence between
anonymity and indistinguishability for KEMs.
Parts of the results described in this chapter were published in [El Aimani, 2009a]
at Africacrypt 2009.
2.1 General framework
The formalization of a security notion capturing key privacy was motivated by the numerous ap-
plications in which anonymity surfaced. A typical example is this real-life scenario: a mobile user
A is communicating with a base station B. Assume that an eavesdropper E knows the set of users
communicating with B, and can also listen to the communications of the users with B. In these
circumstances, A still wants to keep his identity (or public key) private from E . This is possible if
the ciphertexts do not reveal any information about the public key, namely if the encryption scheme
is anonymous.
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The formal definition of anonymity for public key encryption was first given in [Bellare et al.,
2001]); it is described through a game between a challengerR and an adversaryA. The game runs
in three phases. In phase 1,A is given two challenge public keys pk0 and pk1, and has access to the
oracles, allowed by the attack model ATK, for both keys pk0 and pk1. Once A decides that phase
1 is over, he outputs to R a challenge message m⋆. In phase 2, R selects uniformly at random
one of the challenge public keys, uses it to encrypt m⋆, and hands the resulting ciphertext to A. In
phase 3, A continues querying the oracles he had access to in the first phase, with the restriction
of not making queries w.r.t. to the challenge. At the end of phase 3, A outputs his guess for the
public key underlying the challenge ciphertext. A is considered successful when the output guess
is correct.
Definition 2.1 (Anonymity - ANO-ATK). Let Γ = (keygen, encrypt, decrypt) be a public key
encryption scheme, and let A be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiment, for
b
R←− {0, 1}, where κ is a security parameter:
Experiment Expano-atk−bΓ,A (κ)
(pk0, sk0)← Γ.keygen(κ),
(pk1, sk1)← Γ.keygen(κ),
(m⋆, I)← AO(find, pk0, pk1)∣∣∣∣∣∣
if atk = cpa then O = empty.
if atk = pca then O = Oi, i = 0, 1;Oi : (m, c) 7−→ m ?= Γ.decryptski(c).
if atk = cca then O = Oi, i = 0, 1;Oi : c 7−→ Γ.decryptski(c).
c⋆ ← Γ.encryptpkb(m⋆)
d← AO(guess, I, c⋆)∣∣∣∣∣∣
if atk = cpa then O = empty.
if atk = pca then O = Oi, i = 0, 1;Oi : (m, c)( 6= (m⋆, c⋆)) 7−→ m ?= Γ.decryptski(c).
if atk = cca then O = Oi, i = 0, 1;Oi : c( 6= c⋆) 7−→ Γ.decryptski(c).
Return d
We define the advantage of A via:
Advano−atkΓ,A (κ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expano−atk−bΓ,A (κ) = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Given (t, q) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε, q)-ANO-ATK adversary against Γ if, running
in time t and issuing q queries to the allowed oracles, A has Advano−atkΓ,A (κ) ≥ ε. Γ is said to be
(t, ε, q)-ANO-ATK secure if no (t, ε, q)-ANO-ATK adversary against it exists. Finally, we consider
an encryption scheme Γ with security parameter κ ∈ N; Γ(κ) is said to be ANO-ATK secure if,
for any polynomial functions t, q : N → N and any non-negligible function ε : N → [0, 1], it is
(t(κ), ε(κ), q(κ))-ANO-ATK secure.
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Exploring the relationship between data privacy and key privacy in public key encryption
schemes came very natural to researchers. Indeed, in their seminal work [Bellare et al., 2001],
the authors observe that the new notion is totally different from data privacy, as there exist encryp-
tion schemes that satisfy one notion but not the other. They also claimed that “it is not hard to see
that the goals of data privacy and key privacy are orthogonal”. Recently, this claim was proven
in [Zhang et al., 2007] by exhibiting a technique that upgrades the key privacy (in an encryption
scheme already enjoying this property) but destroys the data privacy, and vice versa. Such a result
can be considered as negative, since it only shows how to build a encryption scheme which has
one property but not the other. But what about the opposite? Can one specify simple assumptions
to hold in an encryption scheme so that key privacy yields data privacy and vice versa? Such an
approach has been considered in the literature for a different primitive, namely undeniable sig-
natures. In fact, invisibility and anonymity are two security properties that are closely related in
undeniable signatures. The first one requires an adversary not be able to distinguish a valid signa-
ture on a certain message from any uniformly chosen bit-string from the signature space, whereas
the second notion refers to the hardness of, in possession of a signature and two public keys, telling
under which key the signature was created. Since the introduction of undeniable signatures, these
two notions were treated separately and many schemes emerged which either meet the first notion
or the second, until 2003 where a comprehensive study [Galbraith & Mao, 2003] led to the conclu-
sion that anonymity and invisibility are essentially the same under certain conditions. With such a
result, one can seek only one notion when designing undeniable signatures.
In the rest of this chapter, and in an attempt to bridge the gap between anonymity and indistin-
guishability in encryption schemes, we specify simple conditions to hold in the given encryption
scheme so that anonymity implies indistinguishability and vice versa. This will allow a direct
use of existing results about data/key privacy of asymmetric encryption schemes rather than “do-
ing the work” from scratch as claimed in [Bellare et al., 2001]. As a consequence, we confirm
the results in [Bellare et al., 2001] that prove the anonymity under chosen plaintext attacks of El
Gamal’s encryption scheme and the anonymity under chosen ciphertext attacks of Cramer-Shoup’s
encryption, assuming the intractability of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH). Finally,
we define the notion of anonymity for key and data encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs and DEMs)
and provide a similar study to that of public key encryption on the equivalence between anonymity
and indistinguishability for KEMs and DEMs.
2.2 Key privacy vs data privacy
In this section, we present conditions that suffice to conclude on the anonymity of an encryp-
tion scheme given existing results about its indistinguishability and vice versa. Our result builds
from the work of [Galbraith & Mao, 2003] on undeniable signatures and extends it to public key
encryption.
We stress that every choice of the security parameter κ defines a key space PK × SK (corre-
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sponding to the space of key pairs (pk, sk) generated by the keygen algorithm), a message space M
and a ciphertext space C. In particular, the ciphertext space C depends merely on κ and not on a
specific key.
2.2.1 The main result
Let Γ be a public key encryption scheme given by its three algorithms: Γ.keygen, Γ.encrypt, and
Γ.decrypt. The following are the properties needed to prove the relationship between key privacy
and data privacy.
Property A: Let κ be a security parameter and let (pk, sk) be an output of Γ.keygen. Consider the
uniform distribution on M. Then, the distribution on C corresponding to the random variable
Γ.encryptpk(m) (m R←− M) is computationally indistinguishable from uniform.
Property B: Let κ be a security parameter and let m ∈ M be an arbitrary message. Consider
the distribution induced by the probabilistic algorithm Γ.keygen on the key space PK− SK.
Then, from a key pair (pk, sk) sampled according to this distribution, the distribution on C
corresponding to the random variable Γ.encryptpk(m) is computationally indistinguishable
from uniform.
Intuitively, Property A means basically the following: for a fixed key and varying messages, en-
cryptions look random. It is worth noting that the same property has been formulated differently
in [Halevi, 2005], where the author requires the distributions in questions to be statistically indis-
tinguishable. Property B suggests that, for a fixed message and varying keys, encryptions look
random.
We get now to the relation between anonymity and indistinguishability. Theorem 2.1 says
that if Property A holds in an encryption scheme Γ, then indistinguishability implies anonymity.
Theorem 2.2 requires Property B for anonymity to yield indistinguishability in a given encryption
scheme. Both theorems stand in all attack models (ATK ∈ {CPA,PCA,CCA}).
Theorem 2.1. Let Γ be a public key encryption scheme that has Property A. Given (t, q) ∈ N2 and
ε ∈ [0, 1]; if Γ is (t, ε, q)-IND-ATK secure, then it is (t, ε
2
, q)-ANO-ATK secure, where ATK ∈
{CPA,PCA,CCA}.
Proof. Given an anonymity adversary Aano−atk, we will create an indistinguishability adversary
Aind−atk in the same attack model ATK. Let pk0 be the input toAind−atk. Aind−atk will run Γ.keygen
to generate a public key pk1 together with its corresponding private key sk1.
Queries made by Aano−atk are answered in the following way: if they are with respect to the
key pk0, they are forwarded to Aind−atk’s own challenger. Otherwise, in case they are with respect
to pk1, they are answered by Aind−atk using the private key sk1.
WhenAano−atk outputs a message m0 and requests a challenge,Aind−atk chooses a message m1
uniformly at random from M that he will pass, together with m0 to his challenger. Aind−atk will
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get an encryption Γ.encryptpk0(mb), of either m0 or m1 (b
R←− {0, 1}), which he will forward to
Aano−atk. Queries by Aano−atk continue to be handled as before.
If Γ.encryptpk0(mb) corresponds to the encryption of m0 (under pk0), then with overwhelming
probability it is not an encryption of m0 under pk1. Otherwise, if Γ.encryptpk0(mb) is the encryp-
tion of m1 (under pk0), then by virtue of Property A, Γ.encryptpk0(m1) is a random element in C
and with overwhelming probability it is not an encryption of m0 under either key.
At the end of the game, Aano−atk outputs a guess b′ on the key under which Γ.encryptpk0(mb)
was created. Aind−atk will then output the same guess b′.
Since ǫ is defined to be the advantage ofAano−atk, we have ǫ = |Pr(b′ = 0|b = 0)− 1
2
|. In fact,
Aano−atk is expected to work only when b = 0 (proper simulation), which explains the conditional
probability. In this case, Aano−atk is considered successful when he recognizes the challenge to be
an encryption under pk0 of the message m0.
The advantage of Aind−atk is, according to Definition 1.5, ∣∣Pr(b′ = b)− 1
2
∣∣ and we have:
Adv(Aind−atk) =
∣∣∣∣Pr(b′ = b)− 12
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣Pr(b′ = 0, b = 0) + Pr(b′ = 1, b = 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Pr(b′ = 0|b = 0)Pr(b = 0) + Pr(b′ = 1|b = 1)Pr(b = 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
≈
∣∣∣∣(ǫ+ 12)12 + 12 12 − 12
∣∣∣∣ = 12ǫ.
The last inequality, due to Pr(b′ = 1|b = 1) ≈ 1
2
, is explained by the fact that in case b = 1, there
is a negligible chance for Γ.encryptpk0(m1) to be also an encryption of m0 under pk1.
Theorem 2.2. Let Γ be a public key encryption scheme that has Property B. Given (t, q) ∈ N2
and ε ∈ [0, 1]; if Γ is (t, ε, q)-ANO-ATK secure, then it is (t, ε
2
, q)-IND-ATK secure, where ATK ∈
{CPA,PCA,CCA}.
Proof. From an indistinguishability adversary Aind−atk with advantage ǫ, we will construct an
anonymity adversary Aano−atk as follows.
Let (pk0, pk1) be the input to Aano−atk. Aano−atk will run Aind−atk on pk0. Queries made by
Aind−atk will be simply passed to Aano−atk’s own challenger.
At some time, Aind−atk outputs two messages m0, m1. Aano−atk will forward m0 to his chal-
lenger and obtain the challenge Γ.encryptpkb(m0) where b
R←− {0, 1}. Aano−atk will then pass the
challenge to Aind−atk and continue to handle queries as previously.
In case b = 0, the challenge encryption is a valid encryption of m0 and an invalid encryption of
m1 under pk0. In the other case, since pk1 (together with sk1) is sampled from PK−SK and Property
B holds, then Γ.encryptpk1(m0) is a random element in C and with overwhelming probability it is
not an encryption of m1 under pk0. Therefore, when Aind−atk outputs his guess b′, Aano−atk will
forward the same guess to his own challenger.
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The advantage of Aind−atk in such an attack is defined by: ǫ = ∣∣Pr(b′ = 0|b = 0)− 1
2
∣∣
. In fact,
Aind−atk is expected to work only when b = 0. In this case, Aind−atk is considered successful when
he recognizes the challenge to be an encryption of m0 under pk0.
The overall advantage of Aano−atk is according to Definition 2.1:
Adv(Aano−atk) =
∣∣∣∣Pr(b′ = b)− 12
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣Pr(b′ = 0, b = 0) + Pr(b′ = 1, b = 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Pr(b′ = 0′|b = 0)Pr(b = 0) + Pr(b′ = 1|b = 1)Pr(b = 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
≈
∣∣∣∣(ǫ+ 12)12 + 12 12 − 12
∣∣∣∣ = 12ǫ.
In fact, Pr(b′ = 1|b = 1) ≈ 1
2
, because in the case where b = 1, there is a negligible chance for
Γ.encryptpk1(m0) to be also an encryption of m1 under pk0.
2.2.2 On the orthogonality between key privacy and data privacy
In [Zhang et al., 2007], the authors propose a technique that turns an anonymous encryption scheme
into a distinguishable anonymous encryption scheme, and vice versa. The idea consists in con-
sidering the augmented scheme which appends the message to its encryption (using the original
scheme). Since the new ciphertext does not reveal more information about the public key than
the original scheme does, it is still anonymous. Concerning the other part, from an indistinguish-
able scheme one can consider the encryption scheme consisting of appending the public key to the
encryption of the message. The new scheme does not reveal more information about the message
than the original scheme does. Therefore, it is still indistinguishable. However, it is not anonymous
since it discloses the public key.
Theorem 2.2 complies with this result since the first encryption scheme (obtained by appending
the message to the ciphertext) does not have Property B; for a fixed message m, the distribution
considered in Property B is easily distinguished from uniform. In fact, the probability that a ci-
phertext sampled according to this distribution equals a ciphertext whose suffix is different from
m is exactly zero. Similarly, Theorem 2.1 is in accordance with this result since the encryption
scheme obtained by appending the public key to the ciphertext does not have Property A. Indeed,
for a fixed key pk, the probability that a ciphertext sampled from the distribution considered in
Property A equals another ciphertext whose suffix differs from pk is exactly zero.
Before concluding this paragraph, it is worth noting that Property A highlights a strength of
the discrete-log-based world in contrast to the RSA-based world. Concretely, let Γ be an RSA-
based encryption scheme where the public key comprises the RSA modulus N to be used. If the
ciphertext c (seen as a set) contains an element e ∈ ZN , then the scheme will never have Property
A. In fact, for a fixed key pk (where N ∈ pk) and a message m chosen uniformly at random from
M, the probability that Γ.encryptpk(m) equals an element c′ ∈ C with the component e′ ≥ N ,
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is exactly zero. Therefore, it is easy to distinguish the distribution on C, defined in Property
A, from the uniform distribution. This argument conforms again to the result in [Bellare et al.,
2001], namely the fact that RSA-OAEP is not anonymous though it is indistinguishable in the
most powerful attack model.
2.3 Application
In the previous paragraph, we showed that our results are consistent with the negative results in
[Zhang et al., 2007] concerning the independence of key privacy from data privacy. In fact, as
Properties B and A do not hold in the augmented encryption schemes respectively, one cannot
deduce one security notion from the other. In this section, we confirm the positive results in
[Bellare et al., 2001] concerning the anonymity of El Gamal’s [El Gamal, 1985] and of Cramer-
Shoup’s [Cramer & Shoup, 2003] encryption schemes.
2.3.1 El Gamal’s encryption revisited
The ElGamal scheme, described in Figure 1.3 (Subsection 1.2.2), is IND-CPA-secure under the
hardness of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH). Actually, the following holds:
Adv(Aind−cpaElGamal) = Adv(Rddh).
To analyze the ANO-CPA property of El Gamal, it suffices to check whether Property A holds.
The ciphertext space C consists of:
C =
{
(gt, myt) ∈ G×G : t R←− Zd, m ∈ M, (y = gx, x) ∈ PK− SK
}
= G×G.
We show now that the distribution on C, corresponding to the random variable ElGamal.encrypty(m),
where y is a fixed public key and m is a message sampled uniformly at random from M, is exactly
the uniform distribution. Let (a1, a2) ∈ C be a fixed value from G×G.
Pr[(gt, myt) = (a1, a2)] = Pr[g
t = a1] Pr[my
t = a2|gt = a1]
=
1
d
Pr[myt = a2|yt = ax1 ] =
1
d
Pr[m = a2a
−x
1 ] =
1
d2
.
The last equality is due to the fact that m was sampled uniformly at random from M = G. We
conclude with Theorem 2.1 that El Gamal’s encryption is ANO-CPA secure under the DDH as-
sumption and we have: Adv(Rddh) ≈ 1
2
Adv(Aano−cpaElGamal ), which complies with Theorem 1 in [Bellare
et al., 2001].
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2.3.2 Cramer-Shoup’s encryption revisited
Cramer-Shoup’s encryption scheme [Cramer & Shoup, 2003] is IND-CCA secure under the DDH
assumption. It uses a prime order group (G, ·) with order d, and given by two generators g1 and
g2. Furthermore, it requires a family of collision resistant hash functions H = (HG,HE), defined
by a probabilistic generator algorithm HG - which takes as input the security parameter κ and
returns a key K - and a deterministic algorithm HE - which takes as input the key K and a string
m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and returns an element in Zd:
setup(κ) keygen encryptpk(m) decryptsk(u1, u2, e, v)
(d, g1)
R←− G¯ x1, x2, y1, y2, z R←− Zd r R←− Zd α← EH(u1, u2, e)
g2
R←− Gd c← gx11 gx22 ; d← gy11 gy22 u1 ← gr1; u2 ← gr2 if ux1+αy11 ux2+αy22 = v
K ← HG(κ) h← gz1 e← mhr then m← eu−z1
Return(d, g1, g2, K) pk← (d, g1, g2, c, d, h,K) α←HEK(u1, u2, e) else m←⊥
sk← (x1, x2, y1, y2, z) v ← crdrα Return(m)
Return(pk, sk) Return(u1, u2, e, v)
To analyze the anonymity of the scheme, it suffices to check Property A. We have:
C =
{
(gr1, g
r
2, mh
r, crdαr) : r
R←− Zd, (m, c, d, h) ∈ M× PK, α = EG(gr1, gr2, mhr)
}
.
It is then easy to see that the size of C is d3. Therefore, to show that Property A holds, it suf-
fices to show that for a fixed key pk = (c, d, h) 1 and a message m R←− M, the probability that
encryptpk(m) = (g
r
1, g
r
2, mh
r, crdαr) equals a given value (a1, a2, a3, a4) ∈ C is exactly 1d3 :
Pr[(gr1, g
r
2, mh
r, crdαr) = (a1, a2, a3, a4)]
= Pr[gr1 = a1] Pr[g
r
2 = a2|gr1 = a1] ·
Pr[mhr = a3|(gr1, gr2) = (a1, a2)] ·
Pr[crdαr = a4|(gr1, gr2, mhr) = (a1, a2, a3)]
=
1
d
· Pr[DLg1(a1) = DLa2g2 ] · Pr[m = a3a−z1 ] ·
Pr[EHK(a1, a2, a3) = DLay11 ay22 (a4a
−x1
1 a
−x2
2 )]
=
1
d
· 1 · 1
d
· 1
d
=
1
d3
.
In fact, since (a1, a2, a3, a4) ∈ C, then DLg1(a1) = DLg2(a2) holds with probability 1. More-
over, as m was chosen uniformly at random from M = G, then the probability that m equals
a given value in G is exactly 1
d
. Finally, the relationship (EHK is a deterministic algorithm)
1Note that g1, g2 and K are fixed for all keys in the setup algorithm.
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EHK(a1, a2, a3) = DLay11 ay22 (a4a
−x1
1 a
−x2
2 ) holds in Zd, for arbitrary values (a1, a2, a3, a4) ∈ C
with probability 1
d
. We conclude with Theorem 2.1 that Cramer-Shoup’s encryption is ANO-CCA-
secure under the DDH assumption.
2.4 Key and data encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs & DEMs)
Key and data encapsulation mechanisms arise very often in cryptography. In fact, they are both
combined to build public key encryption schemes using the so-called “hybrid encryption paradigm”;
a KEM is first used to fix a session key along with its encapsulation, then the DEM (which is noth-
ing but a secret key encryption algorithm) is used to encrypt the message in question using the
session key. Decryption is achieved by first recovering the key from the encapsulation (part of the
ciphertext) then applying the DEM decryption algorithm using the recovered key.
In this section, we recall the formal definition of KEMs and DEMs, then we define the anonymity
security notion for these mechanisms, and we provide a study of the equivalence between this new
notion and the traditional indistinguishability notion.
2.4.1 Key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs)
A KEM is a tuple which comprises the following algorithms:
1. Setup (setup). This algorithm generates the public parameters of the scheme.
2. Key generation (keygen). This algorithm probabilistically generates, on input a security
parameter κ, a key pair (pk, sk).
3. Encapsulation (encap). This algorithm inputs the public key pk, runs on a random tape u,
and generates a session key denoted k and its encapsulation c.
4. Decapsulation decap. Given the private key sk and the element c, this algorithm computes
the decapsulation k of c, or returns ⊥ if c is invalid.
The standard security goal for KEMs is indistinguishability. It informally means the hardness
of distinguishing the key corresponding to an arbitrary encapsulation from a uniformally chosen
bit-string from the (session) key space. We give below the formal definition of this property.
Definition 2.2 (Indistinguishability (KEMs) - IND-ATK). Let K = (keygen, encap, decap) be a
KEM with session key space K, and let A be a PPTM. We consider the following random experi-
ment, for b R←− {0, 1}, where κ is a security parameter:
55
Experiment Expind-atk-bK,A (κ)
(pk, sk)← K.keygen(κ),
I ← AO(find, pk)∣∣∣∣∣∣
if atk = cpa then O = empty
if atk = pca then O : (c, k) 7−→ k ?= K.decapsk(c)
if atk = cca then O : k 7−→ K.decapsk(c)
(c⋆, k⋆)← k.encappk()
if b = 0 then {k R←− K, k⋆ ← k}
d← AO(guess, I, c⋆, k⋆)∣∣∣∣∣∣
if atk = cpa then O = empty
if atk = pca then O : (c, k) ( 6= (c⋆, k⋆)) 7−→ k ?= K.decapsk(k)
if atk = cca then O : c ( 6= c⋆) 7−→ K.decapsk(c)
Return d
We define the advantage of A via:
Advind−atkK,A (κ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expind−atk−bk,A (κ) = b] − 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Given (t, q) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε, q)-IND-ATK adversary against K if,
running in time t and issuing q queries to the allowed oracles, A has Advind−atkK,A (κ) ≥ ε. The
scheme K is said to be (t, ε, q)-IND-ATK secure if no (t, ε, q)-IND-ATK adversary A against it
exists. Finally, we consider a KEM K with security parameter κ ∈ N; K(κ) is said to be IND-ATK
secure if, for any polynomial functions t, q : N → N and any non-negligible function ε : N →
[0, 1], it is (t(κ), ε(κ), q(κ))-IND-ATK secure.
An example of a KEM is the mechanism underlying the El Gamal encryption ((G, ·) is a group
generated by g where |G| = d):
Example 2.3. The most famous and probably oldest KEM known in the literature is the mechanism
underlying El Gamal’s encryption [El Gamal, 1985]. We depict this KEM in Figure 2.1. The El
Gamal KEM is trivially IND-CPA secure under the DDH assumption.
Example 2.4. Another popular KEM was introduced in [Boneh et al., 2004a], and is titled the
Linear Diffie-Hellman KEM. We depict this KEM in Figure 2.2. The Linear Diffie Hellman KEM
is IND-CPA secure under the hardness of decision linear problem, which we describe in Definition
2.5.
Definition 2.5 (Decision Linear Problem (DLP)). Given U, V, H, aU, bV, cH ∈ G, output 1 if
a+ b = c mod (#G) and 0 otherwise.
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Setup Consider a group (G, ·), generated by g where |G| = d.
Key generation Choose x R←− Zd and compute y ← gx,
set pk← (d, g, y) and sk← (d, g, x).
Encapsulation Choose t R←− Zd and compute gt and yt,
set the session key k ← yt and its encapsulation c← gt.
Decapsulation One recovers the key yt from gt as follows yt ← (gt)x.
Figure 2.1: The El Gamal KEM
Setup Consider a bilinear additive group (G,+), with prime order d, generated by P .
Key generation Generate two secret values x1, x2
R←− Z×d , and compute X1 ← x1P and X2 ← x2P ,
set the private key sk← (x1, x2) and the public key pk← (X1,X2).
Encapsulation Choose a random nonce (a, b) R←− Z2d,
generate the session key k ← (a+ b)P and its encapsulation c← (aX1, bX2).
Decapsulation Given the private key sk and the encapsulation c = (aX1, bX2),
compute the key k as k ← x−11 aX1 + x−12 bX2.
Figure 2.2: The Linear Diffie-Hellman KEM
Anonymity in KEMs
We define similarly anonymity for KEMs to be the hardness of distinguishing pairs of encapsu-
lations/keys based on the underlying public key. Combining this goal with the different attack
models {CPA, PCA,CCA} results in three security notions which we formally present as follows:
Definition 2.6 (Anonymity (KEMs) - ANO-ATK). Let K = (keygen, encap, decap) be a KEM,
and letA be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiment, for b R←− {0, 1}, where κ is a
security parameter:
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Experiment Expano-atk−bK,A (κ)
(pk0, sk0)← K.keygen(κ),
(pk1, sk1)← K.keygen(κ),
I ← AO(find, pk)∣∣∣∣∣∣
if atk = cpa then O = empty.
if atk = pca then O = Oi, i = 0, 1;Oi : (c, k) 7−→ k ?= K.decapski(c).
if atk = cca then O = Oi, i = 0, 1;Oi : k 7−→ K.decapski(c).
(c⋆, k⋆)← K.encappkb()
d← AO(guess, I, c⋆, k⋆)∣∣∣∣∣∣
if atk = cpa then O = empty.
if atk = pca then O = Oi, i = 0, 1;Oi : (c, k) ( 6= (c⋆, k⋆)) 7−→ k ?= K.decapski(c).
if atk = cca then O = Oi, i = 0, 1;Oi : c ( 6= c⋆) 7−→ K.decapski(c).
Return d
We define the advantage of A via:
Advano−atkK,A (κ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expano−atk−bK,A (κ) = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Given (t, q) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε, q)-ANO-ATK adversary against K if, running
in time t and issuing q queries to the allowed oracles,A has Advano−atkK,A (κ) ≥ ε. The scheme K is
said to be (t, ε, q)-ANO-ATK secure if no (t, ε, q)-ANO-ATK adversary against it exists. Finally,
we consider a KEM K with security parameter κ ∈ N; κ(κ) is said to be ANO-ATK secure if,
for any polynomial functions t, q : N → N, and any non-negligible function ε : N → [0, 1], it is
(t(κ), ε(κ), q(κ))-ANO-ATK secure.
Similarly to the study provided in the previous section, we formulate a further property which is
sufficient for anonymity to induce indistinguishability. Informally speaking, this property suggests
that for a fixed encapsulation c and varying public keys pk (with the corresponding private keys
sk), the resulting decapsulations decapsk(c) look random.
Again, we stress that every choice of the security parameter κ defines a key space PK × SK
(corresponding to the space of key pairs (pk, sk)), an encapsulation space C (corresponding to
the encapsulations generated by the KEM encapsulation algorithm) and a session key space K
(corresponding to the session keys generated by the KEM decapsulation algorithm).
Property C: Let κ be a security parameter. Let further c be an arbitrary encapsulation value
from C. Consider the distribution induced by the probabilistic algorithm keygen on the key space
PK × SK. Then, from a key (pk, sk) sampled according to this distribution, the distribution on
K, corresponding to the random variable decapsk(c), is computationally indistinguishable from
uniform.
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Remark 2.1. The KEM underlying the El Gamal encryption scheme satisfies trivially this property,
and so does the linear Diffie-Hellman KEM.
Note that there exist evidently KEMs which do not fulfill this property, for instance KEMs where
the decapsulation algorithm returns ⊥ for some keys; for such KEMs, we cannot use Theorem 2.3
to derive indistinguishability from anonymity.
Theorem 2.3. Let K be a key encapsulation mechanism that has Property C. Given (t, q) ∈ N2
and ε ∈ [0, 1]; if K is (t, ε, q)-ANO-ATK secure, then it is (t, ε, q)-IND-ATK secure, where ATK ∈
{CPA,PCA,CCA}.
Proof. First assume that the distribution on the session keys space K (considered in Property C) is
exactly the uniform distribution. From an indistinguishability adversaryAind−atk with advantage ǫ,
we will construct an anonymity adversary Aano−atk as follows.
Let (pk0, pk1) be the input to Aano−atk. Aano−atk will run Aind−atk on pk0. Queries made by
Aind−atk will be simply passed to Aano−atk’s own challenger. Note that pk1 is independent of the
view of Aind−atk.
At some time, Aano−atk gets from his challenger a challenge (c, k) and is asked to tell the
key (pk0 or pk1) under which it was created. Aano−atk will forward this challenge to Aind−atk. In
case it was created under pk1, since pk1 (together with the corresponding private key) is sampled
from PK × SK, Property C implies that k = K.decapsk1(c) is a uniformly random element of K.
Therefore, the value k is either the decapsulation of c under pk0, or a uniformly random element in
K, and thus compatible with the game Aind−atk is designed to play.
Further queries by Aind−atk continue to be handled as before. At the end, Aind−atk will output
a bit representing his guess for k being the decapsulation of c under the public key pk0 or not.
Aano−atk will use this bit as his guess for the key under which k was created. It is clear that:
Adv(Aano−atk) = Adv(Aind−atk).
Now assume that the distribution on K is only indistinguishable from uniform. Let Aind−atk be
an indistinguishability distinguisher. If the advantage of Aind−atk in the reduction described above
is non-negligibly different from the advantage of Aind−atk in a real attack, then Aind−atk can be
easily used as a distinguisher for the distribution considered by Property C. As a consequence:
Adv(Aano−atk) ≈ Adv(Aind−atk),
where ≈ means “equal up to negligible terms”.
Theorem 2.4. Let K be a key encapsulation mechanism. Given (t, q) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1]; if K is
(t, ε, q)-IND-ATK secure, then it is (t, ε
2
, q)-IND-ATK secure, where ATK ∈ {CPA,PCA,CCA}.
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Proof. Given an anonymity adversary Aano−atk with advantage ǫ, we will create an indistinguisha-
bility adversary Aind−atk in the same attack model ATK. Let pk0 be the input to Aind−atk. Aind−atk
will run keygen to generate a public key pk1 together with its corresponding private key sk1.
Queries made by Aano−atk are answered in the following way: if they are with respect to the
key pk0, they are forwarded to Aind−atk’s own challenger. Otherwise, in case they are with respect
to pk1, they are answered by Aind−atk using the private key sk1.
Eventually,Aind−atk receives (c, k) from his own challenger, where k is either the decapsulation
of c with respect to the key pk0 or a uniformly chosen element from K. Aind−atk will forward his
challenge to Aano−atk.
Queries by Aano−atk continue to be handled as before.
If k corresponds to the decapsulation of c (under pk0), then with overwhelming probability it is
not the decapsulation of c under pk1 (pk1 (along with sk1) was produced by Aind−atk and therefore
it is independent of the view of his challenger who generates the challenge (c, k)). Otherwise, it is
a random element in K, and with overwhelming probability it is not the decapsulation of c under
either key.
At the end of the game, Aano−atk outputs a guess b′ on the key used to decapsulate c in k.
Aind−atk will then output the same guess b′ to his challenger.
We have Adv(Aano−atk) = ∣∣ǫ = Pr(b′ = 0|b = 0)− 1
2
∣∣
. In fact, Aano−atk is expected to work
only when k is the decapsulation of c under pk0 (corresponds to b = 0), which explains the con-
ditional probability. In this case, Aano−atk is considered successful when he recognizes that k is
decapsulation of c under pk0.
The advantage of Aind−atk is by definition ∣∣Pr(b′ = b)− 1
2
∣∣ and we have:
Adv(Aind−atk) =
∣∣∣∣Pr(b′ = b)− 12
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣Pr(b′ = 0, b = 0) + Pr(b′ = 1, b = 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Pr(b′ = 0|b = 0)Pr(b = 0) + Pr(b′ = 1|b = 1)Pr(b = 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
≈
∣∣∣∣(ǫ+ 12)12 + 12 12 − 12
∣∣∣∣ = ǫ2
The last inequality, due to Pr(b′ = 1|b = 1) ≈ 1
2
, is explained by the fact that in case b = 1, there
is a negligible chance for k to be the decapsulation of c under pk1.
2.4.2 Data encapsulation mechanisms (DEMs)
DEMs are secret key encryption algorithms. They are, similarly to public key encryption, given
by the same three algorithms (keygen, encrypt and decrypt), with the exception of generating only
one key in the keygen algorithm which will serve for encryption as well as for decryption.
The security notion for DEMs, that corresponds to the ANO-CPA notion for public key en-
cryption, is the anonymity under a one time attack; we define it as follows
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Definition 2.7 (Anonymity (DEMs) - ANO-OT). Let D = (keygen, encrypt, decrypt) be a DEM,
and letA be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiment, for b R←− {0, 1}, where κ is a
security parameter:
Experiment Expano-ot−bD,A (κ)
k0 ← D.keygen(κ),
k1 ← D.keygen(κ),
(m⋆, I)← A(find)
e⋆ ← Γ.encryptkb(m⋆)
d← A(guess, I, e⋆)
Return d
We define the advantage of A via:
Advano−otD,A (κ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expano−ot−bD,A (κ) = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Given t ∈ N and ε ∈ [0, 1],A is called a (t, ε)-ANO-OT adversary againstD if, running in time t,
A has Advano−otD,A (κ) ≥ ε. The schemeD is said to be (t, ε)-ANO-OT secure if no (t, ε)-ANO-OT
adversary against it exists. Finally, we consider a DEM D with security parameter κ ∈ N; D(κ)
is said to be ANO-OT secure if, for any polynomial function t : N → N and any non-negligible
function ε : N→ [0, 1], it is (t(κ), ε(κ))-ANO-OT secure.
Note that the above notion corresponds to the ANO-CPA notion in the public key world because
the adversary does not have any oracle access. In fact, in the secret key scenario, the adversary
cannot even encrypt messages of his choice (chosen plaintext attack) since he does not have the
key at his disposal.
It is easy to see that the same analysis, provided in Section 2.2, of the relation between
anonymity and indistinguishability for public key encryption applies also here for DEMs. More-
over, it can be shown that one can obtain an ANO-CPA-secure encryption scheme from an ANO-
CPA-secure KEM combined with an ANO-OT-secure DEM. The proof is similar to that of the
indistinguishability notion, which is given in [Herranz et al., 2006]. Finally, we introduce the fol-
lowing security notion for DEMs which captures both the indistinguishability and the anonymity
under a one-time attack2:
Definition 2.8 (Invisibility (DEMs) - INV-OT). Let D = (keygen, encrypt, decrypt) be a DEM
with ciphertext space C, and let A be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiment, for
b
R←− {0, 1}, where κ is a security parameter:
2Later in this thesis, we will show how to use INV-OT and ANO-OT secure DEMs, combined with secure KEMs
and secure digital signatures in order to build efficient and secure opaque signatures.
61
Experiment Expinv-ot−bD,A (κ)
k ← D.keygen(κ),
(m⋆, I)← A(find, k)
e⋆ ← Γ.encryptk(m⋆)
if b = 0 then {e R←− C, e⋆ ← e}
d← A(guess, I, e⋆)
Return d
We define the advantage of A, via:
Advinv−otD,A (κ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expinv−ot−bD,A (κ) = b] − 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Given t ∈ N and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε)-INV-OT adversary against D if, running in time
t, A has Advinv−otD,A (κ) ≥ ε. The scheme D is said to be (t, ε)-INV-OT secure if no (t, ε)INV-OT
adversary against it exists. Finally, we consider a DEM D with security parameter κ; D(κ) is
said to be INV-OT secure if, for any any polynomial function t : N → N and any non-negligible
function ε : N→ [0, 1], it is (t(κ), ε(κ))-INV-OT secure.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proved that key privacy and data privacy in encryption schemes are related to
a certain extent. In fact, under some conditions, we showed that one notion yields the other. This
allows to use existing work on the data privacy of some schemes in order to derive their anonymity.
Moreover, we defined the anonymity notion for key and data encapsulation mechanisms and pro-
vided a study on the equivalence between this notion and the indistinguishability notion in these
mechanisms.
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Part II
Generic Constructions of Confirmer
Signatures
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Chapter 3
Overview of Confirmer Signatures
Abstract. Designated Confirmer signatures were introduced to limit the verification
property inherent to digital signatures. In fact, the verification in these signatures
is replaced by a confirmation/denial protocol between the designated confirmer and
the signature recipient.
In this chapter, we give a short overview of designated confirmer signatures; we will
start with the motivation behind such signatures, then provide the formal definition
of these signatures as well as of their security properties, and finally, we will browse
through the different realizations of these signatures from basic cryptographic prim-
itives.
3.1 Motivation and definition
Digital signatures capture most of the properties met by signatures in the paper world, for instance
the universal verification. However, in some applications, this property is not desired or at least
needs to be controlled. The typical applications where we wish to restrain the holder of a signature
from convincing other parties of the validity of the signature in question are:
Licensing software [Chaum & van Antwerpen, 1990] A software vendor is willing to embed
signatures in his products such that only the paying customers are entitled to check the au-
thenticity of these products. Moreover, he does not wish these paying customers to convince
other parties of the genuineness of his goods.
Contract signing [Goldwasser & Waisbard, 2004] An employer issues a job offer to a certain can-
didate. Naturally, the employer needs to compete with the other job offers in order to attract
the good candidate. Therefore, he does not wish the offer to be revealed to his competitors.
At the same time, the candidate needs more than a verbal or unsigned agreement in order
to protect himself from the employer not keeping his promise. Finally, when the candidate
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accepts the offer, the employer wishes to convert the job offer he has issued to a publicly
verifiable one, instead of having to issue a new contact.
Undeniable signatures were introduced in [Chaum & van Antwerpen, 1990] for this purpose;
they proved critical in situations where privacy or anonymity is a big concern, e.g. licensing soft-
ware [Chaum & van Antwerpen, 1990], electronic cash [Chaum & Pedersen, 1993; Boyd & Foo,
1998; Pointcheval, 2001] and electronic voting and auctions. In these signatures, the verification
can be only attained by means of a cooperation with the signer, called the confirmation/denial
protocols. Unfortunately, this very virtue (verification with only the signer’s help) became their
major shortcoming for many practical applications. The flaw was later repaired in [Chaum, 1995]
by introducing the concept of designated confirmer signatures. In fact, this concept involves three
entities, namely the signer who produces the signature, the designated confirmer who confirms
or denies the alleged signature, and finally the recipient of the signature. Actually, in the litera-
ture, there is a clear separation between designated confirmer signatures or confirmer signatures
for brevity, and directed signatures [Lim & Lee, 1993] which share the same concept as confirmer
signatures with the exception of allowing both the signer and the confirmer to confirm/deny signa-
tures. Finally, a desirable property in confirmer signatures is the convertibility of the signatures to
ordinary ones. Indeed, such a property turned out to play a central role in fair payment protocols
[Boyd & Foo, 1998].
Syntax
A convertible designated confirmer signature (CDCS) scheme consists of the following procedures:
Key generation (keygen). This algorithm inputs a security parameter κ and generates prob-
abilistically two key pairs (skS, pkS) and (skC , pkC) for the signer and for the confirmer
respectively.
ConfirmedSign (confirmedSign). On input skS , pkC , and a message m, the signer outputs a
confirmer signature signature µ, then interacts with the signature recipient (via an interactive
protocol) to convince him of the validity of the just generated signature.
Verification (verify). This is an algorithm, run by the signer on a just generated signature or by
the confirmer on any signature, to verify the validity of the alleged signature. The input to
the algorithm is, in addition to the public keys pkS and pkC , the message, and the alleged
signature, the random nonces rS used to produce the signature in case the algorithm is run
by the signer, or the private key skC in case the algorithm is run by the confirmer. The output
of this algorithm is either 1 if the purported signature if valid on the message, or 0 otherwise.
Confirmation/denial protocols (confirm/deny). These are interactive protocols between the con-
firmer and a signature recipient (the verifier). Their common input consists of, in addition
to pkS and pkC , the alleged signature µ, and the message m in question. The confirmer uses
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his private key skC to convince the verifier of the validity (invalidity) of the signature µ on
m. At the end, the verifier either accepts or rejects the proof.
Selective conversion (convert). This is an algorithm run by the confirmer, on a message m and
its corresponding signature µ, using skC , in addition to pkC and pkS . The result is either ⊥
in case µ is invalid w.r.t m, or a string which can be universally verified as a valid digital
signature on the message m w.r.t. pkS.
Selective verification (verifyConverted). This is an algorithm for verifying converted signatures.
It inputs the converted signature, the message, pkS , and pkC , and outputs either 0 or 1.
Remark 3.1. In [Gentry et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007], the authors give the possibility of ob-
taining directly digital signatures on a given message. We find this unnecessary since it is already
enough that a CDCS scheme supports the convertibility feature. Moreover, in [Wikstro¨m, 2007],
the author considers a further protocol used by the confirmer to prove the correctness of the con-
version. Throughout this thesis, we will mention the constructions that extend to this augmented
model.
Remark 3.2 (Security parameter). In the rest of this part, the security parameter of a construc-
tion consists of a tuple that comprises the security parameters used for the construction’s build-
ing blocks. Thus, when we invoke the key generation or the setup algorithms of a construction’s
building block on input a given security parameter, say κ, we mean that we call the mentioned al-
gorithms on input the field in κ which corresponds to the security parameter of the building block
in question. The same remark applies for security; when we say that a construction’s component
is secure for the security parameter κ, we mean that it is secure w.r.t. the field in κ corresponding
to the security parameter of this component.
3.2 Security model
Since their introduction, many definitions and security models for CDCS have emerged. We
present in this section the security properties we adhere to in this thesis. A security property
is, as commonly agreed on, an attribute allowing a cryptographic scheme to withstand malicious
attempts aiming at make it deviate from its prescribed task. These malicious attempts can be clas-
sified into two categories:
1. Attempts conducted by adversaries inside the system. This is for instance the case where
the scheme operators are dishonest, coerced, or where they simply have their private keys
compromised or stolen.
2. Attempts conducted by adversaries outside the system. These are the default attacks any
cryptographic scheme should take into consideration.
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A cryptographic scheme resilient against the first type of attacks is said to procure security
in an insider model, whereas a scheme resilient against the second type of attacks is said to be
secure in an outsider model. Consideration of the appropriate security model depends upon the
functionality of the scheme; for some schemes it is enough to consider outsider security, for others
it is imperative to consider insider security at least for some scheme properties.
The rest of this section will be devoted to the definition of the security properties we opt for, as
well as to the comparison of these properties with the popular ones found in the literature.
Let CS be a CDCS scheme given by the algorithms/protocols keygen, confirmedSign, verify,
confirm/deny, convert, and verifyConverted.
We assume that keygen inputs a security parameter κ and generates the key pairs (skS, pkS) and
(skC , pkC) for the signer and for the confirmer respectively.
Let M and S be the message and signature spaces considered by CS respectively. Let further the
confirmedSign (probabilistic) procedure produce a signature µ ∈ S and a protocol (S, V ) between
the signer S and the verifier V (the signature recipient). Finally, we denote by rS the randomness
used in the confirmedSign procedure to generate the signature µ.
3.2.1 Completeness
The CDCS scheme CS is complete when it satisfies the following properties:
1. Every signature produced following the CS.confirmedSign procedure should be validated by
the CS.verify algorithm. Moreover, if the signer and the signature holder are honest, then the
signer must be able to confirm every valid signature he has just generated.
∀m ∈M, if CS.confirmedSign{skS ,pkS ,pkC}(m) = {µ, (S, V )} then :
CS.verify{pkS ,pkC ,rS}(m,µ) = 1, and
Pr[(S, V )(m,µ, pkC , pkS) = Reject] = negl(κ),
where the probability is taken over the random tosses of both the prover and the verifier, and
negl is a negligible function.
2. The conversion of every signature produced following the CS.confirmedSign procedure should
be a string which can be universally verified as a valid digital signature on the message in
question.
∀m ∈M, if CS.confirmedSign{skS ,pkS ,pkC}(m) = {µ, (S, V )} then :
σ = CS.convertskC(m,µ)⇒ CS.verifyConverted{pkS ,pkC}(m, σ) = 1.
3. If the confirmer and the signature holder are honest, then the confirmer must be able to
confirm every valid signature, i.e. every signature validated by the algorithm CS.verify, and
disavow every invalid signature.
68
∀m ∈M, ∀µ ∈ S :
CS.verify{pkS ,pkC ,skC}(m,µ) = 1⇒ Pr[CS.confirm(m,µ, pkC , pkS) = Reject] = negl(κ),
CS.verify{pkS ,pkC ,skC}(m,µ) = 0⇒ Pr[CS.deny(m,µ, pkC , pkS) = Reject] = negl(κ),
where the probability is taken over the random tosses of both the prover and the verifier, and
negl is a negligible function.
3.2.2 Security for the verifier
This property informally means that an adversary who compromises the private keys of both the
signer and the confirmer cannot convince the verifier of the validity (invalidity) of an invalid (a
valid) confirmer signature. That is, the protocols confirmedSign, confirmation and denial are
sound. It is obvious that we consider security in the insider model for this property. In fact, we
require the genuiness of the signatures despite their opacity. The formal definition of this property
is as follows.
Definition 3.1. Let A be an adversary against the confirmer signature scheme CS. We consider
the following experiment:
1. A is given (skS, pkS) and (skC , pkC), output of the algorithm CS.keygen.
2. A produces a message m. He also runs CS.confirmedSign on m and produces a signature
µ using skS, pkS and pkC . Finally, A produces a string µ′, from the confirmer signatures
space, such that CS.verify{pkS ,pkC ,skC}(m,µ
′) = 0.
3. A interacts with a verifier V on the common input (m,µ′) and executes the protocol (A, V ),
as a part of the CS.confirmedSign algorithm, in addition to the protocol CS.confirm. More-
over, A interacts with V on the common input (m,µ) and runs the protocol CS.deny.
CS is said to provide security for the verifier if the following equations hold:
Pr[(A, V )(m,µ′, pkC , pkS) = Accept] = negl(κ), (3.1)
Pr[CS.confirm(m,µ′, pkC , pkS) = Accept] = negl(κ), (3.2)
Pr[CS.deny(m,µ, pkC , pkS) = Accept] = negl(κ), (3.3)
where the probability is over all the random tosses ofA and V , and negl is a negligible function.
3.2.3 Security for the signer
Security for the signer informally means that no one (including the confirmer) except the signer
can issue valid confirmer signatures; it is then clear that this security property considers insider
adversaries (the confirmer).
The formal definition of this requirement is as follows.
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Definition 3.2 (Security for the signer). We consider the CDCS scheme CS described earlier in
this section. Let A be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiment:
Experiment Expeuf−cmaCS,A (κ)
(pkS, skS)← CS.keygen(κ)
(pkC , skC)← A(pkS)
(m⋆, µ⋆)← AS(pkS, pkC , skC)
S : m 7−→ CS.confirmedSign{skS ,pkS ,pkC}(m)
return 1 if and only if the following properties are satisfied:
- CS.verify{pkS ,pkC ,skC}[m
⋆, µ⋆] = 1
- m⋆ was not queried to S
We define the success of A via:
Succeuf-cmaCS,A (κ) = Pr
[
Expeuf-cmaCS,A (κ) = 1
]
.
Given (t, qs) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε, qs)-EUF-CMA adversary against CS if,
running in time t and issuing qs queries to the CS.confirmedSign oracle, A has Succeuf-cmaCS,A (κ) ≥
ε. The scheme CS is said to be (t, ε, qs)-EUF-CMA secure if no (t, ε, qs)-EUF-CMA adversary
against it exists. Finally, we consider a CDCS scheme CS with security parameter κ ∈ N; CS(κ) is
said to be EUF-CMA secure if, for any polynomial functions t, qs : N→ N and any non-negligible
function ε : N→ [0, 1], it is (t(κ), ε(κ), qs(κ))-EUF-CMA secure.
Remark 3.3. Note that the adversary A in the above definition is not given the oracles CS.verify,
CS.confirm/CS.deny, and CS.convert. In fact, these oracles are useless for him as he has the
confirmer private key skC at his disposal.
3.2.4 Security for the confirmer
This is the crucial property for confirmer signatures as it quantifies their opacity. We can divide it
into two sub-properties: non-transferability which refers to the inability of the verifier to transfer
his conviction about the validity/invalidity of a signature to a third party, and opacity which refers
to the inability of a verifier to decide on the validity/invalidity of a signature w.r.t. a given message.
The first property can be ensured if the protocols CS.confirmedSign, CS.confirm and CS.deny
are zero knowledge, that is if the transcript resulting from the interaction of the verifier with the
signer or the confirmer during these protocols can be efficiently simulated.
The second property is a bit intricate. First, there is the question of whether to consider insider
or only outsider adversaries. Insider security means that the signer’s private key can be compro-
mised in which case the entire system is broken. However, it (insider security) might be needed in
situations where we want to protect the invisibility of signatures issued by the genuine signer from
70
an adversary who has stolen this signer’s private key. The second issue concerning the opacity
of the signatures is whether one should hide the validity of the signatures w.r.t. the message in
question or hide the identity of the signer. In the rest of this subsection, we will describe formally
the non-transferability of confirmer signatures as well as the different notions of their opacity.
Non-transferability
Let CS be the CDCS scheme described above. Non-transferability of CS.confirmedSign and of
CS.confirm/CS.deny is defined through the following two games involving the adversary, the
signer, the confirmer, and a simulator:
Game 1: the adversary is given the public keys of the signer and of the confirmer, namely pkS
and pkC resp. He can then make arbitrary queries of type CS.confirmedSign to the signer
and of type CS.confirm/CS.deny and CS.convert to the confirmer. Note that the adversary
is allowed at any time to create his own key pairs (skS′, pkS′) and query the confirmer for
verification/conversion of signatures w.r.t. these key pairs. Eventually, the adversary presents
two stringsm and µ for which he wishes to carry out, on the common input (m,µ, pkS, pkC),
the protocol CS.confirmedSign with the signer, or the protocols CS.confirm/CS.deny with the
confirmer. The private input of the signer is the randomness used to generate the signature
µ (in case µ is a signature just generated by the signer), whereas the private input of the
confirmer is his private key skC . The adversary continues issuing queries to both the signer
and the confirmer until he decides that this phase is over and produces an output.
Game 2: this game is similar to the previous one with the difference of playing a simulator
instead of running the real signer or the real confirmer when it comes to the interaction
of the adversary with the signer in CS.confirmedSign or with the confirmer in CS.confirm/
CS.deny on the common input (m,µ, pkS, pkC). The simulator is not given the private input
of neither the signer nor the confirmer. It is however allowed to issue a single oracle call
that tells whether µ is a valid confirmer signature on m w.r.t. pkS and pkC . Note that the
simulator in this game refers to a probabilistic polynomial Turing machine with rewind.
The signatures issued by CS are said to be non-transferable if there exists an efficient simulator such
that for all (pkS, pkC), the outputs of the adversary in Game 1 and Game 2 are indistinguishable.
Remark 3.4. The notion of non-transferability is very close to the notion of zero knowledge in
the sense that both notions assume the existence of an efficient algorithm (the simulator) capable
of producing transcripts of the proof/protocol in question that are indistinguishable from those
obtained from the interaction with the real prover. The only difference is that in non-transferability,
we require that the simulator interacts with the adversary, whereas in zero knowledge transcripts
are enough. However, according to Remark 1.9, the ZK property of the CS.confirmedSign or
the CS.confirm/CS.deny protocols is enough to ensure the non-transferability of the confirmer
signatures.
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Invisibility
Invisibility against a chosen message attack (INV-CMA) for the confirmer signature scheme CS is
defined through the following game between an attacker A and his challenger R:
Phase 1: afterA gets the public parameters of CS, namely pkS and pkC , fromR, he starts issuing
queries of type CS.confirmedSign, CS.confirm/CS.deny, and CS.convert in an adaptive way.
Challenge: once A decides that Phase 1 is over, he outputs two messages m⋆0, m⋆1 and requests a
challenge signature µ⋆. R picks uniformly at random a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Then µ⋆ is generated
using the CS.confirmedSign algorithm on the message m⋆b .
Phase 2: A resumes adaptively making the previous types of queries, with the exception of not
querying (m⋆i , µ⋆), i = 0, 1, to the CS.{confirm, deny} and CS.convert oracles. At the end,
A outputs a bit b′. He wins the game if b = b′.
Definition 3.3 (Invisibility (INV-CMA)). Let CS be the CDCS scheme described earlier, and let
A be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiment for b R←− {0, 1}:
Experiment Expinv-cma−bCS,A (κ)
(pkS , skS , pkC , skC)← CS.keygen(κ)
(m⋆0,m
⋆
1,I)← AS,Cv,V(find, pkS , pkC)∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : m 7−→ CS.confirmedSign{skS ,pkS ,pkC}(m)
Cv : (m,µ) 7−→ CS.convertskC (m,µ)
V : (m,µ) 7−→ CS.{confirm, deny}(m,µ, pkC , pkS)
µ⋆ ← CS.confirmedSign{skS ,pkS ,pkC}(m⋆b)
d← AS,Cv,V(guess,I, µ⋆, pkS, pkC)∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : m 7−→ CS.confirmedSign{skS ,pkS ,pkC}(m)
Cv : (m,µ)(6= (m⋆i , µ⋆), i = 0, 1) 7−→ CS.convertskC (m,µ)
V : (m,µ)(6= (m⋆i , µ⋆), i = 0, 1) 7−→ CS.{confirm, deny}(m,µ, pkC , pkS)
Return d
We define the advantage of A via:
Advinv−cmaCS,A (κ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expinv−cma−bCS,A (κ) = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N4 and ε ∈ [0, 1],A is called a (t, ε, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA adversary against
CS if, running in time t and issuing qs queries to the CS.confirmedSign oracle, qv queries to the
CS.confirm/CS.deny oracles, and qsc queries to the CS.convert oracle,A has Advinv−cmaCS,A (κ) ≥ ε.
The scheme CS is said to be (t, ε, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA secure if no (t, ε, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA
adversary against it exists. Finally, we consider a CDCS scheme CS with security parameter
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κ ∈ N; CS(κ) is said to be INV-CMA secure if, for any polynomial functions t, qs, qv, qsc : N→ N
and any non-negligible function ε : N → [0, 1], it is (t(κ), ε(κ), qs(κ), qv(κ), qsc(κ))-INV-CMA
secure.
Anonymity
Anonymity against a chosen message attack (ANO-CMA) for the confirmer signature scheme CS
is defined through the following game between an attacker A and his challenger R.
Phase 1: A gets two public keys for CS, namely two key pairs (skS0 , pkS0) and (skS1 , pkS1) for
the signer, and two key pairs (skC0 , pkC0) and (skC1 , pkC1) for the confirmer. He then issues
queries to the CS.confirmedSign, CS.confirm/CS.deny, and CS.convert oracles, w.r.t. both
keys, in an adaptive way.
Challenge: once A decides that Phase 1 is over, he outputs a messages m⋆ and requests a chal-
lenge signature µ⋆. R picks uniformly at random a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, then µ⋆ is generated using
the CS.confirmedSign algorithm on the message m⋆ w.r.t. (pkSb , pkCb) .
Phase 2: A resumes adaptively making the previous types of queries, with the exception of not
querying (m⋆, µ⋆) to theCS.{confirm, deny} and CS.convert oracles of both keys (pkSb, pkCb),
b = 0, 1 . At the end, A outputs a bit b′. He wins the game if b = b′.
Definition 3.4 (Anonymity (ANO-CMA)). Let CS be the CDCS scheme defined earlier, and let A
be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiment for b R←− {0, 1}:
Experiment Expano-cma−bCS,A (κ)
(pkS0 , skS0 , pkC0 , skC0)← CS.keygen(κ)
(pkS1 , skS1 , pkC1 , skC1)← CS.keygen(κ)
(m⋆,I)← AS,Cv,V(find, pkS0 , pkS1 , pkC0 , pkC1)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
S = Si, i = 0, 1;Si : m 7−→ CS.confirmedSign{skSi ,pkSi ,pkCi}(m).
Cv = Cvi, i = 0, 1;Cvi : (m,µ) 7−→ CS.convertskCi (m,µ).
V = Vi, i = 0, 1;Vi : (m,µ) 7−→ CS.{confirm, deny}(m,µ, pkCi , pkSi).
µ⋆ ← CS.confirmedSign{skSb ,pkSb ,pkCb}(m
⋆)
d← AS,Cv,V(guess,I, µ⋆)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
S = Si, i = 0, 1;Si : m 7−→ CS.confirmedSign{skSi ,pkSi ,pkCi}(m).
Cv = Cvi, i = 0, 1;Cvi : (m,µ)(6= (m⋆, µ⋆)) 7−→ CS.convertskCi (m,µ).
V = Vi, i = 0, 1;Vi : (m,µ)(6= (m⋆, µ⋆)) 7−→ CS.{confirm, deny}(m,µ, pkSi , pkCi).
Return d
We define the advantage of A via:
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Advano−cmaCS,A (κ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expano−cma−bCS,A (κ) = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N4 and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε, qs, qv, qsc)-ANO-CMA adver-
sary against CS if, running in time t and issuing qs queries to the CS.confirmedSign oracle,
qv queries to the CS.confirm/CS.deny oracles, and qsc queries to the CS.convert oracle, A has
Advano−cmaCS,A (κ) ≥ ε. The scheme CS is said to be (t, ε, qs, qv, qsc)-ANO-CMA secure if no
(t, ε, qs, qv, qsc)-ANO-CMA adversary against it exists. Finally, we consider a CDCS scheme
CS with security parameter κ ∈ N; CS(κ) is said to be ANO-CMA secure if, for any poly-
nomial functions t, qs, qv, qsc : N → N and any non-negligible function ε : N → [0, 1], it is
(t(κ), ε(κ), qs(κ), qv(κ), qsc(κ))-ANO-CMA secure.
Strong invisibility
To capture both anonymity and invisibility, Galbraith and Mao introduced in [Galbraith & Mao,
2003] a notion, which we denote SINV-CMA, that requires the confirmer signatures to be indistin-
guishable from random elements in the signature space. This new notion is proven to imply both
INV-CMA and ANO-CMA (Theorem 1 and Theorem 4 respectively of [Galbraith & Mao, 2003]).
This notion is defined exactly as the INV-CMA notion with the difference that when it comes to
the challenge phase, the adversary produces a message m and the challenge signature is either a
valid confirmer signature on m, issued according to confirmedSign, or a random string from the
confirmer signatures space.
Definition 3.5 (Strong Invisibility (SINV-CMA)). Let CS be the CDCS scheme, described earlier,
with confirmer signatures space S, and let A be a PPTM. We consider the following random
experiment for b R←− {0, 1}:
Experiment Expsinv-cma−bCS,A (κ)
(pkS , skS , pkC , skC)← CS.keygen(κ)
(m⋆,I)← AS,Cv,V(find, pkS , pkC)∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : m 7−→ CS.confirmedSign{skS ,pkS ,pkC}(m)
Cv : (m,µ) 7−→ CS.convertskC (m,µ)
V : (m,µ) 7−→ CS.{confirm, deny}(m,µ, pkC , pkS)
µ⋆ ← CS.confirmedSign{skS ,pkS ,pkC}(m⋆)
if b = 0 then {µ R←− S, µ⋆ ← µ}
d← AS,Cv,V(guess,I, µ⋆, pkS , pkC)∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : m 7−→ CS.confirmedSign{skS ,pkS ,pkC}(m)
Cv : (m,µ)(6= (m⋆, µ⋆)) 7−→ CS.convertskC (m,µ)
V : (m,µ)(6= (m⋆, µ⋆)) 7−→ CS.{confirm, deny}(m,µ, pkC , pkS)
Return d
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We define the advantage of A via:
Advsinv−cmaCS,A (κ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expsinv−cma−bCS,A (κ) = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N4 and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε, qs, qv, qsc)-SINV-CMA adver-
sary against CS if, running in time t and issuing qs queries to the CS.confirmedSign oracle,
qv queries to the CS.confirm/CS.deny oracles, and qsc queries to the CS.convert oracle, A has
Advsinv−cmaCS,A (κ) ≥ ε. The scheme CS is said to be (t, ε, qs, qv, qsc)-SINV-CMA secure if no
(t, ε, qs, qv, qsc)-SINV-CMA adversary against it exists. Finally, we consider a CDCS scheme
CS with security parameter κ ∈ N; CS(κ) is said to be SINV-CMA secure if, for any poly-
nomial functions t, qs, qv, qsc : N → N and any non-negligible function ε : N → [0, 1], it is
(t(κ), ε(κ), qs(κ), qv(κ), qsc(κ))-SINV-CMA secure.
3.2.5 Comparison with other security models
In this paragraph, we compare our security model with the popular ones found in the literature:
• Our definitions of completeness, security for the verifier and non-transferability of the con-
firmedSign, confirmation, and denial protocols are the same provided as in [Camenisch &
Michels, 2000; Gentry et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007].
• We consider the insider security model against malicious confirmers in our definition for
unforgeability. I.e. the adversary is allowed to choose his key pair (skC , pkC). This is
justified by the need of preventing the confirmer from impersonating the signer by issuing
valid signatures on his behalf. Hence, our definition of unforgeability, which is the same
as the one considered by [Wikstro¨m, 2007], implies its similars in [Camenisch & Michels,
2000; Gentry et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007].
• Our definition of invisibility (INV-CMA), oppositely to the definitions in [Camenisch &
Michels, 2000; Gentry et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007], is considered in the outsider security
model. I.e. the adversary does not know the private key of the signer. We justify this
by considering the CDCS scheme broken if the signer is corrupted or coerced. Actually,
“outsider security might be all one needs” for invisibility as phrased by the authors in [An
et al., 2002].
• Our definition of invisibility (INV-CMA), oppositely to the definitions in [Gentry et al.,
2005; Wang et al., 2007], allows the signer to sign the same message many times without
loss of invisibility, which is needed in licensing software.
• Finally our definition of invisibility (INV-CMA), like the definitions in [Camenisch & Michels,
2000; Gentry et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007] and unlike the definition in [Galbraith & Mao,
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2003], does not guarantee the non-transferability of the signatures. I.e. the confirmer sig-
nature might convince the recipient that the signer was involved in the signature of some
message. We refer to the discussion in [Gentry et al., 2005] (Section 3) for techniques that
can be used by the signer to camouflage the presence of valid signatures, e.g. the signer can
for instance publish a few “dummy” signatures during each time period.
3.3 Constructions
Since the introduction of confirmer signatures, a number of attempts have been made to produce
them from basic primitives. The first construction is due to Okamoto [Okamoto, 1994], and was
used to prove equivalence between confirmer signatures and public key encryption with respect to
existence. Thus, efficiency was not taken into account in the framework. The subsequent proposals
follow one of the following two strategies; either produce a digital signature on the message to be
signed, then encrypt the resulting signature, or produce a commitment on the message, encrypt the
string used to generate the commitment, and finally sign the latter. We recall in this section the
constructions realizing those two approaches along with their security analyses.
3.3.1 The “encryption of a signature” paradigm
This approach consists in first producing a digital signature on the message to be signed, then
encrypting the produced signature using a suitable public key encryption scheme. The construction
was first formally1 described in [Camenisch & Michels, 2000], and required the components to
meet the highest security notions (EUF-CMA signatures and IND-CCA encryption). The main
weakness of the construction lies in the resort to zero knowledge (ZK) protocols of general NP
statements in the confirmation/denial protocol.
The construction
Let Σ be a digital signature scheme given by Σ.keygen which generates a key pair (private key =
Σ.sk, public key= Σ.pk), Σ.sign, and Σ.verify. Let furthermore Γ denote a public key encryption
scheme described by Γ.keygen that generates the key pair (private key = Γ.sk, public key= Γ.pk),
Γ.encrypt, and Γ.decrypt.
Finally, let m ∈ {0, 1}⋆ be a message. The construction is as follows:
Setup (setup). On input the security parameter κ, output the public parameters of Γ and Σ.
Key generation (keygen). Invoke the algorithms Σ.keygen and Γ.keygen to generate the keys
Σ.sk, Σ.pk, Γ.sk, and Γ.pk. Set the signer’s key pair to (Σ.sk,Σ.pk) and the confirmer’s key
pair to (Γ.sk,Γ.pk).
1The idea without proof was already known, for instance, it was mentioned in [Damga˚rd & Pedersen, 1996].
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ConfirmedSign (confirmedSign). On a message m, the signer first computes a (digital) signature
σ = ΣΣ.sk.sign(m) on m, then encrypts the result using Γ.encrypt. The resulting ciphertext
µ = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(σ) forms the output confirmer signature. Moreover, the signer interacts
with the signature recipient in a zero knowledge protocol where he (the signer) proves that
the output is a valid confirmer signature on the message in question. The prover’s private
input is the randomness used to generate the encryption µ of σ.
Verification (verify). To check whether an alleged confirmer signature µ, issued on a certain
message m, is valid, the confirmer first decrypts it to recover σ, then calls the algorithm
Σ.verify on the result using Σ.pk. The signature is valid if and only if the output of the latter
item is 1. We stress again that this algorithm is run by the confirmer. It can also be run
by the signer on a just generated signature µ; using the randomness used to generate µ (as
encryption of some σ), the signer checks whether µ is well formed, i.e. whether µ is indeed
an encryption of σ, then he checks, using Σ.pk, whether σ is a valid digital signature on m.
Confirmation/Denial protocol (confirm/deny). To confirm (deny) a purported signature µ on a
certain message m, the confirmer first checks its validity using the verification algorithm.
According to the result, the signer issues a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of the de-
cryption of µ, that passes (does not pass) Σ.verify.
Selective conversion (convert). Given a signature µ on m, the confirmer first checks whether it
is valid. If it is the case, then he outputs Γ.decryptΓ.sk(µ), otherwise he outputs ⊥.
Selective verification (verifyConverted). It is easy to see that the verification of converted signa-
tures can be achieved by the algorithm Σ.verify using Σ.pk.
Remark 3.5. It is possible to issue the confirmation/denial protocols as well as the one under-
lying the confirmedSign algorithm because the underlying assertions define either NP (in case of
confirmedSign or confirm) or co-NP (in case of deny) languages which accept zero knowledge
proof systems according to Subsection 1.4.2.
Security analysis
The completeness of the construction above is ensured by the correctness of the algorithms Σ.sign,
Σ.verify, Γ.encrypt and Γ.decrypt, and by the completeness of the proofs underlying the protocols
confirmedSign, confirm and deny. As for the security for the verifier and the non-transferability of
the signatures, they are established thanks to the soundness and zero knowledgeness of the proofs
underlying the protocols confirmedSign, confirm, and deny. Moreover, the resulting signatures are
existentially unforgeable against malicious confirmers, and they are invisible in the insider model.
Theorem 3.1. Given (t, qs) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], the construction depicted above is (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-
CMA secure against malicious confirmers if the underlying signature scheme is also (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-
CMA secure.
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The proof is similar to that provided in [Camenisch & Michels, 2000] although the latter one
does not explicitly prove the construction to be unforgeable against malicious confirmers.
Proof. Let A be a (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA adversary against the construction. We will construct a
(t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA adversary R against the underlying digital signature scheme as follows.
R gets the public key of the signature scheme Σ from his challenger. Then he chooses a suitable
encryption scheme Γ and gets from A the generated confirmer key pair (Γ.pk,Γ.sk).
Signature queries made by A on a message mi can be answered as follows. First, R requests
his challenger for a digital signature σi on mi, then he encrypts σi in µi and outputs the result toA.
Finally, he interacts with A in a protocol where he proves that the generated signature is indeed a
valid confirmer signature on mi. The private input of R in this protocol is the randomness used to
encrypt σi in µi, or Γ.sk. Note that A can check the validity of this signature himself using Γ.sk.
Eventually, A outputs a pair (m,µ) consisting of a message m that was never queried for
signature and a valid confirmer signature µ on it. R will simply output σ = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(µ) to his
own challenger. In fact, σ is a valid digital signature on the message m which was never queried
by R to his own challenger, and thus forms a valid existential forgery on Σ.
Theorem 3.2. Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N4 and ε ∈ [0, 1], the construction above is (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-
INV-CMA secure in the insider model if the underlying encryption scheme is (t, ǫ, qv + qsc)-IND-
CCA secure.
We give a sketch of the proof below and we refer to the full version in [Camenisch & Michels,
2000].
Sketch. Let R be an IND-CCA adversary against an encryption scheme Γ. R gets the public key
Γ.pk of the encryption scheme from his challenger and is further given an INV-CMA adversary A
against the construction depicted above.
R will choose a digital signature scheme Σ along with a key pair (Σ.sk,Σ.pk) and will provide
A with the public parameters of the confirmer signature resulting from combining the encryption
scheme Γ and the signature Σ. A will get also hold of the private signing key, namely Σ.sk.
Simulation of the confirmedSign queries made by A is done as the ordinary algorithm would
perform, namely by first producing a digital signature, using Σ.sk, on the message in question,
then encrypting the resulting signature using Γ.pk. The resulting ciphertext forms the confirmer
signature output to A. R will then interact with A to prove the validity of the just generated
signature. The private input of R in such a protocol is the randomness used to encrypt the digital
signature.
Simulation of the confirm/deny queries (m,µ) is done by first invoking the decryption oracle
of Γ on µ to obtain σ = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(µ), then checking the validity of σ w.r.t. m. According to the
result, R issues a simulation of the confirm/deny protocols. In fact, since the confirmer signatures
are non-transferable, then there exists a simulation of the confirmation/denial protocols which is
indistinguishable from the real execution of these protocols. Simulation of the convert queries is
done by simply decrypting (using the decryption oracle) the confirmer signature in question.
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Eventually, A outputs two messages m0, m1 and requests a challenge confirmer signature. At
that point, R produces a digital signature σi = Σ.signΣ.sk(mi) on each message mi, i = 0, 1. With
overwhelming probability, σ0 6= σ1 as m0 6= m1. Then, R gives these two signatures to his own
challenger. He gets as a challenge ciphertext µ⋆, which is either the encryption of σ0 or σi, that he
will forward to A.
A continues issuing confirmedSign, confirm/deny and convert queries as before . Note that
at that point, and according to the invisibility notion considered by the authors in [Camenisch &
Michels, 2000], A is not allowed to issue confirm/deny and convert queries which involve µ⋆. R
can answer as previously, for instance he is able to invoke his decryption oracle without problems
as the confirmer signatures in play are different from the challenge ciphertext µ⋆.
Finally, when A outputs his guess (either 0 or 1) on the message underlying the signature µ⋆,
A will forward the same guess to his own challenger.
Other variants
The Goldwasser-Waisbard [Goldwasser & Waisbard, 2004] construction. This construction
was the first to circumvent, although partially, the main problem in the basic paradigm,
namely the recourse to proofs of general NP statements in the confirmation/denial protocols.
The idea consists in considering a class S of digital signatures which accept efficient witness
hiding proofs of knowledge (WHPOK). A WHPOK (see for instance [Goldreich, 2001, Sec-
tion 4.6] for more details) is informally a proof where the prover does not reveal the witness
but may leak some knowledge during his interaction with the verifier; it is then a weaker
notion than zero knowledge. Let (t, b, sb) be an accepting transcript resulting from the in-
teraction, between a prover and a verifier, in which the prover convinces the verifier that he
holds a digital signature σ on the common input message m. t forms the first message, or
the commitment, sent by the prover. b R←− {0, 1} denotes the public coin, or the challenge
sent by the verifier. Finally, sb denotes the response of the prover to the challenge b. It is
assumed that given two different accepting transcripts (t, b, sb) and (t, 1− b, s1−b), there ex-
ists a knowledge extractor which can extract the witness, namely the signature σ. With such
a class of signatures in addition to an IND-CCA secure encryption scheme Γ, the authors in
[Goldwasser & Waisbard, 2004] provide confirmer signatures on a message m as follows:
1. The signer first produces a digital signature σ on m. Then, he computes the commit-
ment t he would send to the verifier if he wishes to provide a WHPOK for σ. Next he
computes s0 and s1, the responses to the challenges b = 0 and b = 1 resp., along with
their encryptions e0 and e1 using random coins r0 and r1 resp. Finally the signer sends
(t, e0, e1) to the signature recipient.
2. The signature recipient selects b R←− {0, 1} and sends it to the signer.
3. The signer reveals sb to the verifier along with the random coin used to produce its
encryption eb, namely rb.
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4. The signature recipient accepts if eb is indeed the encryption of sb using rb, and if
(t, b, sb) is indeed an accepting transcript for the WHPOK.
The triplet (t, e0, e1) forms the confirmer signature the verifier needs to present before the
confirmer for verification or conversion. In fact, the confirmer can decrypt both e0 and e1
in s0 and s1 resp., then extract the witness σ in case of a valid signature and finally interact
(in case of a confirmation query) with the verifier in a protocol similar to the one above.
Conversion is done by revealing σ. And finally, the denial of an invalid signature consists of
a ZK proof that the conversion returns an invalid signature.
The construction successfully gets rid of proofs of general NP statements in the confirma-
tion protocol. However, it still resorts to them in the denial protocol. Moreover, the length
of the signatures as well as their generation cost grow linearly with the number of rounds
in the WHPOK. Finally, the security guarantees satisfied by the construction are much more
relaxed compared to the ones met by the construction realizing the basic “encryption of a
signature” paradigm. For instance, the non-transferability of the signatures may not be guar-
anteed with the use of WHPOK, as the adversary might get sufficient knowledge (from the
confirmation protocol) to convince other parties with the validity of the signature he is hold-
ing. Also, the adversary is not given access to a conversion oracle in the non-transferability
definition which means that one can say nothing about his ability in transferring knowledge
of the validity of signatures when he sees some converted signatures.
The Wikstro¨m [Wikstro¨m, 2007] construction. This construction does not differ much from
the basic “encryption of a signature” paradigm in that it consists in first producing a digital
signature on the message to be signed then encrypting the resulting signature. The difference
is that the used encryption scheme needs to support labels. Actually, the encryption of the
digital signatures is done under the label Σ.pk, which denotes the public key of the signer.
An instantiation of the construction is further provided and is proved secure under the strong
RSA assumption, the decision composite residuosity assumption, and the decision Diffie-
Hellman problem. The basic novelty of the work [Wikstro¨m, 2007] lies in the new security
model proposed for confirmer signatures, and in which the construction is analyzed. We
summarize below the basic new security definitions proposed in [Wikstro¨m, 2007]:
1. Security for the signer. This property is a reformulation of the unforgeability prop-
erty for confirmer signatures, which takes into condition malicious confirmers. I.e. the
adversary is allowed to choose the confirmer key (skC , pkC). Almost all previous con-
structions , e.g. [Camenisch & Michels, 2000; Goldwasser & Waisbard, 2004; Gentry
et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007] extend to this model.
2. Security for the confirmer. This property, called in [Wikstro¨m, 2007] impersonation
resistance, requires that no one should play the role of the genuine confirmer, namely
prove that the confirmer key is well formed, that a signature is valid/invalid and finally
that a conversion is correct. The formalization of such is property is done as usual
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through a game where the adversary has access to a genuine confirmer oracle that he
can consult up to the challenge phase. Consequently, one gets with this definition
only a “lunch-time” security for the confirmer unlike the definitions proposed earlier in
Subsection 3.2.4. The non-transferability of signatures proposed in [Wikstro¨m, 2007]
is the same proposed earlier in this chapter.
The Security for the verifier property in [Wikstro¨m, 2007] is the same proposed in Subsec-
tion 3.2.2, which agrees with the definitions in [Camenisch & Michels, 2000; Goldwasser
& Waisbard, 2004; Gentry et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007]. Finally, it is worth mention-
ing that the model in [Wikstro¨m, 2007] requires the confirmer to prove the correctness of a
conversion. Again, all the previous constructions,e.g. [Camenisch & Michels, 2000; Gold-
wasser & Waisbard, 2004; Gentry et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007], as well as the ones we
will encounter in this thesis extend to this model.
3.3.2 The “signature of a commitment” paradigm
This paradigm was first considered in [Michels & Stadler, 1998] to build confirmer signatures from
signatures obtained using the Fiat-Shamir paradigm. The main criticism to such a construction lies
in the resort to the ROM (resulting from the use of the Fiat-Shamir Paradigm) and the non-support
of the convertibility feature. In [An et al., 2002], the authors upgraded this technique to the “en-
crypt then commit then sign” method, which consists in first generating a random string, say r and
encrypting it in e, then using r to generate a commitment c on the message to be signed, and finally
produce a digital signature on the commitment c. This approach was used in the context of sign-
cryption in [An et al., 2002] and was analyzed in the insider security model. Later in [Gentry et al.,
2005], the authors used it to build confirmer signatures and provided an efficient instantiation us-
ing Camenisch-Shoup [Camenisch & Shoup, 2003]’s encryption and and Pedersen’s commitment.
The resulting construction was shown to be invisible in the insider security model if the underlying
commitment is hiding and the underlying encryption is IND-CCA secure. However, the authors
in [Wang et al., 2007] disproved this claim by exhibiting an attack against the invisibility of the
construction regardless of the underlying encryption: given the challenge signature (e, c, σ) on the
message mb, where b ∈ {0, 1} and m0, m1 are the challenge messages output by the invisibility
adversary A, the latter computes a commitment c′ such that the underlying message m′ is mean-
ingfully related to m0, m1 (m′ = k+mb−m0, where k is known toA) and the underlying random
string is the same used to create c. Such a construction is possible using Pedersen’s commitment.
Next, A produces a digital signature σ′ on c′ (this is possible in the insider security model) and
queries the conversion oracle on (e, c′, σ′) and the message k; if the oracle answers r 6=⊥, then A
outputs b = 0, otherwise if the oracle answers ⊥, A outputs b = 1. The authors in [Wang et al.,
2007] proposed a fix to this construction which consists in using encryption schemes with labels.
In the rest of this section, we describe the construction of [Wang et al., 2007] and we recall its
security analysis.
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The construction in [Wang et al., 2007]
Setup (setup). Consider a digital signature scheme Σ, an encryption scheme Γ with labels, and a
commitment scheme Ω.
Key generation (keygen). The signer key pair consists of (Σ.pk,Σ.sk), corresponding to the key
pair of the signature scheme Σ, whereas the confirmer key pair consists of (Γ.sk,Γ.sk) which
corresponds to the key pair related to Γ.
ConfirmedSign (confirmedSign). To sign a message m, the signer first computes a commit-
ment c on the message, then encrypts in e, under the label m‖Σ.pk, the random string
used for the commitment, say r, and finally, signs the commitment c using Σ.sk. The con-
firmer signature consists of the triple (e, c,Σ.signΣ.sk(c)). Next, the signer interacts with
the verifier in a protocol where he (the signer) proves in ZK the knowledge of r such that
r = Γ.decryptΓ.sk,m‖Σ.pk(e) and c = Ω.commit(m, r). Such a proof is possible to issue using
the randomness used to encrypt r in e. In fact, the encryption and commitment algorithms in
an encryption scheme and a commitment scheme resp. define an NP language that accepts a
zero knowledge proof system.
Confirmation/Denial protocol (confirm/deny). To confirm/deny a signature µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3)
on a given message m, the confirmer first checks whether µ3 is a valid digital signature
on µ2 w.r.t. Σ.pk, if so, he provides a ZK proof (using his private key Γ.sk) of the equal-
ity/inequality of the decryption of µ1 (w.r.t. the label m‖Σ.pk) and the opening value of the
commitment µ2 w.r.t. m. Again this proof is plausible since every NP (co-NP in case of
inequality) language accepts a zero knowledge proof system.
Verification (verify). The verification of a purported signature µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3) on a given mes-
sage m is achieved by first checking the validity of µ3 w.r.t. to m as a digital signature, then
checking the equality of the decryption of µ1 (w.r.t. the label m‖Σ.pk) and the opening value
of µ3, as a commitment on m. This equality check can be achieved by the signer, who has
just generated µ, given the randomness used to create the ciphertext µ1, or by the confirmer
who can decrypt µ1 using Γ.sk.
Selective conversion (convert). Selective conversion of a signature µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3) is achieved
by releasing the decryption of µ1, in case µ is valid, or the symbol ⊥ otherwise.
Selective verification (verifyConverted). It is easy to see that the verification of converted signa-
tures can be achieved by the algorithms Ω.open and Σ.verify.
Security analysis
Completeness, soundness and non-transferability of the confirmedSign and the confirmation/denial
protocols follow directly from using zero knowledge proofs of knowledge. Concerning unforge-
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ability of the resulting confirmer signatures, it rests on the EUF-CMA security and on the binding
property of the underlying digital signature scheme and the commitment scheme respectively. Fi-
nally, invisibility is attained by using an IND-CCA secure encryption scheme with labels and a
secure commitment scheme. Details about the proofs were not given so far, but are due to appear
in a forthcoming paper (full version of [Wang et al., 2007]). Since the paper is not available yet,
we flesh out what we suspect to be the proofs in this paragraph.
Theorem 3.3. Given (t, qs) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], the construction depicted above is (t, ǫ, qs)-
EUF-CMA secure if uses a binding commitment scheme and a (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA secure digital
signature scheme.
Proof. Let A be an attacker against the construction. We will construct an attacker R against the
underlying signature scheme as follows.
R gets the parameters of the signature scheme Σ from his challenger, namely the public key
Σ.pk. Then, R will choose an appropriate encryption scheme Γ with labels and a commitment
scheme Ω. R gets from A the generated confirmer key pair (Γ.pk,Γ.sk) and finally sets the men-
tioned entities as components of the constructionA is trying to attack.
For a signature query on a message mi, R will first create a commitment ci using a random
string ri, then he will query his own challenger for a digital signature on ci. Let σi be the output
digital signature on ci. The output confirmer signature consists of the triple µi = (ei, ci, σi), where
ei is an encryption of ri under the label mi‖Σ.pk.
A will have at his disposal Γ.sk and thus he won’t need to ask confirm/deny or selective con-
version queries. And, even in case he requests them, R is able to answer such queries with the
knowledge of Γ.sk.
At some point, A will output a forgery µ⋆ = (e⋆, c⋆, σ⋆) on some message m⋆ that has never
been queried. If there exists an 1 ≤ i ≤ qs such that c⋆ = ci, where µi = (ei, ci, σi) is an
output confirmer signature on a query mi, then since mi 6= m⋆, R will output a collision for the
commitment scheme Ω. As the latter is by assumption binding, c⋆ never occurred in signatures
output to A. Therefore (c⋆, σ⋆) corresponds to a valid existential forgery on Σ.
The invisibility of the construction is considered in [Wang et al., 2007] in a slightly different
model and it rests on the security of the underlying encryption and commitment schemes. The main
difference between the model in [Wang et al., 2007] and our definition of invisibility, provided
earlier, lies in giving the adversary the signer’s private key, however disallowing him to make
verification/conversion queries w.r.t. the challenge message and valid signatures on it.
Definition 3.6 (Invisibility [Wang et al., 2007] (INV2-CMA)). Let CS = (keygen, confirmedSign,-
verify, confirm/deny, convert, verifyConverted) be a CDCS scheme, and let A be a PPTM. We de-
fine the relation R between two strings µ and µ′ w.r.t. a message m to be 1 if both µ and µ′ are
valid confirmer signatures on m (w.r.t. the same signer’s key) and we write R(m,µ, µ′) = 1. We
consider the following random experiment, where κ is a security parameter, and b R←− {0, 1}:
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Experiment Expinv2-cma−bCS,A (κ)
(pkS , skS , pkC , skC)← CS.keygen(κ)
(m⋆0,m
⋆
1, I)← ACv,V(find, pkS , skS , pkC)∣∣∣∣ Cv : (m,µ) 7−→ CS.convertskC (m,µ)V : (m,µ) 7−→ CS.{confirm, deny}(m,µ, pkC , pkS)
µ⋆ ← CS.confirmedSign{skS ,pkS ,pkC}(m⋆b )
d← ACv,V(guess, I, µ⋆, pkS , skS , pkC)∣∣∣∣ Cv : (m,µ)(6= (m⋆i , µ˜) : R(mi, µ⋆, µ˜) = 1, i = 0, 1) 7−→ CS.convertskC (m,µ)V : (m,µ)(6= (m⋆i , µ˜) : R(mi, µ⋆, µ˜) = 1, i = 0, 1) 7−→ CS.{confirm, deny}(m,µ, pkC , pkS)
Return d
We define the advantage of A via:
Advinv2−cmaCS,A (κ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expinv2−cma−bCS,A (κ) = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Given (t, qv, qsc) ∈ N3 and ε ∈ [0, 1],A is called a (t, ε, qv, qsc)-INV2-CMA adversary against
CS if, running in time t and issuing qv queries to the CS.confirm/CS.deny oracles and qsc queries
to the CS.convert oracle, A has Advinv2−cmaCS,A (κ) ≥ ε. The scheme CS is said to be (t, ε, qv, qsc)-
INV2-CMA secure if no (t, ε, qv, qsc)-INV2-CMA adversary against it exists. Finally, we consider
a CDCS scheme CS with security parameter κ ∈ N; CS(κ) is said to be INV2-CMA secure if, for
any polynomial functions t, qv, qsc : N → N and any non-negligible function ε : N → [0, 1], it is
(t(κ), ε(κ), qv(κ), qsc(κ))-INV2-CMA secure.
Remark 3.6. Note that the adversary in the above definition does not need a CS.confirmedSign
oracle since he has the signing private key skS .
We present in the sequel the invisibility analysis in the model considered by the authors in
[Wang et al., 2007].
Theorem 3.4. Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N4 and ε ∈ [0, 1], the construction depicted earlier in this
subsection is (t, ǫ, qv, qsc)-INV2-CMA if it uses an injective, binding, and (t, ǫh)-hiding commit-
ment, and a (t, ǫ+ǫh
2
, qv + qsc)-IND-CCA secure encryption with labels.
Before proving this theorem, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 3.5. Let Ω and Γ be a commitment and a public key encryption schemes respectively. We
consider the following game between an adversary A and his challengerR:
1. R invokes the algorithms Γ.keygen(κ) to generate (pk, sk), where κ is a security parameter.
2. A outputs two messages m0 and m1 such that m0 6= m1 to his challenger.
3. R generates two nonces r0 and r1 such that r0 6= r1. Next, he chooses two bits b, b′ R←−
{0, 1} uniformly at random. Finally, he outputs to A cb = Ω.commit(mb, r1−b′) and eb′ =
Γ.encryptpk(rb′).
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4. A outputs a bit ba representing his guess of cb not being the commitment of mb using the
nonce Γ.decrypt(eb′). A wins the game if ba 6= b, and we define his advantage to be
Adv(A) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b 6= ba]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ,
where the probability is taken over the random tosses of both A and R.
If Ω is injective, binding, and (th, ǫh)-hiding, then Adv(A) in the above game is equal to ǫh.
Proof. Let ǫ be the advantage ofA in game above. We will construct an adversaryR which breaks
the hiding property of the used commitment with advantage ǫ.
• R gets from A the message m0, m1, and forwards them to his own challenger.
• R receives from his challenger the commitment cb = Ω.commit(mb, r) for some b R←− {0, 1}
and some nonce r.
• R generates a nonce r′ and outputs to A cb and e = Γ.encryptpk(r′).
• When A outputs a bit ba, R outputs to his challenger 1− ba.
IfA can by some means get hold of r′, then he can compute ci = Ω.commit(mi, r′), i = 0, 1. Since
Ω is injective and binding then cb 6= Ω.commit(mb, r′) and cb 6= Ω.commit(m1−b, r′) respectively,
i.e. cb /∈ {c0, c1}.
We have by definition:
ǫh = Adv(R) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[1− ba = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Pr[ba 6= b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
= Adv(A)
Remark 3.7. Note that the above lemma holds true regardless of the used encryption Γ. For
instance, it can be used with encryption schemes which support labels and which do not require
any kind of security.
Let us now prove Theorem 3.4.
Proof. We assume the existence of a (t, ǫ, qv, qsc) invisibility adversaryA against the construction,
where the underlying commitment is injective, binding, and (t, ǫh)-hiding. We will construct a
reduction R which (t, ǫ+ǫh
2
, qv + qsc)-IND-CCA breaks the underlying encryption scheme.
85
[Parameter generation] R gets the parameters of the encryption scheme Γ from his challenger.
Then he will choose a signature scheme Σ (along with a key pair (Σ.pk,Σ.sk)) and a secure
commitment scheme Ω. R will set the above entities as components of the constructionA is
trying to attack.
[confirm/deny and convert queries] To confirm/deny an alleged signature µi = (µ1i , µ2i , µ3i ) on a
message mi, R will proceed as follows. First he checks the validity of the digital signature
µ3i on µ
2
i , in case it is invalid, he will output ⊥, otherwise he will obtain the decryption
of µ1i (from the decryption oracle thanks to the CCA attack model), ri; if ri is (is not) the
same string used to compute the commitment µ2i , R will issue a zero knowledge proof of
the equality (inequality) of the decryption of µ1i and the string used for the commitment
µ2i . R can issue these proofs without the knowledge of Γ.sk using the rewinding technique
which consists in rewinding the verifier (the adversary A) until his output agrees with what
the simulator (R) has generated (the proofs are ZK and thus simulatable, see Remark 1.9).
Selective conversion is similarly carried out with the exception of issuing the decryption of
µ1i in case the confirmer signature is valid and ⊥ otherwise.
[Challenge phase] At some point, A will output two messages m0, m1. R will then choose
uniformly at random a bit b R←− {0, 1}, and generate two different nonces r0 and r1. R
will output to his challenger the label mb‖Σ.pk and the strings r0, r1. He receives then a
ciphertext eb′ , encryption of rb′ , for some b′
R←− {0, 1}. To answer his challenger, R will
compute a commitment cb on the message mb using the string rb′′ where b′′
R←− {0, 1}. Then,
R will output µ = (eb′, cb,Σ.signΣ.sk(cb)) as a challenge signature to A.
In case eb′ is an encryption of rb′′ (that is if b′ = b′′), then µ corresponds to a valid confirmer
signature on mb. Otherwise, it is not a valid signature on neither mb nor m1−b. In fact,
Ω is injective and cb is a commitment on mb using a string different from the decryption
of eb′ under the label mb‖Σ.pk. If the advantage of A is non-negligibly different from the
advantage ofA in the attack described in Definition 3.6, then and according to Lemma 3.5,A
can be easily used to break the hiding property of the underlying commitment.
[Post challenge Phase]Rwill continue to handleA’s queries as before. Note that in this phase,R
cannot query his challenger for the decryption of eb′ under the label mb‖Σ.pk. R needs such
a decryption query if A requests the verification (conversion) of (eb′ , c, σ) on the message
mb, where σ is a valid digital signature on c, and c is a valid commitment on mb using either
r0 or r1. If such a query occurs, R will issue the denial protocol (output ⊥). This differs
from the real algorithm when (eb′ , c, σ) is a valid confirmer signature on mb; two cases man-
ifest: either c = cb in which case such a signature is not allowed for verification/conversion
according to Definition 3.6, or c = Ω.commit(mb, r1−b”) which is very unlikely to occur
since r1−b” is external to A.
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[Final output] Let ba be the bit output by A. R will output b′′ to his challenger in case b = ba
and 1− b′′ otherwise.
The advantage of A in such an attack is defined by
ǫ = Adv(A) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ba = b|b′ = b′′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
= max(Pr[ba = b|b′ = b′′]− 1
2
,Pr[ba 6= b|b′ = b′′]− 1
2
)
Moreover, and according to Lemma 3.5, we have in case b′ 6= b”:
ǫh =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ba 6= b|b′ 6= b′′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
= max(Pr[ba 6= b|b′ 6= b′′]− 1
2
,Pr[ba = b|b′ 6= b′′]− 1
2
)
Let us assume without loss of generality that ǫ = Pr[ba = b|b′ = b′′] − 12 and eh = Pr[ba 6=
b|b′ 6= b′′]− 1
2
. The advantage of R is the given by:
Adv(R) = Pr[b = ba, b′ = b′′] + Pr[b 6= ba, b′ 6= b′′]− 1
2
= Pr[b = ba|b′ = b′′] Pr[b′ = b′′] + Pr[b 6= ba|b′ 6= b′′] Pr[b′ 6= b′′]− 1
2
=
1
2
(ǫ+
1
2
) +
1
2
(
1
2
+ ǫh)− 1
2
=
ǫ+ ǫh
2
The last but one equation is due to the fact Pr[b′ 6= b′′] = Pr[b′ = b′′] = 1
2
as b′′
R←− {0, 1}.
3.4 Conclusion
In this section, we presented the two basic approaches adhered to when building convertible con-
firmer signatures from basic primitives. The invisibility of both constructions was investigated in
the insider security model, which requires the underlying encryption scheme to meet the highest
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level of security, namely IND-CCA security. This impacts negatively the efficiency of the confir-
mation/denial protocols as they resort to proofs of general NP statements, e.g. proving knowledge
of the plaintext underlying an IND-CCA encryption. Since insider security might be too strong
than what is actually needed in most real life applications, it would be interesting to examine the
invisibility of these constructions in the outsider security model with the hope of weakening the
security assumptions on the underlying building blocks and consequently improving the efficiency
of the construction in general, and of its confirmation/denial protocols in particular.
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Chapter 4
The “Encryption of a Signature” Paradigm
Abstract. The “encryption of a signature” paradigm is the most intuitive way to ob-
tain designated confirmer signatures; it consists in first generating a digital signature
on the message to be signed, then encrypting the result using a suitable encryption
scheme. This approach requires the constituents (encryption and signature schemes)
to meet the highest security notions in order to achieve secure constructions in the
insider security model.
In this chapter, we revisit this method and establish the necessary/minimal and suf-
ficient assumptions on the building blocks in order to attain secure confirmer sig-
natures in the outsider model. Our study concludes that the paradigm, used in its
basic form, cannot allow a class of encryption schemes which is vital for the effi-
ciency of the confirmation/denial protocols. Next, we propose a slight variation of
the paradigm and we demonstrate its efficiency by explicitly describing its confir-
mation/denial protocols when instantiated with building blocks from a large class
of signature/encryption schemes. Interestingly, the class of signatures we consider
is very popular and has been for instance used to build efficient designated verifier
signatures.
Parts of the results described in this chapter were published in [El Aimani, 2008]
and [El Aimani, 2009b] at IndoCrypt 2008 and IndoCrypt 2009 resp.
4.1 Analysis of the plain paradigm
We consider the construction of the plain ”encryption of a signature” paradigm depicted in Subsec-
tion 3.3.1. More precisely, let Σ be a digital signature scheme given by Σ.keygen which generates
a key pair (private key = Σ.sk, public key= Σ.pk), Σ.sign, and Σ.verify. Let furthermore Γ denote
an encryption scheme described by Γ.keygen that generates the key pair (private key = Γ.sk, public
key= Γ.pk), Γ.encrypt and Γ.decrypt. The construction is as follows:
Setup (setup). On input the security parameter κ, output the public parameters of Γ and Σ.
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Key generation (keygen). Invoke the algorithms Σ.keygen and Γ.keygen to generate the keys
Σ.sk, Σ.pk, Γ.sk and Γ.pk. Set the signer’s key pair to (Σ.sk,Σ.pk) and the confirmer’s key
pair to (Γ.sk,Γ.pk).
ConfirmedSign (confirmedSign). Let m be the message to be signed. The signer first computes
a (digital) signature σ = ΣΣ.sk.sign(m) on m, then encrypts it using Γ.encrypt. The resulting
ciphertext µ = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(σ) forms the output confirmer signature. Moreover, the signer
interacts with the signature recipient in a zero knowledge protocol where he (the signer)
proves that the output is a valid confirmer signature on the message in question. The prover’s
private input is the randomness used to generate the encryption µ of σ.
Verification (verify). To check whether an alleged confirmer signature µ, issued on a certain
message m, is valid, the confirmer first decrypts it in σ, then calls the algorithm Σ.verify on
the result using Σ.pk. The signature is valid if and only if the output of the latter item is 1.
We stress again that this algorithm is run by the confirmer. It can also be run by the signer
on a just generated signature µ; using the randomness used to generate µ (as encryption of
some σ), the signer checks whether µ is well formed, i.e.whether µ is indeed an encryption
of σ, then he checks, using Σ.pk, whether σ is a valid digital signature on m.
Confirmation/Denial protocol (confirm/deny). To confirm (deny) a purported signature µ on a
certain message m, the confirmer first checks its validity using the verification algorithm.
According to the result, the signer issues a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of the de-
cryption of µ, that passes (does not pass) Σ.verify.
Selective conversion (convert). Given a signature µ on m, the confirmer first checks whether it
is valid. If it is the case, then he outputs Γ.decryptΓ.sk(µ), otherwise he outputs ⊥.
Selective verification (verifyConverted). It is easy to see that the verification of converted signa-
tures can be achieved by the algorithm Σ.verify using Σ.pk.
In this section, we prove that the condition on the underlying signature scheme (EUF-CMA
secure) is also necessary to achieve EUF-CMA secure confirmer signatures. Furthermore, we prove
that IND-PCA secure encryption schemes are already enough, though a minimal requirement, to
achieve INV-CMA signatures.
4.1.1 The exact unforgeability of the construction
Theorem 4.1. Given (t, qs) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], the above generic construction is (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-
CMA secure if and only if the underlying digital signature scheme is (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA secure.
Proof. The If direction has been already proven (see Subsection 3.3.1). We prove now the other di-
rection. Let (m⋆, σ⋆) be an existential forgery against the digital signature scheme. One can derive
a forgery against the confirmer signature by simply encrypting the signature σ⋆ using the public
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key of the confirmer. Simulation of the attacker’s environment is easy; the reductionR (EUF-CMA
attacker against the confirmer signature) will forward the appropriate parameters (those concern-
ing the underlying digital signature) to the EUF-CMA attacker A against the underlying signature
scheme. For a signature query on a message m, R will first request his challenger for a confirmer
signature µ that he decrypts using the private key of the confirmer (R has access to skC according
to the EUF-CMA security game described in 3.2.3) in σ, which he (R) will output to A.
At the end, A outputs a valid digital signature σ⋆ on a message m⋆ that he has never queried
for signature. R encrypts this signature in µ⋆ using the public key of the confirmer and outputs the
result as a valid existential forgery on m⋆ (R never queried m⋆ for a confirmer signature).
4.1.2 The exact invisibility of the construction
In this paragraph, we prove that IND-PCA secure encryption schemes are a minimal and sufficient
requirement to achieve INV-CMA secure confirmer signatures. To prove this assertion, we proceed
as follows. We first show that the INV-CMA security of the resulting signatures cannot rest on the
NM-CPA security of the underlying encryption scheme. We do this by means of an efficient meta-
reduction that uses such a reduction (the algorithm reducing NM-CPA breaking the underlying
encryption scheme to INV-CMA breaking the construction) to break the NM-CPA security of the
encryption scheme. Thus, under the assumption that the encryption scheme is NM-CPA secure,
the meta reduction forbids the existence of such a reduction. In case the encryption scheme is
not NM-CPA secure, such a reduction will be useless. This result will rule out automatically all
the other notions that are weaker than NM-CPA, namely OW-CPA and IND-CPA. Next, we use
a similar technique to exclude the OW-CCA notion. The next security notion to be considered is
IND-PCA. Luckily, this notion turns out to be sufficient to obtain INV-CMA secure signatures.
Note that meta-reductions have been successfully used in a number of important cryptographic
results, e.g. the result in [Boneh & Venkatesan, 1998] which proves the impossibility of reducing
factoring to the RSA problem, or the results in [Paillier & Vergnaud, 2005; Paillier, 2007] which
show that some well known signatures which are proven secure in the random oracle cannot con-
serve the same security in the standard model. All those impossibility results are partial as they
apply only for certain reductions. Our result is in a first stage also partial since it requires the
reduction R, trying to attack a certain property of an encryption scheme given by the public key
Γ.pk, to provide the adversary against the confirmer signature with the confirmer public key Γ.pk.
We will denote such reductions by key-preserving reductions, inheriting the name from a wide and
popular class of reductions which supply the adversary with the same public key as its challenge.
Such reductions were for instance used in [Paillier & Villar, 2006] to prove a separation between
factoring and IND-CCA-breaking some factoring-based encryption schemes in the standard model.
Our restriction to such a class of reductions is not unnatural since, to our best knowledge, all the
reductions basing the security of the generic constructions of confirmer signatures on the security
of their underlying components, feed the adversary with the public keys of these components (sig-
nature schemes, encryption schemes, and commitment schemes). Next, we use similar techniques
91
to [Paillier & Villar, 2006] to extend our impossibility results to arbitrary reductions.
Impossibility results for key-preserving reductions
Lemma 4.2. Assume there exists a key-preserving reduction R that converts an INV-CMA adver-
saryA against the above construction to an NM-CPA adversary against the underlying encryption
scheme. Then, there exists a meta-reduction M that NM-CPA breaks the encryption scheme in
question.
Let us first interpret this result. The lemma claims that under the assumption of the underlying
encryption scheme being NM-CPA secure, there exists no key-preserving reductionR that reduces
NM-CPA breaking the encryption scheme in question to INV-CMA breaking the construction, or
if there exists such an algorithm, then the underlying encryption scheme is not NM-CPA secure,
thus rendering such a reduction useless.
Proof. LetR be a key-preserving reduction that reduces NM-CPA breaking the encryption scheme
underlying the construction to INV-CMA breaking the construction itself. We will construct an al-
gorithmM that usesR to NM-CPA break the same encryption scheme by simulating an execution
of the INV-CMA adversary A against the construction.
Let Γ be the encryption scheme M is trying to attack. M launches R over Γ with the same
public key, say Γ.pk. M, acting as the INV-CMA adversary A against the construction, queries
R on m0, m1 R←− {0, 1}⋆ for confirmer signatures. Then, he queries the resulting strings µ0, µ1
(corresponding to the confirmer signatures on m0 and m1 respectively) for a selective conversion.
Let σ0 and σ1 be the output (digital) signatures on m0 and m1 respectively. At that point, M
inputs D = {σ0, σ1} to his own challenger as a distribution probability from which the plaintexts
will be drawn. He gets in response a challenge encryption µ⋆, of either σ0 or σ1 under Γ.pk, and
is asked to produce a ciphertext µ′ whose corresponding plaintext is meaningfully related to the
decryption of µ⋆. To do this, M chooses uniformly at random a bit b R←− {0, 1}. Then, he queries
the presumed confirmer signature µ⋆ on mb for a selective conversion. If the result is different
from ⊥, i.e. µ⋆ is the encryption of σb, then M will output Γ.encryptΓ.pk(σb) (σb refers to the
bit-complement of the element σb) and the relation R: R(m,m′) = (m′ = m). Otherwise, he will
output Γ.encryptΓ.pk(σ1−b) and the same relation R. Finally M aborts the game (stops simulating
an INV-CMA attacker against the generic construction).
Remark 4.1. In the above proof, R may not behave as a standard INV-CMA challenger. For
instance, he may produce inconsistent answers when A asks the signature of m0 and m1, the
conversion of µ0 and µ1 w.r.t. m0 and m1 respectively, or the conversion of µ⋆ w.r.t. m0 or m1. In
this case, M cannot answer his NM-CPA challenge, however A is not either expected to answer
his INV-CMA challenge, and therefore R will be compelled to solve his challenge without the help
of A; that is R will be useless as it is solving a challenge without the help of A, i.e. an easy
challenge.
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Actually, such an argument applies for all the impossibility results that will be used throughout
this thesis; if the reduction provides an incorrect simulation causing the meta-reduction a failure
in answering his challenge, then the adversary, played/simulated by this meta-reduction, is not
neither expected to answer his challenge. In this case, the reduction will be useless as it is solving
a challenge in polynomial time without the help of the adversary.
Lemma 4.3. Assume there exists a key-preserving reduction R that converts an INV-CMA adver-
sary A against the above construction to a OW-CCA adversary against the underlying encryption
scheme. Then, there exists a meta-reduction M that OW-CCA breaks the encryption scheme in
question.
As mentioned previously, this lemma claims that under the assumption of the underlying en-
cryption scheme being OW-CCA secure, there exists no key-preserving reduction R that reduces
OW-CCA breaking the encryption scheme in question to INV-CMA breaking the construction, or
if there exists such an algorithm, then the underlying encryption scheme is not OW-CCA secure,
thus rendering such a reduction useless.
Proof. The proof technique is similar to the one above. Let R be the key-preserving reduction
that reduces OW-CCA breaking the encryption scheme underlying the construction to INV-CMA
breaking the construction itself. We will construct an algorithmM that uses R to OW-CCA break
the same encryption scheme by simulating an execution of the INV-CMA adversary A against the
construction.
Let Γ be the encryption scheme M is trying to attack. M gets his challenge c and is equipped
with a decryption oracle that he can query on all ciphertexts of his choice except of course on
the challenge. M launches R over Γ with the same public key Γ.pk and the same challenge c.
Obviously, all decryption queries made by R, which are by definition different from the challenge
ciphertext c, can be forwarded to M’s own challenger. At some point,M, acting as an INV-CMA
attacker against the construction, will output two messagesm0, m1 and gets as response a challenge
signature µ⋆ which he is required to tell to which message it corresponds. With overwhelming
probability, µ⋆ 6= c, in fact, the challenge c is not the encryption of a certain σ such that σ is
a valid digital signature on the message m0 or the message m1. Therefore, M queries his own
challenger for the decryption of µ⋆ (he can issue such a query since it is different from the challenge
ciphertext). He checks whether the result, say σ, is a valid digital signature on m0 or m1. Then, he
will simply output the result of this verification. Finally, when R outputs his answer, decryption
of the ciphertext c, M will simply forward this result to his challenger.
Remark 4.2. In the above proof, if R gives c as a challenge confirmer signature to A (simulated
by M), then A cannot solve the INV-CMA challenge as M cannot invoke his decryption oracle
on c. Since it is very unlikely that c corresponds to a valid confirmer signature on the challenge
messages m0 or m1, then whatever is the answer of A (actually in this case, A, simulated by M
who launched R over c, can abort the invisibility game) to the challenge c, this answer will not
helpR solving his OW-CCA challenge since he already knows that c cannot be (with overwhelming
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probability) a valid confirmer signature on either messages m0 or m1. In other words, in this case,
whatever R learns from A, he can also learn it without A, which corresponds to a reduction R
solving a OW-CCA challenge in polynomial time without the help of A, i.e. the reduction R is
useless as it is solving an easy problem.
Remark 4.3. Note that the success of the meta-reduction M, in the above proofs, is identical to
the success of the reduction R. Moreover, the above results apply to any key-preserving reduction
(from NM-CPA or OW-CCA breaking the encryption scheme to INV-CMA breaking the construc-
tion), for instance, they apply to the (key-preserving) reduction making the best possible use of
INV-CMA adversaries against the construction.
Theorem 4.4. The encryption scheme underlying the above construction must be at least IND-
PCA secure, in case the considered reduction is key-preserving, in order to achieve INV-CMA
secure signatures.
Proof. We proceed in this proof with elimination. Lemma 4.2 rules out the notion NM-CPA and
thus the notions IND-CPA and OW-CPA. Moreover, Lemma 4.3 rules out OW-CCA and thus OW-
PCA (and also OW-CPA). Thus, the next notion to be considered is IND-PCA.
Remark 4.4. The above theorem is only valid when the considered notions are those obtained from
pairing a security goal GOAL ∈ {OW, IND,NM} and an attack model ATK ∈ {CPA,PCA,CCA}.
Presence of other notions will require an additional study. However, Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 will be
always of use when there exists a relation between these new notions and the notions OW-CCA and
NM-CPA.
Generalization to arbitrary reductions
To extend the results in the previous paragraph to arbitrary reductions, we first define the notion of
non-malleability of an encryption scheme key generator through the following two games:
In Game 0, we consider an algorithm R trying to break an encryption scheme Γ , w.r.t. a public
key Γ.pk, in the sense of NM-CPA (or OW-CCA) using an adversary A which solves a problem
A, perfectly reducible to OW-CPA breaking the encryption scheme Γ. In this game,R launchesA
over his own challenge key Γ.pk and some other parameters chosen freely by R. We will denote
by Adv0(RA) the success probability of R in such a game, where the probability is taken over
the random tapes of both R and A. We further define SuccGame0Γ (A) = maxR Adv0(RA) to be
the success in Game 0 of the best reduction R making the best possible use of the adversary A.
Note that the goal of Game 0 is to include all key-preserving reductions R from NM-CPA (or
OW-CCA) breaking the encryption scheme in question to solving a problem A, which is reducible
to OW-CPA breaking the same encryption scheme.
In Game 1, we consider the same entities as in Game 0, with the exception of providing R with,
in addition to A, a OW-CPA oracle (i.e. a decryption oracle corresponding to Γ) that he can query
w.r.t. any public key Γ.pk′ 6= Γ.pk, where Γ.pk is the challenge public key of R. Similarly, we
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define Adv1(RA) to be the success of R in such a game, and SuccGame1Γ (A) = maxR Adv0(RA)
the success in Game 1 of the reduction R making the best possible use of the adversary A and of
the decryption (OW-CPA) oracle.
Definition 4.1. An encryption scheme Γ is said to have a non-malleable key generator if
∆ = maxA|SuccGame1Γ (A)− SuccGame0Γ (A)| is negligible in the security parameter.
This definition informally means that an encryption scheme has a non-malleable key generator
if NM-CPA (or OW-CCA) breaking it w.r.t. a key pk is no easier when given access to a decryption
(OW-CPA) oracle w.r.t. any public key pk′ 6= pk.
We generalize now our impossibility results to arbitrary reductions as follows.
Theorem 4.5. If the encryption scheme underlying the above construction has a non-malleable
key generator, then it must be at least IND-PCA secure in order to achieve INV1-CMA secure
confirmer signatures.
To prove this theorem, we first need the following lemma (similar to Lemma 6 of [Paillier &
Villar, 2006])
Lemma 4.6. Let A be an adversary solving a problem A, reducible to OW-CPA breaking an en-
cryption scheme Γ, and let R be an arbitrary reduction R that NM-CPA (OW-CCA) breaks an
encryption scheme Γ given access to A. We have
Adv(R) ≤ SuccGame1Γ (A).
Proof. We will construct an algorithmM that plays Game 1 with respect to a perfect oracle forA
and succeeds in breaking the NM-CPA (OW-CCA) security of Γ with the same success probability
ofR. AlgorithmM gets a challenge w.r.t. a public key pk and launchesR over the same challenge
and the same public key. IfR callsA on pk, thenMwill call his own oracle forA. Otherwise, ifR
calls A on pk′ 6= pk, M will invoke his own decryption oracle for pk′ (OW-CPA oracle) to answer
the queries. In fact, by assumption, the problem A is reducible to OW-CPA breaking Γ. Finally,
when R outputs the result to M, the latter will output the same result to his own challenger.
The proof of Theorem 4.5 is similar to that of Theorem 5 in [Paillier & Villar, 2006]:
Proof. We first remark that the invisibility of the construction depicted above is perfectly reducible
to OW-CPA breaking the encryption scheme underlying the construction. In fact, an invisibility
adversaryA, given a challenge confirmer signature, can first decrypt it, then check, using the algo-
rithm Σ.verify and Σ.pk, whether the result is a valid digital signature on the message in question.
Next, we note that the advantage of the meta-reductionM in the proof of Lemma 4.2 (Lemma 4.3)
is the same as the advantage of any key-preserving reductionR reducing the invisibility of a given
confirmer signature to the NM-CPA (OW-CCA) security of its underlying encryption scheme Γ.
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For instance, this applies to the reduction making the best use of an invisibility adversaryA against
the construction. Therefore we have:
SuccGame0Γ (A) ≤ Succ(NM − CPA[Γ]),
where Succ(NM − CPA[Γ]) is the success of breaking Γ in the NP-CPA sense. We also have
SuccGame0Γ (A) ≤ Succ(OW − CCA[Γ]).
Now, Let R be an arbitrary reduction from NM-CPA (OW-CCA) breaking an encryption scheme
Γ, with a non-malleable key generator, to INV-CMA breaking the construction (using the same
encryption scheme Γ). We have
Adv(R) ≤ SuccGame1Γ (A)
≤ SuccGame0Γ (A) + ∆
≤ Succ(NM − CPA[Γ])(Succ(OW − CCA[Γ])) + ∆
since ∆ is negligible, then under the assumption of Γ being NM-CPA (OW-CCA) secure, the
advantage of R is also negligible.
Positive results
One can give an informal explanation to the result above as follows. It is well known that construc-
tions obtained from the sign then encrypt paradigm are not strongly unforgeable. I.e. a polynomial
adversary is able to produce, given a valid confirmer signature on a certain message, another valid
confirmer signature on the same message without the help of the signer. Indeed, given a valid
confirmer signature on a message, an attacker can request its corresponding digital signature from
the selective conversion oracle, then he encrypts it under the confirmer public key and obtains a
new confirmer signature on the same message. Therefore, any reduction R from the invisibility
of the construction to the security of the underlying encryption scheme will need more than a list
of records maintaining the queried messages along with the corresponding confirmer and digital
signatures. Thus the insufficiency of notions like IND-CPA. In [Camenisch & Michels, 2000],
the authors stipulate that the given reduction would need a decryption oracle (of the encryption
scheme) in order to handle the queries made by the INV-CMA attacker A, which makes the invis-
ibility of the construction rest on the IND-CCA security of the encryption scheme. In our work,
we remark that the queries made by A are not completely uncontrolled by R. In fact, they are
encryptions of some data already released by R, provided the digital signature scheme is strongly
unforgeable, and thus known to him. Therefore, a plaintext checking oracle suffices to handle those
queries.
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Theorem 4.7. Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N4 and (ε, ǫ′) ∈ [0, 1]2, the construction given above is
(t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA secure if the underlying digital signature is (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure
and the underlying encryption scheme is (t+ qsqsc(qsc+ qv), ǫ · (1− ǫ′)(qsc+qv), qsc(qsc+ qv))-IND-
PCA secure.
Proof. Let A be an attacker that (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA breaks the invisibility of the above
confirmer signature, believed to use a (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure signature scheme. We will
construct an algorithmR that IND-PCA breaks the underlying encryption scheme as follows:
[Key generation] R will get the public parameters of the target encryption scheme from his
challenger, that are Γ.pk , Γ.encrypt, and Γ.decrypt. Then, he will choose an appropriate
signature scheme Σ with parameters Σ.pk, Σ.sk, Σ.sign, and Σ.verify.
[confirmedSign queries] For a signature query on a message m. R first computes a (digital)
signature σ on m using his secret key Σ.sk. Then, he encrypts σ and outputs the result
to A. Besides, R issues a ZK proof of knowledge of σ that satisfies the equation defined
by Σ.verify. Finally, R will maintain a list L of the queries (messages), the corresponding
digital signatures and finally the signatures he issued. R will proceed in this way for each
query and not only each new query.
[convert queries] For a putative confirmer signature µ on m, R will look up the list L. We
note that each record of L comprises three components : (1) the queried message mi (2) σi
corresponding to a digital signature on mi (3) Γ.encryptΓ.pk(σi) = µi, which corresponds to
the confirmer signature issued on mi. If no record having as first component the message m
appears in L, thenR will output⊥. Otherwise, let t be the number of records having as first
component the message m. R will invoke the plaintext checking oracle (PCA) furnished by
his own challenger on (σi, µ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, where σi corresponds to the second component
of such records. If the PCA oracle identifies µ as a valid encryption of some σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ t,
then R will return σi, otherwise he will return ⊥. This simulation differs from the real one
when the signature µ is valid and was not obtained from the signing oracle. We note that
the only ways to create a valid confirmer signature without the help of R consist in either
encrypting a digital signature obtained from the conversion oracle or coming up with a new
fresh pair of message and corresponding signature (m,µ). R can handle the first case using
his PCA oracle and list of records L. In the second case, we can distinguish two sub-cases:
either m has not been queried to the signing oracle in which case the pair (m,µ) corresponds
to an existential forgery on the confirmer signature scheme and thus to an existential forgery
on the underlying digital scheme according to Theorem 4.1, or m has been queried to the
signing oracle but Γ.decrypt(µ) is not an output of the selective conversion oracle, which
corresponds to a strong existential forgery on the underlying digital signature. Therefore, the
probability that this scenario does not happen is at least (1 − ǫ′)qsc because the underlying
digital signature scheme is (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure by assumption.
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[confirm/deny queries] R will proceed exactly as in the selective conversion with the exception
of simulating the denial protocol instead of returning⊥, or the confirmation protocol instead
of returning the converted digital signature. R can issue such proofs without knowing the
private key of the encryption scheme using the rewinding technique (see Remark 1.9) be-
cause the protocols are zero knowledge and thus simulatable, or using designated verifier
proofs [Jakobsson et al., 1996] in a registered key model. Analogously, the probability that
A does not query a valid signature he has not obtained from the signing oracle is at least
(1− ǫ′)qv .
[Challenge phase] Eventually,A will output two challenging messages m0 and m1. R will then
compute two signatures σ0 and σ1 on m0 and m1 respectively, which he gives to his own
challenger. R will receive then the challenge µ⋆, as the encryption of either σ0 or σ1, which
he will forward to A.
[Post challenge phase] A will continue issuing queries to the signing, confirmation/denial and
selective conversion oracles and R can answer as previously. Note that in this phase, A is
not allowed to query the selective conversion or the confirmation/denial oracles on (mi, µ⋆),
i = 0, 1. Also, R is not allowed to query his PCA oracle on (µ⋆, σi), i = 0, 1. If during the
selective conversion or confirmation/denial queries made by A, R is compelled to query his
PCA oracle on (µ⋆, σi), i = 0, 1, he will simply output ⊥ in case of a selective conversion
query or simulate the denial protocol in case of a verification query. This differs from the
real scenario when µ⋆ is a valid confirmer signature on some message m /∈ {m0, m1}, which
corresponds to an existential forgery on the underlying signature scheme (σi will be a valid
digital signature onm0 or m1 and on a messagem /∈ {m0, m1}). Again, this does not happen
with probability at least (1− ǫ′)qsc+qv .
[Final output] When A outputs his answer b ∈ {0, 1}, R will forward this answer to his own
challenger. Therefore R will IND-PCA break the underlying encryption scheme with ad-
vantage at least ǫ · (1−ǫ′)(qv+qsc), in time at most t+qsqsc(qv+qsc) after at most qsc(qsc+qv)
queries to the PCA oracle.
Unfortunately, requiring the encryption scheme to be at least IND-PCA secure seems to impact
negatively the efficiency of the construction as it excludes homomorphic schemes from use (a
homomorphic encryption scheme cannot be IND-PCA secure). In fact, such schemes can be (as
we will show later in this document) efficient decryption verifiable, i.e. they accept efficient ZK
proofs of knowledge of the decryption of a given ciphertext. In the next section, we discuss an
attempt to circumvent this problem.
Remark 4.5. There exists a simpler way to exclude homomorphic encryption from the design which
consists in proceeding as follows:
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First rule out the notions OW-CPA, IND-CPA and OW-PCA by remarking that ElGamal’s encryp-
tion meets all those notions (under the CDH, DDH and GDH assumption resp. ) but still cannot
be used as an ingredient in the construction. In fact, ElGamal offers the possibility of, given a
ciphertext, creating another ciphertext for the same message (multiply the first component by gr,
for some r, and the second one by yr, where (sk = x, pk = y = gx) is the key pair of the scheme).
Now, let (µ,m0, m1) be a challenge of an INV-CMA adversary A. By construction, µ is an ElGa-
mal encryption of some σ, which is a digital signature on either m0 or m1. By the argument above,
A can create another confirmer signature µ′, that is another encryption of σ, and that he can query
(w.r.t. m0 for example) to the selective conversion oracle and then answer his own challenge.
Next, deduce that the encryption scheme in constructions derived from the “encryption of a sig-
nature” paradigm must be at least OW-CCA or NM-CPA or IND-PCA secure in order to lead to
secure constructions. Finally, conclude by the fact that a homomorphic scheme cannot be NM-CPA
secure nor OW-CCA nor IND-PCA secure1.
However, in order to determine the exact security needed to achieve secure constructions from the
mentioned paradigm, there seems no known simpler way to exist than the study provided in this
section.
4.2 An efficient construction from a variant of the paradigm
One attempt to circumvent the problem of strong forgeability of constructions obtained from the
plain “encryption of a signature” paradigm can be achieved by binding the digital signature to its
encryption. In this way, from a digital signature σ and a message m, an adversary cannot create
a new confirmer signature on m by just re-encrypting σ. In fact, σ forms a digital signature on m
and some data, say c, which uniquely defines the confirmer signature on m. Moreover, this data c
has to be public in order to issue the confirmedSign/confirmation/denial protocols.
In this section, we propose a realization of this idea using hybrid encryption (the KEM/DEM
paradigm). We also allow more flexibility without compromising the overall security by encrypting
only one part of the signature and leaving out the other part, provided it does not reveal information
about the key nor about the message.
1Let E be an encryption scheme such that ∀m,m′ ∈ M : E.encrypt(m ⋆ m′) = E.encrypt(m) ◦ E.encrypt(m′),
where M is the message space, encrypt is the encryption algorithm and finally ⋆ and ◦ are some group laws defined
by E on the message and ciphertext spaces resp. Let c be the NM-CPA challenge. An adversary can simply choose
a random message m′ R←− M, encrypt it in c′ and finally output c ◦ c′ and the relation R = ⋆m′. Now, let c be a
OW-CCA challenge, an adversary can choose again a random message m′ R←−M, encrypt it in c′ and then query c⋆ c′
to the decryption oracle. Let m” be the result, the adversary can simply output m” ⋆ m′−1 as the decryption of c (we
assume that computing inverses in M is done efficiently). Similarly, a homomorphic scheme cannot be IND-PCA
secure.
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4.2.1 The construction
Let Σ be a digital signature scheme given by Σ.keygen, which generates a key pair (Σ.sk, Σ.pk),
Σ.sign, and Σ.verify. Let furthermore K be a KEM given by K.keygen, which generates a key
pair (K.pk, K.sk), K.encap, and K.decap. Finally, we consider a DEM D given by D.encrypt and
D.decrypt.
We assume that any digital signature σ, generated using Σ on an arbitrary message m, can be
efficiently transformed in a reversible way to a pair (s, r) where r reveals no information about
m nor about (Σ.sk,Σ.pk). I.e. there exists an algorithm that inputs a message m and a key pair
(Σ.sk,Σ.pk) and outputs a string statistically indistinguishable from r, where the probability is
taken over the messages and the key pairs considered by Σ. This technical detail will improve the
efficiency of the construction as it will not necessitate encrypting the entire signature σ, but only
the message-key-dependent part, namely s. Finally, we assume that s belongs to the message space
of D.
In the rest of this section, we consider that the encapsulations generated by the KEM K are
exactly κ-bit long, where κ is a security parameter. This can be for example realized by padding
with zeros, on the left of the most significant bit of the given encapsulation, until the resulting
string has length κ. Moreover, the operator ‖ denotes the usual concatenation operation between
two bit-strings. As a result, the first bit of m will always be at the (κ+1)-st position in c‖m, where
c is a given encapsulation. Such a technical detail will play an important role in the unforgeability
and invisibility of the construction.
The construction of confirmer signatures from Σ, K, and D is given as follows.
Key generation (keygen). Call Σ.keygen and K.keygen to generate, on input a security parameter
κ, Σ.sk, Σ.pk, K.pk, and K.sk respectively. Set the signer’s key pair to (Σ.sk,Σ.pk) and the
confirmer’s key pair to (K.sk,K.pk).
ConfirmedSign (confirmedSign). Fix a key k together with its encapsulation c. Then, com-
pute a (digital) signature σ = Σ.signΣ.sk(c‖m) = (s, r) on c‖m. Finally, output µ =
(c,D.encryptk(s), r) and prove the knowledge of s, decryption of (c,D.encryptk(s)), which
together with r forms a valid digital signature on c‖m w.r.t. Σ.pk. This proof is possible
because the signer knows k and (s, r), and the last assertion defines an NP language which
accepts a ZK proof system.
Confirmation/Denial protocol (confirm/deny). To confirm (deny) a purported signature µ =
(µ1, µ2, µ3), issued on a certain messagem, the confirmer first computes k = K.decapK.sk(µ1)
then calls Σ.verify on (D.decryptk(µ2), µ3) and µ1‖m using Σ.pk. According to the result,
the signer issues a ZK proof of knowledge of the decryption of (µ1, µ2) that, together with
µ3, passes (does not pass) the verification algorithm Σ.verify. Again this proof is possible
because the given assertions are either NP or co-NP statements and therefore accept a ZK
proof system.
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Selective conversion (convert). To convert a given signature µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3) issued on a certain
message m, the confirmer first checks its validity. In case it is valid, the signer computes
k = K.decapK.sk(µ1), outputs (D.decryptk(µ2), µ3), and proves that k is the decapsulation
of µ1, otherwise he outputs ⊥.
Theorem 4.8. Given (t, qs) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], the above construction is (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA
secure if the underlying digital signature scheme is (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA secure.
Proof. Let A be an attacker that (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA breaks the existential unforgeability of the
above construction. We will construct an adversary R that (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA breaks the under-
lying digital signature scheme:
[Key generation] R gets the parameters of the signature scheme in question from his challenger.
Then he chooses an appropriate KEM K and DEM D and asks A to provide him with the
confirmer key pair (K.sk,K.pk). Finally, R fixes the above parameters as a setting for the
confirmer signature scheme A is trying to attack.
[confirmedSign queries] For a signature query on a message m, R will first compute an encapsu-
lation c together with its decapsulation k (using Γ.pk). Then, he will request his challenger
for a digital signature σ = (s, r) on c‖m. Finally, he encrypts s in D.encryptk(s), then
outputs the confirmer signature (c,D.encryptk(s), r) and proves in ZK its validity to A.
[Final Output] Once A outputs his forgery µ⋆ = (µ⋆1, µ⋆2, µ⋆3) on m⋆. R will compute the decap-
sulation of µ⋆1, say k. If µ⋆ is valid then by definition (D.decryptk(µ⋆2), µ⋆3) is a valid digital
signature on µ⋆1‖m⋆. Thus, R outputs (D.decryptk(µ⋆2), µ⋆3) and µ⋆1‖m⋆ as a valid existential
forgery on Σ. In fact, if, during a query made by A on a message mi , R is compelled to
query his own challenger for a digital signature on µ⋆1‖m⋆ = µi1‖mi, then m⋆ = mi (by
construction), which contradicts the fact that (µ⋆, m⋆) is an existential forgery output by A.
Note that there will be no need to simulate the confirmation/denial and selective conversion oracles
since A knows K.sk which allows the verification of the confirmer signatures.
The following remark is vital for the invisibility of the resulting undeniable signatures.
Remark 4.6. The previous theorem shows that existential unforgeability of the underlying digital
signature scheme suffices to ensure existential unforgeability of the resulting construction. Actu-
ally, one can also show that this requirement on the digital signature (EUF-CMA security) guar-
antees that no adversary, against the construction, can come up with a valid confirmer signature
µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3) (µ1 is the encapsulation used to generate the confirmer signature µ) on a message
m that has been queried before to the signing oracle but where µ1 was never used to generate
answers (confirmer signatures) to the signature queries.
To prove this claim, we construct from such an adversary, say A, an EUF-CMA adversary R
against the underlying digital signature scheme, which runs in the same time and has the same
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advantage as A. In fact, R will simulate A’s environment in the same way described in the proof
of Theorem 4.8. When A outputs his forgery µ⋆ = (µ⋆1, µ⋆2, µ⋆3) on a message mi that has been
previously queried to the signing oracle, R decrypts (µ⋆1, µ⋆2) in s⋆, which by definition forms,
together with µ⋆3, a valid digital signature on µ⋆1‖mi. Since by assumption µ⋆1 was never used
to generate confirmer signatures on the queried messages, R never invoked his own challenger
for a digital signature on µ⋆1‖mi. Therefore, (s⋆, µ⋆3) will form a valid existential forgery on the
underlying digital signature scheme.
Theorem 4.9. Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N4 and (ε, ǫ′) ∈ [0, 1]2, the construction proposed above
is (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-SINV-CMA secure if it uses a (t, ǫ′, qs)-EUF-CMA secure digital signature, an
INV-OT secure DEM and an (t + qs(qv + qsc), ǫ · (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc)-IND-CPA secure KEM.
Proof. Let A be an attacker that (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-SINV-CMA breaks our construction, assumed to
use a (t, ǫ′, qs)-EUF-CMA secure digital signature and an INV-OT secure DEM. We will construct
an algorithmR that (t + qs(qv + qsc), ǫ · (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc)-IND-CPA breaks the underlying KEM.
[Key generation] R gets the parameters of the KEM K from his challenger. Then, he chooses an
appropriate INV-OT secure DEM D together with an (t, ǫ′, qs)-EUF-CMA secure signature
scheme Σ.
[confirmedSign queries] For a signature query on m. R first fixes a session key k together with
its decapsulation c using K.pk. Then he computes a (digital) signature σ = (s, r) on c‖m
using Σ.sk. Next, he encrypts s (using k) in D.encryptk(s) and outputs to A the confirmer
signature (c,D.encryptk(s), r). Finally, he interacts withA in a ZK protocol where he proves
that (c,D.encryptk(s)) is the encryption of some swhich together with r forms a valid digital
signature on c‖m w.r.t. Σ.pk. R will maintain a list L of the encapsulations c and keys k
used to generate the confirmer signatures.
[confirm/deny queries] For a signature µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3) on a message m, R will look up the list
L. If a record having as first component the encapsulation µ1, R will use the corresponding
decapsulation, say k, to decrypt (µ1, µ2) in s. If (s, µ3) is a valid digital signature on c‖m,
R will run the confirmation protocol, otherwise, he will run the denial protocol. R can
issue such proofs of knowledge, without knowing the private key of K, using the rewinding
technique because the protocols are zero knowledge, thus simulatable. In case µ1 does not
appear in any record of L, R will issue the denial protocol.
This simulation differs from the real one when the signature µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3) on m is valid
and µ1 does not appear in any record of L. We distinguish two cases: either m was never
queried to the signing oracle, then (m,µ) would correspond to an existential forgery on the
confirmer signature scheme, which would lead to an existential forgery on the underlying
signature scheme by virtue of Theorem 4.8. The second case is when m has been previously
queried to the signing oracle in which case (m,µ) would correspond to an existential forgery
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on the underlying digital scheme thanks to Remark 4.6. Hence, the probability that both
scenarios do not happen is at least (1− ǫ′)qv because the underlying digital signature scheme
is (t, ǫ′, qs)-EUF-CMA secure by assumption.
[convert queries] For a selective conversion query on µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3) and m, R will proceed
as he would do in a verification (confirmation/denial) query with the exception of outputting
the decryption of (µ1, µ2, ) together with µ3 instead of simulating the confirmation protocol,
or the symbol ⊥ instead of the denial protocol. Again the probability that this simulation
does not differ from the real execution of the algorithm is at least (1− ǫ′)qsc .
[Challenge] Eventually, A outputs a challenging message m⋆. R will use his challenge (c⋆, k⋆)
to compute a digital signature (s⋆, r⋆) on c⋆‖m⋆. Then, he encrypts s⋆ using k⋆ and outputs
µ⋆ = (c⋆,D.encryptk⋆(s⋆), r⋆) to A. Therefore, µ⋆ is either a valid confirmer signature on
m⋆ or an element indistinguishable from a random element in the (confirmer) signatures
space (k⋆ is random according to Subsection 2.4.1 and the DEM is INV-OT secure). If µ⋆,
in the latter case, is a random element in the confirmer signatures space, then this complies
with the scenario of a real attack. Otherwise, if µ⋆ is only indistinguishable from random,
then if the advantage of A is non-negligibly different from the advantage of an invisibility
adversary in a real attack, then A can be easily turned into an attacker against the INV-OT
security property of the DEM underlying the construction. To sum up, under the INV-OT
assumption of the DEM underlying the construction, the challenge confirmer signature µ⋆
is either a valid confirmer signature on m⋆ or a random element in the confirmer signature
space.
[Post challenge phase] A will continue issuing queries to the signing, confirmation/denial and
selective conversion oracles, and R can answer as previously. Note that in this phase, A
might request the verification or selective conversion of a confirmer signature (c⋆,−,−) on
a message mi. In this case, R will simply issue the denial protocol in case of a verification
query, or the symbol ⊥ in case of a selective conversion query. Following the same analysis
as above, the probability that the simulation does not differ from the real execution is at least
(1− ǫ′)qsc+qv .
[Final output] When A outputs his answer b ∈ {0, 1}, R will forward this answer to his own
challenger. Therefore R will (t + qs(qv + qsc), ǫ · (1 − ǫ′)qv+qsc)-IND-CPA break the KEM
used in the construction.
Note that the strong unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme is not needed here to
achieve invisibility. In fact, if the adversary can come up with another digital signature (s′, r′) on
a given c‖m, then there is just one way to create the corresponding confirmer signature, namely
encrypt s using k = K.decap(c). Therefore, the reduction is able to handle a query requesting
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the confirmation/denial or selective conversion of such a signature by just maintaining a list of the
used encapsulations c and the corresponding decapsulations k.
4.3 Efficient instantiations
In this subsection, we define the classes of signatures/encryption schemes that yield efficient in-
stantiations of the construction defined in the previous section (Section 4.2). The class of digital
signatures we consider is very similar to the one defined by [Shahandashti & Safavi-Naini, 2008] in
the context of designated verifier signatures, whereas the class of considered encryption schemes
spotlights the importance of homomorphic encryption in the framework.
4.3.1 The class S of signatures
Definition 4.2. S is the set of all digital signatures for which there exists a pair of efficient al-
gorithms, convert and retrieve, where convert inputs a public key pk, a message m, and a valid
signature σ on m (according to pk) and outputs the pair (s, r) such that:
1. r reveals no information about m nor about pk, i.e. there exists an algorithm simulate such
that for every public key pk from the key space and for every message m from the message
space, the output simulate(pk, m) is statistically indistinguishable from r.
2. there exists an algorithm compute that on the input pk, the message m and r, computes a
description of an injective one-way function f : (G, ∗)→ (H, ◦s):
• where (G, ∗) is a group and H is a set equipped with the binary operation ◦s ,
• ∀S, S ′ ∈ G: f(S ∗ S ′) = f(S) ◦s f(S ′).
and an I ∈ H, such that f(s) = I .
and retrieve is an algorithm that inputs pk, m and the correctly converted pair (s, r) and retrieves
the signature σ on m.
The class S differs from the class C, introduced in [Shahandashti & Safavi-Naini, 2008], in
the condition required for the one way function f . In fact, in our description of S, the function f
should satisfy a homomorphic property, whereas in the class C, f should only possess an efficient
protocol for proving knowledge of a preimage of a value in its range. We show in Theorem 4.10
that signatures in S accept also efficient proofs for proving knowledge of preimages, and thus
belong to the class C. Conversely, one can claim that signatures in C are also in S, at least from
a practical point of view, since it is not known in general how to achieve efficient protocols for
proving knowledge of preimages of f without having the latter item satisfy some homomorphic
properties. It is worth noting that similar to the classes S andC is the class of signatures introduced
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in [Goldwasser & Waisbard, 2004], where the condition of having an efficient protocol for proving
knowledge of preimages is weakened to having only a witness hiding proof of knowledge. Again,
although this is a weaker assumption on f , all illustrations of signatures in this wider class happen
to be also in C and S. Our resort to specify the homomorphic property on f will be justified
later when describing the confirmation/denial protocols of the resulting construction. In fact, these
protocols are concurrent composition of proofs of knowledge and therefore need a careful study as
it is known that zero knowledge is not closed under concurrent composition. Finally, the class S
encompasses most proposals that were suggested so far, e.g.
RSA-FDH [BELLARE & ROGAWAY, 1996]. The Full Domain Hash RSA is given by the key
pair (pk = (N, e), sk = d), where N is an RSA modulus and ed = 1 mod Φ(N). A valid signature
σ on a message m satisfies σe = H(m) mod N , where H is public hash function. It is easy to see
that:
(σ, ǫ)← convert(pk, m, σ) and σ ← retrieve(pk, m, (σ, ǫ)),
where ǫ is the empty string. The verification equation suggests the following one-way function and
image:
f(x) = xe mod N and I = H(m).
Obviously f is homomorphic as ∀x, y ∈ Z×N : f(xy) = f(x)f(y).
SCHNORR [SCHNORR, 1991]. Schnorr’s signature operates in a group (G, ·) of order q and
generated by g. The key pair is given by (sk = x, pk = y = gx). A signature on a message m is of
the form σ = (c, s) such that c = H(gs · y−c, m) for some random c ∈ Zq . We have:
(s, r = gsy−c)← convert(pk, m, σ) and σ = (H(r,m), s)← retrieve(pk, m, (s, r)).
In fact, since c ∈ Zq is random, then r = gsy−c is also random in G. The one-way function
and image are given by:
f(x) = gx and I = r · yh(r,m).
Obviously ∀x, y ∈ Z×N : f(x+ y) = f(x)f(y).
GHR [GENNARO et al., 1999]. The GHR signature scheme is given by the private key sk =
(p, q) and the public key pk = (p · q = N, s) for some s ∈ Z×N . A signature σ on a message m
satisfies the equation σψ(m) = s, where ψ is a public hash function which maps arbitrary messages
to prime numbers. We have:
(σ, ǫ)← convert(pk, m, σ) and σ ← retrieve(pk, m, (σ, ǫ)),
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and
f(x) = xψ(m) mod N and I = s.
BLS [BONEH et al., 2004B]. The BLS signature operates in a bilinear group (denoted addi-
tively) G = 〈P 〉 of order q and is given by the key pair (sk = x, pk = xP = Y ). A signature σ
on a message m satisfies e(σ, P ) = e(H(m), Y ) where e is the bilinear pairing (with values in a
groupH denoted multiplicatively) underlyingG, and H is a public hash function with values in G.
We have:
(σ, ǫ)← convert(pk, m, σ) and σ ← retrieve(pk, m, (σ, ǫ)),
and
f(Q) = e(Q,P ) and I = e(H(m), Y ).
It is obvious that f is one-way, otherwise the CDH problem is easy in G (e(xP, yP ) =
e(xyP, P )). Moreover ∀P,Q ∈ G : f(Q+R) = f(Q)f(R) (bilinearity property of e).
Other examples in the class S are Modified ElGamal [Pointcheval & Stern, 2000], Cramer-
Shoup [Cramer & Shoup, 2000], Camenisch-Lysyanskaya-02 [Camenisch & Lysyanskaya, 2002],
and most pairing-based signatures that have been proposed so far [Camenisch & Lysyanskaya,
2004; Boneh & Boyen, 2004; Zhang et al., 2004; Waters, 2005] etc. The reason why S encom-
passes most digital signature schemes lies in the fact that a signature verification consists in ap-
plying a function f to the “vital” part of the signature in question, then comparing the result to an
expression computed from the message underlying the signature, the “auxiliary” or “simulatable”
part of the signature, and finally the public parameters of the signature scheme. The function f
must be one-way, otherwise the signature scheme is trivially forgeable. Moreover, it (f ) consists
most of the time of an arithmetic operation (exponentiation, raising to a power, pairing computa-
tion, ...) which satisfies an easy homomorphic property.
Theorem 4.10. The protocol depicted in Figure 4.1 is an efficient zero knowledge protocol for
proving knowledge of preimages of the function f described in Definition 4.2.
We first remark that the function f used in the definition of the class S induces a group law in
f(G) for the operation ◦s. Moreover, we have 1f(G) = f(1G) and ∀S ∈ G: f(s)−1 = f(s−1).
Proof. For completeness, it is clear that if both parties follow the protocol, the prover will always
be able to provide a proof that the verifier will accept.
For soundness, let us assume that the cheating prover P˜ is able to successfully carry out the above
protocol without knowing s. That is, P˜ , after having committed to a t1, is able to answer the
challenge b with a response z satisfying f(z) = t1 ◦s f(s)b. Note that, for a fixed t, the last
equation corresponds each challenge b to a unique response z (f is injective, and we assume that
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Prover P Verifier V
Choose s′ R←− G
Compute t1 = f(s′)
t1−−−−−−−−−−→
b←−−−−−−−−−− Choose b R←− {0, 1}ℓ (b ∈ N)
z = s′ ∗ sb−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify that f(z) = t1 ◦s Ib
Figure 4.1: Proof system for membership to the language {s : f(s) = I} Common input: I and
Private input : s
2ℓ is smaller than the order of the group f(G), which is equal to the order of G). Thus, since f
is one-way, P˜ needs to guess b correctly beforehand in order to provide an accepting answer; P˜
will first choose z R←− G, then computes t1 = f(z) ◦s (f(s)−1)b and sends it as a commitment in
the first step of the protocol, when he receives the correctly guessed b, he will simply answer with
z. This results in a soundness error equal to 2−ℓ, which corresponds to the probability of correctly
guessing the challenge b.
To prove that the protocol is ZK, we provide the following simulator:
1. Generate uniformly a random challenge b′ R←− {0, 1}ℓ. Choose a random z R←− G, compute
t1 = f(z) ◦s (f(s)−1)b and sends it to the verifier.
2. Get b from the verifier.
3. If b = b′, the simulator sends back z. Otherwise, it goes to Step 2 (rewinds the verifier).
The prover’s first message in the protocol is a random value t1 in f(G), and so is the simulator’s.
Moreover, the distributions of the responses of the prover and of the simulator are again identi-
cal. Finally, we observe that the simulator runs in expected time 2ℓ since the probability of not
rewinding the verifier is:
Pr[b = b′] =
∑
bi∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr[b = bi, b
′ = bi]
=
∑
bi∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr[b = bi] Pr[b
′ = bi]
= 2−ℓ
∑
bi∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr[b = bi]
= 2−ℓ
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Adjusting ℓ to a factor logarithmic in the security parameter ensures that the simulator will run
in expected polynomial time.
4.3.2 The class E of encryption schemes
Definition 4.3. E is the set of encryption schemes Γ, obtained from the KEM/DEM paradigm, that
have the following properties:
1. The message space is a groupM = (G, ∗) and the ciphertext space C is a set equipped with
a binary operation ◦e.
2. Let m ∈ M be a message and c its encryption with respect to a key pk. On the common input
m, c, and pk, there exists an efficient zero knowledge proof of m being the decryption of c
with respect to pk. The private input of the prover is either the private key sk, corresponding
to pk, or the randomness used to encrypt m in c (the randomness which is input to the KEM
encapsulation algorithm).
3. ∀m,m′ ∈ M, ∀pk : Γ.encryptpk(m ∗m′) = Γ.encryptpk(m) ◦e Γ.encryptpk(m′). Moreover,
given the randomness used to encrypt m in Γ.encryptpk(m) and m′ in Γ.encryptpk(m′), one
can deduce (using only the public parameters) the randomness used to encrypt m ∗ m′ in
Γ.encryptpk(m) ◦e Γ.encryptpk(m′).
Examples of encryption schemes in the above class are :
EL GAMAL [El Gamal, 1985] : ElGamal’s encryption is a KEM/DEM-based encryption scheme.
It operates in a group (G, ·) = 〈g〉, and is given by the KEM key pair (sk = x, pk = y = gx). To
encrypt a message m ∈ G, one first fixes a key yr together with its encapsulation gr, then encrypts
m by simply computing the product m · yr. The ciphertext consists of the pair (gr, myr). To de-
crypt a ciphertext (c, e), one first decapsulates c to obtain the key k = cx, then retrieves m = ek−1.
Let ◦e, the binary operation defined on G×G, be the term-wise product:
∀a, b, c, d ∈ G : (a, b) ◦e (c, d) = (ac, bd).
ElGamal’s encryption is clearly homomorphic since
encrypt(m) ◦e encrypt(m′) = (gr, myr) ◦e (gs, m′ys) = (gr+s, mm′yr+s) = encrypt(mm′)
Moreover, one can compute the randomness used to encrypt m ·m′ in encrypt(m) ◦e encrypt(m′)
as the sum of the randomnesses used to generate encrypt(m) and encrypt(m′) resp.
Finally, given a ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext, one can efficiently prove the correctness
of this assertion. The private input of the prover is either the randomness used to produce the
ciphertext, or the private key of the scheme. This proof is often called in the literature the proof of
equality of two discrete logarithms. It was first provided in [Chaum & Pedersen, 1993]. Figure 4.2
depicts such a proof.
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Prover Verifier
Choose t R←− Z
Compute h1 = gt
Compute h2 = yt
(h1, h2)−−−−−−−−−−→
b←−−−−−−−−−− Choose b R←− {0, 1}ℓ(b ∈ N)
s = t + xb−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify that gs = h1eb1 and es1 = h2eb2
Figure 4.2: Proof system for {(e1, e2) : e1 = gx ∧ e2 = yx} Common input: (e1, e2, y, g) and
Private input: x
BBS [Boneh et al., 2004a] : It consists of the following algorithms:
• setup. We consider a bilinear group (G,+), with prime order d, generated by P .
• keygen. Probabilistically generate two secret values x1, x2 ∈ Z×d and compute X1 = x1P
and X2 = x2P . Set the private key to sk = (x1, x2) and the public key to pk = (X1, X2).
• encrypt. Let m ∈ G be a message. Generate a random nonce (a, b) ∈ Z2d and compute the
session key k = (a+ b)P and its encapsulation c = (aX1, bX2). The ciphertext correspond-
ing to m is (c, k +m).
• decrypt. Given the private key sk and the element (c, k+m), where c = (aX1, bX2), compute
k as k = x−11 aX1 + x
−1
2 bX2. Then recover m from k +m.
The BBS scheme is IND-CPA secure under the decision linear assumption (Definition 2.5).
Moreover, it is evident that this scheme satisfies the homomorphic properties announced in Defi-
nition 4.3. Finally, the proof that a given BBS ciphertext c decrypts to some message m is simply
the proof of equality of two discrete logarithms: the discrete logarithm of e(aX1, bX2) in base
e(kP,X2), and the discrete logarithm of X1 in base P , where e is the pairing underlying the group
G.
Finally, the Paillier [Paillier, 1999] encryption scheme cannot be viewed as an instance of this
class as it is not based on the KEM/DEM paradigm.
Theorem 4.11. Let Γ be a OW-CPA secure encryption scheme from the above class E. Let fur-
thermore c be an encryption of some message under some public key pk. The protocol depicted in
Figure 4.3 is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of the decryption of c.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.10.
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Prover P Verifier V
Choose s′ R←− G
Compute t2 = Γ.encrypt(s′)
t2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Choose b R←− {0, 1}ℓ (b ∈ N)
z = s′ ∗ sb−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
PoK{z = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(t2 ◦e (e, sk)b)}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Accept if the proof PoK is valid
Figure 4.3: Proof system for membership to the language {(e, sk) : ∃m : m = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(e, sk)}
Common input: (e, sk,Γ.pk) and Private input: Γ.sk or randomness encrypting m in (e, sk)
Proof. To prove this theorem, we first remark that the encryption algorithm, with respect to a given
public key pk, induces a group law in the ciphertext space C.
Completeness is straightforward. Soundness is again easy. In fact, we note that for a fixed
commitment t2, to each challenge b, corresponds a unique response z (we always assume that 2ℓ is
smaller than the order of the ciphertext space), namely the plaintext of the ciphertext t2 ◦e (e, sk)b.
Thus, provided the encryption scheme Γ is one way, a cheating prover P˜ must guess correctly the
challenge b in order to be able to carry out the protocol; i.e. he must choose z R←− G, then computes
the commitment t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(z) ◦e (e, sk)−b and sends it as the first message. Once P˜
receives the correctly guessed challenge, he will respond with z. We conclude that, provided PoK
is sound, the soundness error probability of the protocol is at most 2−ℓ.
For the zero-knowledgeness, we describe the following simulator:
1. Generate uniformly a random challenge b′ R←− {0, 1}ℓ. Choose a random z R←− G, compute
t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(z) ◦e (e, sk)−b and send it to the verifier.
2. Get b from the verifier.
3. If b = b′, the simulator sends back z and simulates the proof PoK for z being the decryp-
tion of t2 ◦e (e, sk)b (this proof is simulatable since it is zero knowledge by assumption).
Otherwise, it goes to Step 2 (rewinds the verifier).
The prover’s first message is always an encryption of a random value, and so is the first message
of the simulator. Since b′ is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}ℓ, then, the probability that the
simulator does not rewind the verifier is 2−ℓ, and thus the simulator runs in expected polynomial
time if ℓ is logarithmic in the security parameter. Finally, the distribution of the answers of the
prover and of the simulator is again the same. We conclude that above proof is perfectly zero
knowledge.
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Prover P Verifier V
Compute I as defined in Definition 4.2 Compute I as defined in Definition 4.2
Choose s′ R←− G
Compute t1 = f(s′)
Compute t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(s′)
t1, t2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Choose b R←− {0, 1}ℓ (b ∈ N)
z = s′ ∗ sb
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
PoK{z = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(t2 ◦e (e, sk)
b)}
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Accept if the proof PoK is valid and,
f(z) = t1 ◦s Ic in case of confirmation,
f(z) 6= t1 ◦s Ic in case of denial.
Figure 4.4: Proof system for membership to the language {(e, sk, r) : ∃s : s =
Γ.decrypt(e, sk) ∧ Σ.verify(retrieve(s, r), m‖e) = ( 6=)1} Common input: (e, sk, r,Σ.pk,Γ.pk)
and Private input: Γ.sk or randomness encrypting s in (e, sk)
4.3.3 The confirmation/denial protocols
We combine an EUF-CMA secure signature scheme Σ ∈ S and a encryption scheme Γ ∈ E,
where the underlying KEM K and DEM D are IND-CPA and INV-OT secure respectively, in the
way described in Subsection 4.2.1. Namely we first compute an encapsulation e together with its
corresponding key k. Then compute a signature σ on e concatenated with the message to be signed.
Finally convert σ to (s, r) using the convert algorithm described in Definition 4.2 and encrypt s in
sk = D.encryptk(s) using k. The resulting confirmer signature is (e, sk, r). We describe in Figure
4.4 the confirmation/denial protocols corresponding to the resulting construction. Note that the
confirmation protocol can be also run by the signer who wishes to confirm the validity of a just
generated signature.
Remark 4.7. The prover in Figure 4.4 is either the confirmer of the signature (e, sk, r) who can
run the above protocols with the knowledge of his private key, or the signer who wishes to con-
firm the validity of a just generated signature (during the confirmedSign protocol). In fact, with
the knowledge of the randomness used to encrypt s in (e, sk), where (s, r) is the converted pair
obtained from σ = Σ.sign(m‖e), the signer can issue the above confirmation protocol thanks to
the properties satisfied by Γ.
Theorem 4.12. The confirmation protocol (run by either the signer on a just generated signature
or by the confirmer on any signature) described in Figure 4.4 is a proof of knowledge with perfect
zero knowledge.
Proof. The confirmation protocol depicted in Figure 4.4 is a parallel composition of the proofs
depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.3. Therefore completeness and soundness follow as a direct conse-
quence from the completeness and soundness of the underlying proofs (see [Goldreich, 2001]).
To prove that the protocol is ZK, we provide the following simulator (for one execution):
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1. Generate b′ ∈R {0, 1}ℓ. Choose z ∈R G and send t1 = f(z)◦sI−b and t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(z)◦e
(e, sk)
−b to the verifier.
2. Get b from the verifier. If b = b′, it sends z and simulates the proof PoK of z being the
decryption of t2 ◦e (e, sk)b (this proof is simulatable since it is by assumption ZK). If b 6= b′,
it goes to Step 1.
The prover’s first message is an encryption of a random value s′ ∈R G, in addition to f(s′),
and so is the simulator’s first message (encryption of z ∗ s−b and f(z ∗ s−b) where z is random).
Therefore the distributions of the prover’s and of the simulator’s messages are the same in the first
round of the proof. Moreover, the simulator runs in an expected polynomial time (we assume ℓ
is logarithmic in the security parameter). Finally, the distribution of the prover’s message in the
third round is also similar to that of the simulator’s. We conclude that the confirmation protocol is
ZK.
Theorem 4.13. The denial protocol described in Figure 4.4 is a proof of knowledge with compu-
tational zero knowledge if the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CPA-secure.
Proof. With the standard techniques, we prove that the denial protocol depicted in Figure 4.4 is
complete and sound. Similarly, we provide the following simulator to prove the ZK property.
1. Generate b′ ∈R {0, 1}. Choose z ∈R G and a random t1 ∈R f(G) and t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(z)◦e
(e, sk)
−b
.
2. Get b from the verifier. If b = b′, it sends z and simulates the proof PoK of z being the
decryption of t2 ◦e (e, sk)b. If b 6= b′, it goes to Step 1.
The prover’s first message is an encryption of a random value s′ ∈R G, in addition to f(s′). The
simulator’s first message is an encryption of a random value z ∗ s and the element t1 ∈R f(G)
(independent of z). Distinguishing these two cases is at least as hard as breaking the IND-CPA
security of the underlying encryption scheme. In fact, if the verifier is able to distinguish these
two cases, it can be easily used to break the encryption scheme in the IND-CPA sense. Therefore,
under the assumption of the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme, the simulator’s and
prover’s first message distributions are indistinguishable. Moreover, the simulator runs in expected
polynomial time, since the number of rewinds is 2ℓ. Finally, the distributions of the prover’s and
the simulator’s messages in the last round are again, by the same argument, indistinguishable under
the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme.
Remark 4.8. In case of confirmer signatures, ZK closedness under concurrent composition might
be a desired property as it is natural to assume a confirmer (or a signer) involved in the confirma-
tion/denial (or confirmedSign) of several signatures with several verifiers. Fortunately, there exists
a result [Damga˚rd, 2000] that shows a wide range of known zero knowledge protocols, for instance
those provided in this chapter, to be modifiable with negligible loss of efficiency to preserve zero
knowledgeness under concurrent composition.
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4.3.4 Comparisons and possible extentions
Sign then encrypt variants. The construction presented in Section 4.2 improves the plain
paradigm [Camenisch & Michels, 2000] as it weakens the assumption on the underlying encryp-
tion scheme from being IND-CCA secure to only being IND-CPA secure. This impacts positively
the efficiency of the construction from many sides. In fact, the resulting signature is shorter and
its generation cost is smaller, since IND-CPA encryption schemes are simpler and allow faster
encryption and shorter ciphertexts than IND-CCA ones. An illustration is given by ElGamal’s en-
cryption and its IND-CCA variant, namely Cramer-Shoup’s encryption where the ciphertexts are at
least twice longer than ElGamal’s ciphertexts. Also, there is a multiplicative factor of at least two
in favor of ElGamal’s encryption/decryption cost. Moreover, the confirmation/denial protocols are
rendered more efficient by the allowance of homomorphic encryption schemes as shown in Section
4.3.3. Such encryption schemes were not possible to use before since a homomorphic scheme can
never attain the IND-CCA security. Besides, even when the IND-CCA encryption scheme is de-
cryption verifiable, e.g. Cramer-Shoup, the involved protocols are much more expensive than those
corresponding to their IND-CPA variant: in case of ElGamal, this protocol amounts to a proof of
equality of two discrete logarithms. The construction achieves also better performances than the
proposal of [Goldwasser & Waisbard, 2004], where the confirmer signature comprises k commit-
ments and 2k IND-CCA encryptions, where k is the number of rounds used in the confirmation
protocol. Moreover, the denial protocol presented in [Goldwasser & Waisbard, 2004] suffers the
resort to proofs of general NP statements (where the considered encryption is IND-CCA). The
same remark applies to the construction of [Wikstro¨m, 2007] where both the confirmation and
denial protocols rely on proofs of general NP statements.
Commitment-based constructions. Our construction does not use the ROM, unlike the con-
structions in [Michels & Stadler, 1998; Wang et al., 2007]. Moreover, it enjoys the strongest notion
of invisibility (SINV-CMA) which captures both invisibility as defined in [Camenisch & Michels,
2000], and anonymity as defined in [Galbraith & Mao, 2003] and which can be an important re-
quirement for confirmer signatures in some settings. Unfortunately, many of the efficient generic
constructions are not anonymous. In fact, constructions like [Michels & Stadler, 1998; Gentry
et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007] have a confirmer signature containing a commitment on the mes-
sage to be signed and a valid digital signature on this commitment. Therefore, such constructions
leak always a part of the signing key, namely the public key of the underlying digital signature.
More precisely, an anonymity attacker A, will get two public keys and a confirmer signature on a
given message and has to tell the key under which the confirmer signature was created. To answer
such a challenge,Awill simply check the validity of the digital signature on the commitment (both
are part of the confirmer signature) with regard to one public key (the confirmer signature public
key includes the public key of the underlying digital signature). The result of such a verification
is sufficient for A to conclude in case the two confirmer public keys do not share the same public
key for the digital signature scheme.
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The upshot is, our construction achieves both maximal security (strong invisibility) without
random oracles, and efficiency in terms of the signature length, generation, confirmation/denial,
and conversion cost. Moreover, the construction readily extends to directed signatures [Lim &
Lee, 1993] or undeniable confirmer signatures [Nguyen et al., 1999] by simply having the con-
firmer share his private key with the signer. Furthermore, one can extend the analysis provided in
this chapter to the other constructions instantiating the “encryption of a signature” paradigm, e.g.
[Goldwasser & Waisbard, 2004; Wikstro¨m, 2007]. In fact, both constructions are not strongly un-
forgeable, thus the necessity of CCA or ∆-CCA security. To circumvent this problem, one can use
similarly a encryption scheme derived from the hybrid encryption paradigm, and produce a signa-
ture on the message concatenated with the encapsulation. Hence, the resulting constructions will
thrive on CPA or ∆-CPA security while conserving the same security, and thus will achieve better
performances as we described above (short signature, small cost and many practical instantiations).
4.4 Conclusion
We provided a thorough analysis of the “encryption of a signature” paradigm. In fact, we set
the necessary/minimal and sufficient assumptions on the building blocks in order to achieve un-
forgeable and invisible designated confirmer signatures under a chosen message attack. Next, we
proposed a construction of confirmer signatures from a variant of the sign then encrypt paradigm
whose invisibility rests on IND-CPA secure encryption schemes. Finally, we demonstrated the
efficiency of our construction by explicitly giving the confirmation/denial protocols of the result-
ing signatures when instantiated with building blocks from a large class of signatures/encryption
schemes. The next direction of research might be to check the necessity of the assumptions, in
light of the previous study, required for the security of the new proposed framework or of the
constructions that use commitment schemes.
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Chapter 5
The “Signature of a Commitment”
Paradigm
Abstract. Generic constructions of designated confirmer signatures follow one of
the following two strategies; either produce a digital signature on the message to
be signed, then encrypt the resulting signature, or produce a commitment on the
message, encrypt the string used to generate the commitment, and finally sign the
latter.
In this chapter, we revisit the second approach. In fact, efficient as the first approach
is, it still applies only to a restricted class of signatures. This is clearly manifested in
the constructions in the previous chapter which do not seem to be plausible with the
PSS signature scheme [Bellare & Rogaway, 1996]. Our goal is to further improve
the “commit then sign” method in terms of efficiency and security by allowing more
efficient instantiations of the encryption and commitment schemes used as building
blocks. Therefore, we first try to determine the exact security property needed in
the encryption to achieve secure constructions. Our study infers the exclusion of
a useful type of encryption from the design due to an intrinsic weakness in the
paradigm. Next, we propose a simple method to remediate to this weakness and we
get efficient constructions which can be used with any digital signature.
Parts of the results in this chapter will appear in the proceedings of ProvSec 2010
[El Aimani, 2010].
5.1 Analysis of the plain paradigm
We consider the construction of the plain “signature of a commitment” paradigm depicted in Sub-
section 3.3.2:
Setup (setup). Consider a digital signature scheme Σ, an encryption scheme Γ with labels, and a
commitment scheme Ω.
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Key generation (keygen). The signer key pair consists of (Σ.pk,Σ.sk), corresponding to the key
pair generated by Σ.keygen, whereas the confirmer key pair consists of (Γ.pk,Γ.sk) which
corresponds to the key pair generated by Γ.keygen.
ConfirmedSign (confirmedSign). To sign a message m, the signer first computes a commitment
c on the message, then encrypts in e, under the label m‖Σ.pk, the random string used for the
commitment, say r, and finally, signs the commitment c using Σ.sk. The confirmer signature
consists of the triple (e, c,Σ.signΣ.sk(c)). Next, the signer interacts with the verifier in a
protocol where he proves in ZK the knowledge of r such that r = Γ.decryptΓ.sk,m‖Σ.pk(e)
and c = Ω.commit(m, r).
Confirmation/Denial protocol (confirm/deny). To confirm/deny a signature µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3)
on a given message m, the confirmer first checks whether µ3 is a valid digital signature on
µ2 w.r.t. Σ.pk, if so, he provides a concurrent ZK proof (using his private key Γ.sk) of the
equality/inequality of the decryption of µ1 (w.r.t. the label m‖Σ.pk) and the opening value
of the commitment µ2 w.r.t. m.
Verification (verify). The verification of a purported signature µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3) on a given mes-
sage m is achieved by first checking the validity of µ3 w.r.t. to m as a digital signature, then
checking the equality of the decryption of µ1 (w.r.t. the label m‖Σ.pk) and the opening value
of the commitment µ2 on m. This equality check can be performed by the signer, who has
just generated µ, given the randomness used to create the ciphertext µ1, or by the confirmer
who can decrypt µ1 using Γ.sk.
Selective conversion (convert). Selective conversion of a signature µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3) is achieved
by releasing the decryption of µ1, in case µ is valid (the triple (Γ.decryptΓ.sk(µ1), µ2, µ3)
forms the converted signature), or the symbol ⊥ otherwise.
Selective verification (verifyConverted). It is easy to see that the verification of converted signa-
tures can be achieved by the algorithms Ω.open and Σ.verify.
The construction was shown, in Subsection 3.3.2, to be unforgeable and invisible in the insider
security model if it uses a SEUF-CMA secure digital signature, an IND-CCA secure encryption
and a secure commitment.
In the rest of this section, we prove that IND-PCA encryption schemes with labels are a min-
imal and sufficient requirement to obtain security for the confirmer, in the outsider model, if the
underlying commitment scheme is secure, and the underlying signature is SEUF-CMA secure.
Our study is similar to the one provided in the previous chapter (Subsection 4.1.2) which ana-
lyzes the plain “encryption of a signature” paradigm. Thus, we will first exclude OW-CCA secure
encryption schemes with labels from use, which will rule out automatically OW-CPA and OW-
PCA encryption schemes. We do this by using an efficient algorithm (a meta-reduction) which
transforms the algorithm (reduction), reducing the invisibility of the confirmer signatures to the
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OW-CCA security of the underlying encryption scheme, to an algorithm breaking the OW-CCA
security of the same encryption scheme. Hence, such a result suggests that under the assumption
of the underlying encryption scheme being OW-CCA secure, there exists no such a reduction, or
if it (the encryption scheme) is not OW-CCA secure, such a reduction will be useless. Next, we
exclude similarly NM-CPA encryption schemes from the design, which will rule out IND-CPA
encryption. The next security notion that has to be considered is IND-PCA, which turns out to be
sufficient to achieve invisibility. Likewise, our impossibility results are in a first stage partial in the
sense that they apply only to key-preserving reductions, i.e. reductions which, trying to attack a
certain property of an encryption scheme given by the public key pk, feed the invisibility adversary
with the confirmer public key pk. Next, we extend the result to arbitrary reductions under some
complexity assumptions on the encryption scheme in question.
5.1.1 Impossibility results
Lemma 5.1. Assume there exists a key-preserving reduction R that converts an INV-CMA adver-
sary A against the above construction into a OW-CCA adversary against the underlying encryp-
tion scheme. Then, there exists a meta-reduction M that OW-CCA breaks the encryption scheme
in question.
As mentioned in the discussion above, the lemma claims that under the assumption of the
underlying encryption scheme being OW-CCA secure, there exists no key-preserving reduction
R that reduces OW-CCA breaking the encryption scheme in question to INV-CMA breaking the
construction, or if there exists such an algorithm, the underlying encryption scheme is not OW-
CCA secure, thus rendering such a reduction useless.
Proof. LetR be the key-preserving reduction that reduces the invisibility of the construction to the
OW-CCA security of the underlying encryption scheme. We construct an algorithm M that uses
R to OW-CCA break the same encryption scheme by simulating an execution of the INV-CMA
adversary A against the construction.
Let Γ be the encryption scheme M is trying to attack w.r.t. a public key Γ.pk. M launches
R over Γ with the same public key Γ.pk. After M gets the label L on which R wishes to be
challenged, he (M) forwards it to his own challenger. Finally, M gets a challenge ciphertext c,
that he forwards to R. Note that M is allowed to query the decryption oracle on any pair (ci-
phertext,label) except on the pair (c, L). Thus, all decryption queries made by R, which are by
definition different from the challenge (c, L), can be forwarded to M’s own challenger. At some
point, M, acting as an INV-CMA attacker against the construction, will output two messages
m0, m1 such that L /∈ {m0‖Σ.pk, m1‖Σ.pk}, where Σ.pk is the public key of the digital signature
underlying the construction. M gets as response a challenge signature µ⋆ = (µ⋆1, µ⋆2, µ⋆3) which he
is required to tell to which message it corresponds. Since the messages m0 and m1 were chosen
such that the label under which the encryption µ⋆1 is created (either m0‖Σ.pk or m1‖Σ.pk) is differ-
ent from the challenge label L, M can query his decryption oracle on both pairs (µ⋆1, m0‖Σ.pk) or
117
(µ⋆1, m1‖Σ.pk). Results of such queries will enableM to open the commitment µ⋆2, and thus check
the validity of the signature µ⋆ w.r.t. one of the messages m0 or m1. Finally, when R outputs his
answer, decryption of the challenge (c, L),Mwill simply forward this result to his challenger.
Lemma 5.2. Assume there exists a key-preserving reduction R that converts an INV-CMA adver-
saryA against the above construction to an NM-CPA adversary against the underlying encryption
scheme. Then, there exists a meta-reduction M that NM-CPA breaks the encryption scheme in
question.
Proof. Let R be a key-preserving reduction that reduces the invisibility of the construction to the
NM-CPA security of its underlying encryption scheme. We will construct an algorithm M that
uses R to NM-CPA break the same encryption scheme by simulating an execution of the INV-
CMA adversary A against the construction.
Let Γ be the encryption scheme with labels M is trying to attack. M launches R over Γ with
the same public key, say Γ.pk. M, acting as the INV-CMA adversary against the construction,
queries R on m0, m1 R←− {0, 1}⋆ for confirmer signatures. Then, he queries the resulting strings
µ0 = (µ
1
0, µ
2
0, µ
3
0) and µ1 = (µ11, µ21, µ31) (corresponding to the confirmer signatures on m0 and
m1 respectively) for a selective conversion. Let r0 and r1 be the output decryption of µ10 and µ11
resp. (i.e. the randomnesses used generate the commitments µ20 and µ21 on m0 and m1 resp.). With
overwhelming probability, we have r0 6= r1 1, and if it is not the case,Mwill repeat the experiment
until he obtains two different r0 and r1. Then, M inputs D = {r0, r1} to his own challenger as a
distribution probability from which the plaintexts will be drawn. Moreover, he chooses uniformly
at random a bit b R←− {0, 1} and outputs to his challenger the challenge label mb‖Σ.pk, where Σ.pk
is the public key of the digital signature underlying the construction. M will receive as a challenge
encryption µ⋆b . At that point, M will query R on the string (µ⋆b , µ2b , µ3b) and the message mb for a
selective conversion. If the result of such a query is different from ⊥, then, µ⋆b is a valid encryption
of the random string used to generate the commitment µ2b , namely rb. M will then output to his
challenger an encryption µ of rb under the same challenge label mb‖Σ.pk, where rb refers to the
bit-complement of the element rb, and the relation R: R(r, r′) = (r′ = r). Otherwise, he will
output an encryption of r1−b (under the same challenge label) and the same relation R. Finally M
aborts the game (stops simulating an INV-CMA attacker against the generic construction).
Thus, when the considered notions are obtained from pairing a goal GOAL ∈ {OW, IND,NM}
and an attack model ATK ∈ {CPA, PCA,CCA}, we have
Theorem 5.3. The encryption scheme underlying the above construction must be at least IND-
PCA secure, in case the considered reduction is key-preserving, in order to achieve INV-CMA
secure signatures.
1Actually, if R uses always the same string to produce the commitments, then the construction is clearly not
invisible.
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Similarly to the study in the previous chapter (Subsection 4.1.2), we generalize the above
theorem to arbitrary reductions if the encryption scheme underlying the construction has a non-
malleable key generator.
Theorem 5.4. If the encryption scheme underlying the above construction has a non-malleable key
generator, then it must be at least IND-PCA secure in order to achieve INV-CMA secure confirmer
signatures.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.5.
Remark 5.1. Note that the above impossibility result holds true only when the considered notions
are those obtained from pairing a security goal GOAL ∈ {OW, IND,NM} and an attack model
ATK ∈ {CPA,PCA,CCA}. Presence of other notions requires an additional analysis, however
Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 will still serve when there is a relation between the new notion and the notions
NM-CPA and OW-CCA.
5.1.2 Positive results
One way to explain the above result is to remark that the construction in question is not strongly
unforgeable. In fact, an adversary A, given a valid signature µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3) on a message m,
can create another valid signature µ′ on m without the help of the signer as follows: A will first
request the selective conversion of µ to obtain the decryption of µ1, say r, which he will re-encrypt
in µ′1 under the same label m‖Σ.pk (Σ.pk is the public key of the digital signature underlying the
construction). Obviously, µ′ = (µ′1, µ2, µ3) is also a valid confirmer signature on m that the signer
did not produce, and thus cannot confirm/deny or convert without having access to a decryption
oracle of the encryption scheme underlying the construction. This explains the insufficiency of
notions like IND-CPA. However, we observe that an IND-CCA secure encryption is more than
needed in this framework since a query of the type µ′ is not completely uncontrolled by the signer.
In fact, its first component µ′1 is an encryption of some data already disclosed by the signer, namely
r, and thus a plaintext checking oracle is sufficient to deal with such a query if the used digital
signature is SEUF-CMA secure.
Theorem 5.5. Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N4 and (ε, ǫ′) ∈ [0, 1]2, the construction given above is
(t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA secure if it uses a (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure digital signature, an
injective, binding and (t, ǫh)-hiding commitment, and a (t + qsqsc(qsc + qv), 12(ǫ + ǫh) · (1 −
ǫ′)(qsc+qv), qsc(qsc + qv))-IND-PCA secure encryption scheme with labels.
Proof. Let A be an attacker against the construction. We will construct an attacker R against the
underlying encryption scheme as follows.
[Parameter generation] R gets the parameters of the encryption scheme Γ from his challenger.
Then he chooses a signature scheme Σ (along with a key pair (Σ.pk,Σ.sk)) and a suitable
commitment scheme Ω. R sets the above entities as components of the construction A is
trying to attack.
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[confirmedSign queries] For a signature query on a message mi, R computes a commitment
ci on mi using a random string ri, which he encrypts in ei under the label mi‖Σ.pk, then
he produces a digital signature σi on ci using Σ.sk. Next, he outputs µi = (ei, ci, σi) as a
confirmer signature on mi and a ZK proof of knowledge of the equality of the decryption of
ei and the string used in the commitment ci. Such a proof is possible using the randomness
ti used to encrypt ri in ei. Finally, R adds the record Ri = (mi, ti, ri, ei, ci, σi) to a history
list L.
[confirm/deny and convert queries] To confirm/deny an alleged signature µi = (µ1i , µ2i , µ3i ) on a
message mi, R will proceed as follows. First he checks the validity of the digital signature
µ3i on µ
2
i , in case it is invalid, he outputs ⊥, otherwise he checks the list L, if he finds a
record Ri having as first field the message mi, he will proceed to the next step, namely
check whether the fourth field of Ri is equal to µ1i , if it is the case, R will issue a ZK proof
of the equality/inequality of the decryption of µ1i and the string used for the commitment µ2i .
R can issue these proofs without the knowledge of Γ.sk using the rewinding technique (the
proofs are ZK and thus simulatable) or by using the second field of Ri (randomness used to
produce the encryption µ1i ). Now, if Ri contains mi in its first field, but its fourth field is
different from µ1i , then R will check the next record Rj (j > i) having mi in its first field
and proceed in a similar fashion. Actually, if the message mi is queried more than once, then
it will occur in many records in L. If R browses through all the records but none of them
contains mi and µ1i in their first and fourth field resp., then for all the records Ri containing
mi in their first field, A will invoke his PCA oracle on the ciphertext µ1i and the third fields
of these records. If one of the queries yields “yes” as an answer, e.g. there exists a record
Rj = (mi, tj , rj, ej, cj , σj) such that its third field rj is a decryption of µ1i , then according to
whether rj is (is not) the opening value of the commitment µ2i onmi,R will issue a ZK proof
of the equality (inequality) of the decryption of µ1i and the string used for the commitment
µ2i . Again such a proof is possible to issue using the rewinding technique (the value tj cannot
be used here because it was not used to encrypt rj in µ1i ). Finally, if no query to the PCA
oracle yields the answer “yes”, then R will issue the denial protocol, namely simulate a ZK
proof, using the rewinding technique, of the inequality of the decryption of µ1i and of the
string used for the commitment µ2i .
Selective conversion is similarly carried out with the exception of issuing the decryption of
µ1i instead of the confirmation protocol and ⊥ instead of the denial protocol.
The difference between the above simulation and the real execution of the algorithm is when
the signature µi = (µ1i , µ2i , µ3i ) is valid, however, µ1i is not an encryption of a string ri already
issued to A during a selective conversion query regarding the message mi and a presumed
signature on it. We distinguish two cases, either mi was never queried for signature, in
which case such a signature would correspond to an existential forgery on the construction
and thus to an existential forgery on the underlying digital signature. Or, mi was queried
before for signature. Let µj = (µ1j , µ2j , µ3j) be the output confirmer signature to such a query.
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Since µ1i is encryption of some ri which was never used to generate signatures on mi, then
µ2i 6= µ2j (both are commitment on mi with different random strings and Ω is injective).
Thus, in this case (µ2i , µ3i ) will correspond to an existential forgery on the underlying digital
signature scheme. We conclude that the above simulation is indistinguishable from the real
execution with probability at least (1 − ǫ′)qv+qsc , as the digital signature scheme underlying
the construction is (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure by assumption.
[Challenge phase] At some point,A will output two messages m0, m1 to R. The latter will then
choose uniformly at random a bit b R←− {0, 1}, and two different random strings r0 and r1
from the corresponding space. R will output to his challenger the label mb‖Σ.pk and the
strings r0, r1. He receives then a ciphertext eb′ , encryption of rb′ , for some b′
R←− {0, 1}. To
answer his challenger, R will compute a commitment cb on the message mb using the string
rb′′ where b′′
R←− {0, 1}. Then, R will output µ = (eb′ , cb,Σ.signΣ.sk(cb)) as a challenge
signature to A. Two cases: either µ is valid confirmer signature on mb (if b′ = b′′), or it is
not a valid signature on neither m0 nor m1. If the advantage of A is non-negligibly different
from the advantage of an INV-CMA attacker in a real attack, then , according to Lemma 3.5,
A can be used to break the hiding property of Ω.
[Post challenge phase] A continues to issue queries and R continues to handle them as before.
Note that at this stage,R cannot request his PCA oracle on (eb′ , ri), i ∈ {0, 1} under the label
mb‖Σ.pk. R would need to query his PCA oracle on such a quantity if he gets a verification
(conversion) query on a signature (e′b, cb,−) 6= µ and the message mb. R will respond to
such a query by simulating the denial protocol (output ⊥). This simulation differs from the
real algorithm when (e′b, cb,−) is valid on mb. Again, such a scenario won’t happen with
probability at least (1 − ǫ′)qv+qsc , because the query would form a strong existential forgery
on the digital signature scheme underlying the construction.
[Final output] The rest of the proof follows in a straightforward way. Now, let µ = (eb′ , cb,-
Σ.signΣ.sk(cb)) be the challenge signature. Let ba be the bit output by A. R will output b′′ to
his challenger in case b = ba and 1− b′′ otherwise.
The advantage of A in such an attack is defined by
ǫ = Adv(A) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ba = b|b′ = b′′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
We also have
ǫh =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ba 6= b|b′ 6= b′′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
We assume again without loss of generality that ǫ = Pr[ba = b|b′ = b′′]− 12 and eh = Pr[ba 6=
b|b′ 6= b′′]− 1
2
. The advantage of R is then given by
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Adv(R) = (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
[
Pr[b = ba, b
′ = b′′] + Pr[b 6= ba, b′ 6= b′′]− 1
2
]
= (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
[
Pr[b = ba|b′ = b′′] Pr[b′ = b′′] + Pr[b 6= ba|b′ 6= b′′] Pr[b′ 6= b′′]− 1
2
]
= (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
[
1
2
(ǫ+
1
2
) +
1
2
(ǫh +
1
2
)− 1
2
]
=
1
2
(ǫ+ ǫh)(1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
The last but one equation is due to the facts Pr[b′ 6= b′′] = Pr[b′ = b′′] = 1
2
as b′′
R←− {0, 1},
and to the fact that, in case b′ 6= b′′, the probability that A answers 1− b is 1
2
greater than the
advantage of the adversary in the game defined in Lemma 3.5, which is equal to ǫh.
5.2 An efficient construction from a variant of the paradigm
One simple way to eliminate the already mentioned weakness (strong forgeability) in signatures
from the plain “signature of a commitment” technique consists in producing a digital signature on
both the commitment and the encryption of the random string used in it. In this way, the attack
discussed before Theorem 5.5 no longer applies, since an adversary will need to produce a digital
signature on the commitment and the re-encryption of the random string used in it. Note that such
a fix already appears in the construction of [Gentry et al., 2005], however, it was not exploitable as
the invisibility was considered in the insider model.
5.2.1 Construction
Let Σ be a signature scheme given by Σ.keygen, that generates (Σ.pk,Σ.sk), Σ.sign, and Σ.verify.
Let further Γ denote an encryption scheme given by Γ.keygen, that generates (Γ.pk,Γ.sk), Γ.encrypt,
and Γ.decrypt. We note that Γ does need to support labels in our construction. Finally let Ω denote
a commitment scheme given by Ω.commit and Ω.open. We assume that Γ produces ciphertexts of
length exactly a certain κ. As a result, the first bit of c will always be at the (κ + 1)-st position in
e‖c, where e is an encryption produced by Γ . Such a technical detail will play an important role
in the unforgeability and invisibility of the construction.
The construction of confirmer signatures from Σ, Γ, and Ω is given as follows.
Key generation. The signer key pair is (Σ.pk,Σ.sk) and the confirmer key pair is (Γ.pk,Γ.sk).
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ConfirmedSign. On input a message m, the signer produces a commitment c on m using
a random string r, encrypts this string in e, and then produces a digital signature σ =
Σ.signΣ.sk(e‖c). Finally, the signer outputs µ = (e, c, σ) as a confirmer signature on m,
and interacts with the verifier to prove in ZK the equality of the decryption of e and of
the string used for the commitment c. This proof is possible using the randomness used to
encrypt r in e.
Confirmation/Denial protocol. On a message m and an alleged signature µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3), the
confirmer checks the validity of µ3 on µ1‖µ2. In case it is not valid, he produces ⊥. Other-
wise, he computes the decryption r of µ1 and checks µ2
?
= Ω.commit(m, r), according to the
result he interacts with the verifier to prove in ZK the equality/inequality of the decryption
of µ1 and of the string used to create µ2.
Selective conversion. The confirmer proceeds as in the confirmation/denial protocol with the
exception of issuing the decryption of µ1 in case the signature is valid or the symbol ⊥
otherwise.
5.2.2 Security analysis
First, we note that the security for the verifier and the non transferability of the confirmedSign,
confirmation, and denial protocols are ensured by using zero knowledge proofs of knowledge.
Furthermore, the construction is EUF-CMA secure and INV-CMA secure if the underlying com-
ponents are secure.
Theorem 5.6. Given (t, qs) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1]2, the construction depicted above is (t, ǫ, qs)-
EUF-CMA secure if it uses a statistically binding commitment scheme and a (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA
secure digital signature scheme.
Proof. (Sketch)
Let A be an EUF-CMA attacker against the construction. We construct an EUF-CMA attacker
R against the underlying digital signature scheme as follows.
R gets the parameters of the digital signature from his attacker, and chooses a suitable en-
cryption and commitment scheme. Simulation of the confirmedSign queries (on messages mi) is
done by first computing a commitment ci on mi using some random string ri, then encrypting the
string ri in ei and finally requesting the challenger for a digital signature σi on ei‖ci. The string
(ei, ci, σi) is output to A along with a proof of equality of the decryption of ei and of the opening
value of ci. Such a proof can be issued using the encryption scheme private key that R knows or
the randomness used to encrypt ri in ei. Confirmation/denial and selective conversion queries can
be perfectly simulated with the knowledge of the encryption scheme private key.
At some point,Awill output a forgery µ⋆ = (e⋆, c⋆, σ⋆) on some message m⋆, which was never
queried before for signature. By definition, σ⋆ is a valid digital signature on e⋆‖c⋆. It will form
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an existential forgery on the digital signature scheme if e⋆‖c⋆ was never queried before by R for a
digital signature. Suppose there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ qs such that e⋆‖c⋆ = ei‖ci where µi = (ei, ci, σi)
was the output confirmer signature on the query mi. Due to the special way the strings ei‖ci are
created, equality of the strings e⋆‖c⋆ and ei‖ci implies equality of their suffixes (that start at the
(κ + 1)-st position), namely c⋆ and ci. This equality implies the equality of mi and m⋆ since
the used commitment is binding by assumption. Thus, R returns (σ⋆, e⋆‖c⋆) as a valid existential
forgery against the digital signature in question.
Theorem 5.7. Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N4 and (ε, ǫ′) ∈ [0, 1]2, the construction depicted above is
(t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA secure if it uses an (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure digital signature, an
injective, statistically binding, and (t, ǫh)-hiding commitment, and a (t+qs(qv+qsc), 12(ǫ+ ǫh)(1−
ǫ′)qv+qsc)-IND-CPA secure encryption scheme.
Proof. [Parameter generation] Simulation of the key generation is similar to the key generation
in the proof of Theorem 5.5.
[confirmedSign queries] To sign a message mi, R (the attacker against the encryption scheme)
will proceed exactly as a real signer would do, with the exception of maintaining a list
L of records that contains the strings used to form the commitments, their corresponding
encryptions along with the random nonces used to produce these encryptions.
[confirm/deny and convert queries] For a verification query on (ei, ci, σi) and mi (where σi is a
valid digital signature on ci), R will simulate the confirmation protocol (using the rewinding
technique or the randomness used to encrypt the opening value of ci in ei) if the encryption
ei appears in at least one record of L, or simulate the denial protocol otherwise. Selective
conversion of a confirmer signature whose first field appears in the list is done by revealing
the opening value of the commitment, otherwise such a confirmer signature is converted to
⊥.
The difference between this simulation and the real execution of the algorithm manifest
when a queried signature, say (ei, ci, σi), is valid but ei was never used to generate confirmer
signatures. We distinguish two cases, either the underlying message mi has been queried
previously on not. In the latter case, such a signature would correspond to an existential
forgery on the construction, thus, to an existential forgery on the underlying digital signature.
In the former case, let (ej, cj, σj) be the output signature to A on the message mi. We have
ei‖ci 6= ej‖cj since ei 6= ej , and both ei and ej are the n-bit prefixes of ei‖ci and ej‖cj
resp. We conclude that the adversary would have to compute a digital signature on a string
for which he never had obtained a signature. Thus, the query would lead to an existential
forgery on the underlying signature scheme. Since the latter is by assumption (t, ǫ′, qs)-
SEUF-CMA secure, the probability that the simulation differs from the real execution is at
least (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc .
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[Challenge phase] Eventually, the adversary outputs two challenging messages m0, m1. R will
then produce two different strings r0, r1 and hands them to his challenger. He gets as re-
sponse a challenge ciphertext eb′ on rb′ for some b′ ∈ {0, 1}. R will choose two bits
b, b′′
R←− {0, 1} and produce a commitment cb on the message mb using the string rb′′ . Fi-
nally, he will produce a digital signature σ on eb′‖cb. The challenge confirmer signature is
µ = (eb′ , cb, σ). Note, that if b′ = b′′, the signature is valid on the messagemb, otherwise, it is
invalid on both messages m0 and m1. Note also that if the advantage of A is non-negligibly
different from the advantage of an INV-CMA attacker in a real attack, then, according to
Lemma 3.5, A can be used to break the hiding property of Ω.
[Post challenge phase] The adversary will continue issuing his queries to R who will handle
them as previously. Note that from now on and during the verification/conversion queries,
the adversary may ask a query (eb′ , cb,−) 6= µ on mb. The probability that such a query is
invalid is at least (1 − ǫ′)qv+qsc since the digital signature scheme is (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA
secure (if the underlying digital signature is not strongly unforgeable, then the adversary
may come up with a new digital signature on eb′‖cb, say σ′ which is different from σ, and
then queries (eb′, cb, σ′) for verification or conversion; the result of such a query will enable
him answer his challenge).
[Final output] At the end, the adversary outputs a bit ba. Clearly the advantage of the adversary
is ǫ = Pr[b′′ = ba|b = b′]− 12 . R will output b′′ in case b = ba and 1− b′′ otherwise.
Similarly, the advantage of R is:
Adv(R) = (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
[
Pr[b = ba, b
′ = b′′] + Pr[b 6= ba, b′ 6= b′′]− 1
2
]
= (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
[
Pr[b = ba|b′ = b′′] Pr[b′ = b′′] + Pr[b 6= ba|b′ 6= b′′] Pr[b′ 6= b′′]− 1
2
]
= (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
[
1
2
(ǫ+
1
2
) +
1
2
(ǫh +
1
2
)− 1
2
]
=
1
2
(ǫ+ ǫh)(1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
Remark 5.2. Both Theorem 5.5 and Theorem 5.7 can be used with computationally binding com-
mitments. The only issue is to have the formulation of both theorems complicated by further terms,
e.g. ǫb, if we use a (t, ǫb)-binding commitment.
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5.2.3 Efficiency analysis
We show in this paragraph that requesting the encryption scheme to be only IND-CPA secure im-
proves the efficiency of constructions from the “signature of a commitment” paradigm from many
sides. First, it enhances the signature generation, verification, and conversion cost, as encryption
and decryption are usually faster in IND-CPA secure encryption than in IND-CCA secure encryp-
tion (e.g. ElGamal vs Cramer-Shoup or Paillier vs Camenisch-Shoup). Next, we achieve also a
shorter signature since ciphertexts produced using IND-CPA schemes are shorter than ciphertexts
produced using IND-CCA secure encryption schemes. Finally, we allow homomorphic encryption
in the design, which will render the confirmedSign/confirmation/denial protocols more efficient. In
fact, in [Gentry et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007], the signer/confirmer has to prove in ZK the equal-
ity/inequality of the decryption of an IND-CCA encryption and an opening value of a commitment
scheme. Thus, the only efficient instantiation, that was provided, used Camenisch-Shoup’s en-
cryption and Pedersen’s commitment. In the rest of this subsection, we enlarge the category of
encryption/commitment schemes that yield efficient instantiations thanks to the allowance of ho-
momorphic encryption in the design.
Definition 5.1. (The class C of commitments) C is the set of all commitment schemes for which
there exists an algorithm compute that on the input: the commitment public key pk, the message m
and the commitment c on m, computes a description of an injective one-way function f : (G, ∗)→
(H, ◦s) where:
• (G, ∗) is a group and H is a set equipped with the binary operation ◦s ,
• ∀r, r′ ∈ G: f(r ∗ r′) = f(r) ◦s f(r′).
and an I ∈ H, such that f(r) = I , where r is the opening value of c w.r.t. m.
It is easy to check that Pedersen’s commitment scheme is in this class. Actually, most commit-
ment schemes have this built-in property because it is often the case that the committer wants to
prove efficiently that a commitment is produced on some message. This is possible if the function
f is homomorphic as shown in Figure 5.1.
Theorem 5.8. The protocol depicted in Figure 5.1 is an efficient zero knowledge protocol for
proving knowledge of preimages of the function f described in Definition 5.1.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.10.
For encryption, we use the same class E considered in Definition 5.2, with the exception of not
requiring the encryption schemes to be derived from the hybrid encryption paradigm.
Definition 5.2. (The class E2 of encryption schemes) E2 is the set of encryption schemes Γ that
have the following properties:
1. The message space is a groupM = (G, ∗) and the ciphertext space C is a set equipped with
a binary operation ◦e.
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Prover P Verifier V
Choose r′ R←− G
Compute t1 = f(r′)
t1−−−−−−−−−−→
b←−−−−−−−−−− Choose b R←− {0, 1}ℓ (b ∈ N)
z = r′ ∗ rb−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify that f(z) = t1 ◦s Ib
Figure 5.1: Proof system for membership to the language {r : f(r) = I} Common input: I and
Private input : r.
2. Let m ∈ M be a message and c its encryption with respect to a key pk. On the common input
pk, m, and c, there exists an efficient zero knowledge proof of m being the decryption of c
with respect to pk. The private input of the prover is either the private key sk, corresponding
to pk, or the randomness used to encrypt m in c.
3. ∀m,m′ ∈ M, ∀pk : Γ.encryptpk(m ∗m′) = Γ.encryptpk(m) ◦e Γ.encryptpk(m′). Moreover,
given the randomness used to encrypt m in Γ.encryptpk(m) and m′ in Γ.encryptpk(m′), one
can deduce (using only the public parameters) the randomness used to encrypt m ∗ m′ in
Γ.encryptpk(m) ◦e Γ.encryptpk(m′).
Examples of encryption schemes in the above class are ElGamal’s encryption [El Gamal, 1985],
the encryption scheme defined in [Boneh et al., 2004a] which uses the linear Diffie-Hellman KEM,
or Paillier’s [Paillier, 1999] encryption scheme. In fact, these encryption schemes are homomor-
phic and possess an efficient protocol for proving that a ciphertext decrypts to a given plaintext:
the proof of equality of two discrete logarithms [Chaum & Pedersen, 1993], in case of ElGamal or
the encryption scheme in [Boneh et al., 2004a], or the proof of knowledge of an N-th root in case
of Paillier’s encryption.
Theorem 5.9. Let Γ be a OW-CPA secure encryption scheme from the above class E2. Let fur-
thermore e be an encryption of some message under some public key pk. The protocol depicted in
Figure 5.2 is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of the decryption of e.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.11.
The confirmation/denial protocol
The confirmedSign, confirmation and denial protocols of the construction in Subsection 5.2.1 are
depicted in Figure 5.3.
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Prover P Verifier V
Choose r′ R←− G
Compute t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(r′)
t2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Choose b R←− {0, 1}ℓ (b ∈ N)
z = r′ ∗ rb−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
PoK{z = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(t2 ◦e eb)}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Accept if PoK is valid
Figure 5.2: Proof system for membership to the language {r : r = Γ.decrypt(e)}
Common input: (e,Γ.pk) and Private input: r and Γ.sk or randomness encrypting r in e.
Prover P Verifier V
Compute I as defined in Definition 5.1 Compute I as defined in Definition 5.1
Choose r′ R←− G
Compute t1 = f(r′)
Compute t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(r′)
t1, t2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Choose b R←− {0, 1}ℓ (b ∈ N)
z = r′ ∗ rb
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
PoK{z = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(t2 ◦e e
b)}
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Accept if the proof PoK is valid and,
f(z) = t1 ◦s Ib in case of confirmation,
f(z) 6= t1 ◦s Ib in case of denial.
Figure 5.3: Proof system for membership to the language {(e, c) : ∃r : r = Γ.decrypt(e) ∧ c = ( 6=
)Ω.commit(m, r)} Common input: (e, c,m,Γ.pk,Ω.pk) and Private input: Γ.sk or randomness
encrypting r in e.
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Remark 5.3. The prover in Figure 5.3 is either the confirmer who can run the above protocols
with the knowledge of his private key, or the signer who wishes to confirm the validity of a just
generated signature. In fact, with the knowledge of the randomness used to encrypt s in e, the
signer can issue the above confirmation protocol thanks to the properties satisfied by Γ.
Theorem 5.10. The confirmation protocol (run by either the signer on a just generated signature
or by the confirmer on any signature) described in Figure 5.3 is a proof of knowledge with perfect
zero knowledge.
Theorem 5.11. The denial protocol described in Figure 5.3 is a a proof of knowledge with com-
putational zero knowledge if the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CPA-secure.
The proofs of both Theorem 5.10 and Theorem 5.11 are similar to those of Theorem 4.12 and
Theorem 4.13 respectively
Remark 5.4. The protocols depicted in Figure 5.3 can be, by virtue of the result of [Damga˚rd,
2000], efficiently turned into protocols that are ZK closed under concurrent composition in the
auxiliary string model if PoK is a Σ protocol.
5.3 The “signature of an encryption” paradigm
We have seen that convertible confirmer signatures realizing the “signature of a commitment”
paradigm are comprised of a commitment on the message to be signed, an encryption of the ran-
dom string used to produce the commitment, and a digital signature on the commitment. Since
IND-CPA encryption can be easily used to get statistically binding and computationally hiding
commitments, one can use instead of the commitment in the previous constructions an IND-CPA
secure encryption scheme. With this choice, there will be no need to encrypt the string used to
produce the encryption of the message, since the private key of the encryption scheme is sufficient
to check the validity of a ciphertext w.r.t. a given message. Note that this construction already
appeared in [An et al., 2002] in the context of signcryption. We give below the full description of
the construction.
Key generation. The signer key pair is (Σ.pk,Σ.sk) and the confirmer key pair is (Γ.pk,Γ.sk)
where Σ and Γ are the digital signature and the encryption scheme underlying the construc-
tion resp.
ConfirmedSign. On inputm, the signer computes an encryption c = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(m) ofm, then
a digital signature σ = Σ.signΣ.sk(c). Finally he outputs (c, σ) and interacts with the verifier
to prove in ZK that c decrypts to obtain m. Such a proof is possible given the randomness
used to encrypt m in c.
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Confirmation/Denial protocol. On a message m and an alleged signature µ = (µ1, µ2), the
confirmer checks the validity of µ2 on µ1. In case it not valid, he produces ⊥. Otherwise,
he computes the decryption m˜ of µ1 and checks whether m˜
?
= m, according to the result, he
gives a ZK interactive (with the verifier) proof, using Γ.sk, of the equality/inequality of the
decryption of µ1 and m.
Selective conversion. The confirmer proceeds as in the confirmation/denial protocol with the
exception of issuing⊥ is case the signature is invalid, and a non-interactive proof that m is
the decryption of the first field of the signature otherwise.
We notice that the construction depicted above achieves better performance than all previ-
ously cited constructions in terms of signature length, generation/verification and conversion cost.
In fact, the signature contains only one encryption and a signature on it. Moreover, verification or
conversion of the signature are simpler as they do not involve anymore checking whether a commit-
ment is correctly computed. Besides, the proofs underlying the confirmedSign/confirmation/denial
protocols are reduced in case of discrete-logarithm-based encryption schemes to proofs of equal-
ity/inequality of discrete logarithms for which there exists efficient protocols [Chaum & Pedersen,
1993; Camenisch & Shoup, 2003]. The only problem with this technique is the resort to non-
interactive ZK (NIZK) proofs of knowledge. In fact, we know how to produce such proofs from
their interactive variants using the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, which is known to provide security only
in the ROM. However, the recent results in [Damga˚rd et al., 2006; Groth & Sahai, 2008; Camenisch
et al., 2009] exhibit efficient NIZK proofs of knowledge in some settings.
5.3.1 Security analysis
Concerning the security analysis, we first note that completeness, soundness, and the ZK property
of the confirmedSign/confirmation/denial protocols are ensured by the use of ZK proofs. Next,
we prove that the construction resists existential forgeries and is invisible if the underlying digital
signature and encryption are SEUF-CMA and IND-CPA secure resp.
Theorem 5.12. Given (t, qs) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], the above construction is (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA
secure if the underlying digital signature is also (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA secure.
Proof. The adversary R against the signature underlying the construction will get the parameters
of the digital signature he is trying to attack from his challenger. Then, he will choose a suitable
encryption. Simulation of signatures is simple; on a query mi, R computes an encryption ci of
mi, then requests his challenger for a signature on ci. Let σi be the answer of such a query. R
will then output (ci, σi) and produce a ZK proof that ci decrypts in mi. Such a proof, in addition
to all the proofs involved in the verification/conversion queries, are possible for R to give with the
knowledge of the encryption private key.
At some time, the adversary A against the construction will output a forgery (c⋆, σ⋆) on a
message m⋆, that was never queried before. σ⋆ is by definition a digital signature on c⋆. The last
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item was never queried by R for digital signature, since otherwise m⋆ would have been queried
before. We conclude that (c⋆, σ⋆) is a valid forgery on the digital signature scheme.
Theorem 5.13. Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N4 and (ε, ǫ′) ∈ [0, 1]2, the construction given above is
(t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA secure if it uses a (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure digital signature and a
(t+ qs(qv + qsc), ǫ(1− ǫ′)qv+qsc)-IND-CPA secure encryption scheme.
Proof. Let A be the invisibility adversary against the construction, we construct an IND-CPA
adversary R against the underlying encryption scheme as follows.
R gets the parameters of the target encryption scheme from his challenger, and chooses a
suitable digital signature scheme. For a confirmedSign query on mi, R will proceed as in the
real algorithm, with the exception of maintaining a list L of records that consists of the query, its
encryption, the randomness used to produce the encryption, and finally the digital signature on
the encryption. R can produce digital signatures on any encryption with the knowledge of the
signature scheme private key. Moreover, he can confirm any signature he has just generated with
the knowledge of the randomness used in the encryption.
For a verification query (ci, σi) on mi, R will check L (after checking of course the validity of
σi on mi), if the record Ri = (mi, ci,−,−) appears in the list, then he will issue a proof that ci
decrypts in mi using the third component of the record. Otherwise, he will simulate a proof of the
inequality of the decryption of ci and mi using the rewinding technique.
For a conversion query,Rwill proceed as in a verification query with the exception of providing the
non-interactive variant of the proof he would issue if the signature is valid (using the randomness
encrypting the message in the first field of the queried confirmer signature), and the symbol ⊥
otherwise.
This simulation differs from the real one when the queried signature (ci, σi) is valid on mi however
ci does not appear in the list (as first field of the output confirmer signatures). We distinguish two
cases, either the message in question mi was not queried before for signature, in which case such a
query would correspond to a valid existential forgery on the construction, and thus on the underling
signature scheme. Or, the queried signature is on a message that has been queried before, which
corresponds to an existential forgery on the underlying signature scheme. Since the signature
scheme underlying the construction is (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure, this scenario does not happen
with probability at least (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc .
At some point, A produces two messages m0, m1. R will forward the same messages to his
challenger and obtain a ciphertext c, encryption of mb for some b
R←− {0, 1}. R will produce a
digital signature σ on c and give the result in addition to c toA as a challenge confirmer signature.
It easy to see that A’s answer is sufficient for R to conclude. Note that after the challenge phase,
A is allowed to issue confirmedSign, verification and conversion queries and R can handle them
as previously. There is however the possibility for A of issuing a verification (conversion) query
of the type (c,−) 6= (c, σ) on mb. R will respond to such a query by issuing the denial protocol
(symbol⊥). The probability that this answer does not differ from the output of the real algorithm is
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at least (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc as the signature scheme underlying the construction is (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA
secure by assumption.
Remark 5.5. Note that the IND-CPA requirement on the encryption scheme is also necessary.
In fact, an invisibility adversary against the construction can easily use an IND-CPA adversary
against the underlying encryption scheme in order to solve his invisibility challenge.
5.3.2 Efficiency analysis
Confirmation/denial protocols
We showed that the confirmation (and also the confirmedSign) protocol, in confirmer signatures
from the “signature of an encryption” paradigm, amounts to proving that a ciphertext encrypts a
given plaintext. This is in general easy since in most encryption schemes, one can define, given
a ciphertext c and its underlying plaintext m, two homomorphic one way functions f and g, and
two quantities I and J such that f(r) = I and g(sk) = J , where r is the randomness used to
encrypt m in c, and sk is the private key of the encryption scheme in question. Examples of such
encryptions are [El Gamal, 1985], the encryption scheme defined in [Boneh et al., 2004a] which
uses the linear Diffie-Hellman KEM, Paillier [Paillier, 1999], and also Cramer-Shoup [Cramer &
Shoup, 2003] and [Camenisch & Shoup, 2003]. The confirmation (confirmedSign) protocol in this
case will be reduced to a proof of knowledge of a preimage of J (I) by the function g (f ), for
which we provided an efficient proof in Figure 5.1.
Concerning the denial protocol, it is not always straightforward. In most discrete-logarithm-
based encryptions, this protocol amounts to a proof of inequality of discrete logarithms as in
[El Gamal, 1985; Boneh et al., 2004a; Cramer & Shoup, 2003]. In case the encryption scheme
belongs to the class E2 defined in Definition 5.1, Figure 5.4 provides an efficient proof that c en-
crypts some m˜ 6= m. In the protocol provided in this figure, f denotes an arbitrary homomorphic
injective one way function:
f(m ⋆m′) = f(m) ◦s f(m′)
With the standard tools, the above denial protocol can be shown to be a proof of knowledge
with computational ZK, if the encryption scheme Γ is IND-CPA secure, and ZK closed under
concurrent composition if PoK is a Σ protocol.
Selective Conversion
The selective conversion in confirmer signatures from the “signature of an encryption” paradigm
consists of a non-interactive proof of the confirmation protocol. As mentioned earlier in this doc-
ument, there has been recently an important progress in this area. We note in this paragraph three
solutions.
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Prover P Verifier V
Choose m′ R←− G
Compute t1 = f(m′)
Compute t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(m′)
t1, t2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Choose b R←− {0, 1}ℓ (b ∈ N)
z = m′ ∗ m˜b
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
PoK{z = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(t2 ◦e c
b)}
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Accept if PoK is valid and f(z) 6= t1 ◦s f(m)b .
Figure 5.4: Proof system for membership to the language {(m, c) : ∃m˜ : m˜ = Γ.decrypt(c)∧ m˜ 6=
m} Common input: (m, c,Γ.pk) and Private input: Γ.sk or randomness encrypting m˜ in c
The case of Paillier [Paillier, 1999]’s encryption scheme. The Paillier encryption [Paillier, 1999]
operates on messages in ZN , where N = pq is a safe RSA modulus. Encryption of a
message m is done by picking a random r ∈R Z×N and then computing the ciphertext
c = rN(1 + mN) mod N2. Decryption of a ciphertext c is first done by raising it to
λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) to find r, then recovering m by computing (r−Nc − 1)/N . It is
easy to see that Paillier’s encryption belongs to what we call the class of fully decryptable
encryption schemes, i.e. encryption schemes where decryption leads to the randomness used
to produce the ciphertext. Thus, selective conversion can simply be achieved by releasing
the randomness used to generate the ciphertext.
Damga˚rd et al. [Damga˚rd et al., 2006]’s solution. This solution transforms a 3-move interactive
ZK protocol P with linear answer to a non-interactive ZK one (NIZK) using a homomorphic
encryption scheme in a registered key model, i.e. in a model where the verifier registers his
key. This technique has been already discussed in 1.4.4 (Paragraph: non-interactive zero
knowledge (NIZK)). The authors in [Damga˚rd et al., 2006] proposed an efficient illustration
using Paillier’s encryption and the proof of equality of two discrete logarithms. We conclude
that with such a technique, the “signature of an encryption” approach accepts an efficient
instantiation if the considered encryption scheme allows proving the correctness of a de-
cryption using a proof of equality of two discrete logarithms, e.g. [El Gamal, 1985; Boneh
et al., 2004a; Cramer & Shoup, 2003].
Groth and Sahai [Groth & Sahai, 2008]’s solution. The authors in this work provide an efficient
NIZK for the language:
PoK = {(a, b) : c1 = ua ∧ c2 = vb ∧ c3 = ga+b}
The common input is g, c1, c2, u, v ∈ (G, ·)where (G, ·) is a bilinear group. The private input
is either (a, b) or (DLg(u),DLg(v)), where DLg(u) denotes the discrete logarithm of u in
base g. We conclude then that the “signature of an encryption” approach accepts an efficient
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instantiation if the considered encryption scheme is the one defined in [Boneh et al., 2004a],
since a proof of the above language can be used to prove that a given ciphertext decrypts to
a given message.
5.4 Conclusion
We analyzed the security of confirmer signatures from the “signature of commitment” paradigm
in the outsider security model. The plain paradigm was shown to necessitate strong encryption
which makes it quite impractical, or at least allow very limited instantiations. However, a small
variation results in a tremendous improvement in the efficiency. We also shed light on a particular
construction which can be seen as a special sub-case of the paradigm, namely the “signature of an
encryption” technique. The advantage of this technique consists in achieving better performance
than the original technique (short signature, small generation, verification, and conversion cost), yet
applying to any signature scheme. Its sole limitation resides in requiring efficient non-interactive
proofs of knowledge. This motivates research to further tackle this problem as was started recently
in [Damga˚rd et al., 2006; Groth & Sahai, 2008; Camenisch et al., 2009].
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Part III
Undeniable Signatures
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Chapter 6
Overview of Undeniable Signatures
Abstract. Undeniable signatures, as previously mentioned in Chapter 3, were intro-
duced in [Chaum & van Antwerpen, 1990] to limit the verification property inher-
ent to digital signatures. In fact, the verification of undeniable signatures cannot be
achieved without the cooperation with the signer. Later, this concept was upgraded
to designated confirmer signatures, where the verification of signatures is delegated
to a designated confirmer. Although undeniable signatures have preceded confirmer
signatures by only five years, the literature on the former was so abundant that it ex-
ceeded triple the literature on the latter. In this chapter, we give a short overview of
the research carried out in respect of undeniable signatures.
6.1 The genesis
Controlling the proliferation of certified copies of documents was the main motivation behind in-
troducing undeniable signatures. In fact, it is well known that digital entities, e.g. authenticated
documents, can be easily copied exactly, and as a consequence they can be subject to improper
use (blackmail or industrial espionage) in case the underlying content is personally or commer-
cially sensitive. For these reasons, Chaum and van Antwerpen introduced undeniable signatures
in [Chaum & van Antwerpen, 1990] as a cryptographic primitive having all properties of digi-
tal signatures except the universal verification. In fact, the verification procedure is replaced by
confirmation/denial protocols the signer issues interactively with the signature recipient.
Later in [Chaum, 1991b], Chaum polished the properties required in an undeniable signature
by introducing the concept of zero-knowledgeness of the confirmation/denial protocols. In fact,
after the interaction with the signer in the mentioned protocols, the signature recipient might get
additional knowledge (than the signature validity/invalidity) and uses it to leak the signature status
to other parties. Another attempt at refining the confirmation/denial protocols was proposed in
[Fujioka et al., 1991]; the authors in this work introduced the notion of interactive bi-proof systems
which aim at proving concurrently which of x ∈ L1 or x ∈ L2 is a true theorem where L1 and L2
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are disjoint languages. Such a notion can be employed in undeniable signatures to assure signature
confirmation and disavowal with the same protocol. Chaum continued to address in [Chaum,
1991a] the potential shortcomings/misreadings (reported for instance in [Desmedt & Yung, 1991])
of his new primitive.
An important advance of undeniable signatures was suggested in [Boyar et al., 1991], namely
the convertibility of the undeniable signatures into publicly verifiable ones. The conversion can
either be selective, i.e. concerns a selected undeniable signature, or universal, where the signer
releases a single bit string allowing the conversion of all undeniable signatures. The authors in
[Boyar et al., 1991] proved the existence of convertible undeniable signatures assuming the exis-
tence of digital signatures and provided an efficient solution based on ElGamal’s signature. This
construction was broken and repaired in [Michels et al., 1996], however the proposed scheme had
only a conjectural security. Another construction of convertible undeniable signatures was given
in [Damga˚rd & Pedersen, 1996] and likewise, the security analysis was only speculative.
We finish this section by citing the works [Pedersen, 1991] and [Chaum et al., 1991] which
support the signer in undeniable signatures with additional features. The former allows the signer to
distribute a part of his secret key to n agents such that any k of these can verify a signature, whereas
the latter proposes the first undeniable signatures with unconditional security for the signer.
6.2 Combination with other primitives
The concept of undeniable signatures was so attractive that it was adopted in many other crypto-
graphic frameworks, e.g.:
Group undeniable signatures [Lyuu & Wu, 2002]. A group signature is a cryptographic prim-
itive which allows a member of a group to anonymously sign messages on behalf of the group.
A group undeniable signature shares the same principle with group signatures with the exception
of necessitating the intervention of the group manager to verify the issued signatures. This new
mechanism can be for instance used to validate price lists, press releases, or digital contracts when
the signatures are commercially sensitive or valuable to a competitor.
Threshold undeniable signatures [Harn & Yang, 1993; Lin et al., 1996; Lee & Hwang, 1999;
Wang et al., 2001, 2002; Kim & Won, 2004; Guo & Tang, 2005; Chen et al., 2005; Lu et al.,
2005]. This concept was initiated in 1992 under the name: group-oriented undeniable signatures.
A group-oriented (t, n) undeniable signature scheme has the following four properties: (1) the
group signature is mutually generated by at least t group members; (2) the signature verification
process is simplified because there is only one group public key required; (3) the signature can
only be verified with the consent of all signers; (4) the signers hold the responsibility for the signed
messages. Group-oriented or threshold undeniable signatures can be for instance used in software
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business where the company which vends the software is funded by a number n of investors and
where the released products must be signed mutually by at least t investors.
Identity-based undeniable signatures [Libert & Quisquater, 2004; Guo & Tang, 2005; Zhang
et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2007b; Li et al., 2007]. Identity-based cryptography is a paradigm pro-
posed by Shamir in [Shamir, 1985] to remove the necessity for public key certificates. This is
achieved by letting the user’s public key be an information identifying him in a non-ambiguous
way (e-mail address, immatriculation number,...), and deriving the corresponding private key us-
ing the master key of a trusted authority called the private key generator (PKG). This concept was
first extended to undeniable signatures in 2004 by Libert and Quisquater, and later it was applied
to different primitives derived from undeniable signatures.
Undeniable multi-signatures [Yun & Lee, 2004, 2005]. An undeniable multi-signature is a
signature produced by a number of signers whose cooperation is mandatory for the verification of
the issued signature. Such a framework is suitable for joint copyright protection on digital contents.
In fact, digital watermarks have been proposed as the means for copyright protection of multimedia
data, and it is often the case that the confirmer of a watermark wants only the intended verifier to
be convinced with the validity of the watermark. In case the digital multimedia content is made
by co-workers, a joint copyright protection scheme is needed to provide equal right to them. Thus,
undeniable multi-signatures provide a good solution in this situation.
Blind undeniable signatures [Sakurai & Yamane, 1996; Huang et al., 2005; Han et al., 2006;
Koide et al., 2008]. A blind signature enables a user to obtain a signature on a message without
revealing the content of the message to the signer. Sometimes, the signer might control some
attributes of the message in question such as “date of issue” or “valid until”, in which case we
talk about a partially blind signature. (Partially) blind signatures proved very useful in many real-
life applications such as online-shopping as they protect the privacy of the user (customer) by
hiding the message (purchased item) from the signer (bank). Unfortunately, the self-authenticating
property of blind signatures jeopardizes completely the privacy of the signer. Thus, merging the
properties of blind and undeniable signatures results in a primitive which guarantees both the
privacy of the signer and of the user.
Proxy undeniable signatures [Wu et al., 2007a]. A proxy signature scheme allows an entity
to delegate his/her signing capability to another entity in a way that the latter can sign messages
on behalf of the former when the former is not available. Proxy signatures have found numerous
practical applications in ubiquitous computing, distributed systems, mobile agent applications, etc.
In some situations, it is required to protect the privacy of the (proxy) signer which entails the
presence of the primitive proxy undeniable signatures. In [Wu et al., 2007a], the authors propose
139
the first convertible undeniable proxy signature scheme with rigorously proven security in the
random oracle model, based on some natural complexity assumptions.
Undeniable confirmer signatures [Nguyen et al., 1999]. In undeniable signatures, a signature
can only be verified with the cooperation of the signer. Thus, absence of the signer obstructs the
entire verification process. This problem is eliminated in confirmer signature schemes where the
verification procedure is delegated to a confirmer rather than the signer. In [Nguyen et al., 1999],
the authors present a variation of confirmer signature, called undeniable confirmer signature in
which both the signer and the confirmer can verify the validity of the signatures. Note, that such a
primitive is often referred to as directed signatures [Lim & Lee, 1993].
Non-interactive designated verifier undeniable signatures [Jakobsson et al., 1996; Kudla &
Paterson, 2005]. The seminal work of Chaum and van Antwerpen [Chaum & van Antwerpen,
1990] on undeniable signatures has been subject to many attacks. The most notable one is due
to Jakobsson [Jakobsson, 1994] where he describes how the signer can be vulnerable to a black-
mailing attack, i.e. a dishonest verifier can threaten the signer to broadcast the validity of a given
signature if the latter does not consent to do what the former asks. Later, Jakobsson et al. [Jakobs-
son et al., 1996] proposed a solution to this problem, called designated verifier proofs. Informally
speaking, a designated verifier proof is a proof of correctness of some “statement” that either the
prover or some designated verifier could have produced. If the prover created the proof, then the
“statement” is correct, however a designated verifier could simulate a valid proof without a cor-
rect statement. As a result, a secure designated verifier proof will convince the designated verifier
of the validity of the given statement, as he did not create the proof, but will convince no other
party as the designated verifier could have generated it. Finally, it was shown in [Jakobsson et al.,
1996] that designated verifier proofs could be made non-interactive, however, a formal definition
of non-interactive proofs of knowledge along with their applications to undeniable signatures was
provided almost a decade later in [Kudla & Paterson, 2005].
6.3 RSA-based constructions
Since the introduction of undeniable signatures in 1989, a significant amount of work has been de-
voted to the investigation of practical schemes implementing this primitive. Up to 1997, this work
was focused on discrete-log-based systems. The scheme in [Gennaro et al., 2000] is the first to use
regular RSA signatures to generate undeniable signatures. In this new setting, both the signature
and verification exponents of RSA are kept secret by the signer, while the public key consists of a
safe RSA modulus and a sample RSA signature on a single public message. The scheme possesses
several attractive properties. First of all, provable security, as forging the undeniable signatures
is as hard as forging regular RSA signatures. Second, both the confirmation and denial protocols
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are zero-knowledge. In addition, these protocols are efficient (particularly, the confirmation proto-
col involves only two rounds of communication and a small number of exponentiations). Finally,
the scheme in [Gennaro et al., 2000] can be efficiently extended to support more advanced prop-
erties of undeniable signatures found in the literature, including convertibility of the undeniable
signatures (into publicly verifiable ones), the possibility to delegate the ability to confirm and deny
signatures to a third party without giving up the power to sign, and the existence of distributed
(threshold) versions of the signing and confirmation operations.
Later in [Miyazaki, 2000], an improved variant of [Gennaro et al., 2000], which supports the
convertibility and the resilience against the hidden verifier attack (described in [Jakobsson et al.,
1996]), is proposed. Improvements of [Gennaro et al., 2000] continued to emerge, for instance the
work in [Galbraith et al., 2002] proposes techniques which allow RSA-based undeniable signatures
for general moduli (in contrast to the work [Gennaro et al., 2000] which rests on safe RSA moduli).
Additionally, the result in [Galbraith & Mao, 2003] develops an RSA-based scheme which has
invisibility. Quite recently, a new approach for constructing selectively convertible RSA-based
undeniable signatures without random oracles has been proposed in [Kurosawa & Takagi, 2006;
Le Trieu et al., 2009].
6.4 Analysis and refinement of the model
New (security) properties. The first security notions that were required in undeniable signatures
were: (1) security for the verifier, which refers to the soundness of the confirmation/denial proto-
cols, (2) unforgeability of the signatures, which refers to the hardness of producing a valid unde-
niable signature on an arbitrary message, (3) non-transferability and invisibility of the signatures,
where non-transferability means the inability of the signature verifier to transfer his knowledge
about the signature status to a third party, and invisibility connotes the difficulty of telling whether
a signature is valid or not. The invisibility property had many variants; the first one requires that
any polynomial adversary is incapable of distinguishing a signature based on the underlying mes-
sage (the adversary outputs two messages m0 and m1 and receives a signature on one of those two
messages; he is then required to tell the message underlying the challenge signature). There exists
also the stronger notion [Galbraith & Mao, 2003] which requires the difficulty of distinguishing
the signature on a message, chosen by the adversary, from a random signature in the signature
space. In the same paper [Galbraith & Mao, 2003], Galbraith and Mao suggested to consider a
further security property, that is anonymity, which informally means the infeasibility of determin-
ing whether a user is or is not the signer of a given message. Such a property can be the source of
abuse by the signer in some situations, thus the introduction of the notion of revocable anonymity
in [Yeung & Han, 2003; Han et al., 2004] to denote the possibility of revoking the anonymity, by
some trusted authority, of some signer who has done illegal actions.
Another security property that needs to be satisfied by convertible undeniable signatures was in-
troduced in [Huang & Wong, 2009] and named resilience to claimability attacks, where a dis-
141
honest/malicious signer both disavows a signature via the disavowal protocol and confirms it via
selective conversion. Always in the case of convertible undeniable signatures, it is desirable in
some situations to delegate the ability to prove the validity and convert signatures to a semi-trusted
third party by providing a verification key [Schuldt & Matsuura, 2010].
Finally, Kurosawa and Furukawa introduced in [Kurosawa & Furukawa, 2008] the notion of uni-
versal composability which informally captures the maintenance of the undeniable signature of its
security properties under a general protocol composition. This notion is motivated by the fact that
undeniable signatures are often used as a building block in a more complicated protocol.
Relations among security notions. The first work that addresses the relations among the differ-
ent security notions of undeniable signatures is [Galbraith & Mao, 2003], where the authors prove
that their notion of invisibility implies their notion of anonymity and the invisibility notion con-
sidered in [Camenisch & Michels, 2000]. They also specify some properties to be satisfied by the
undeniable signature scheme in order to have invisibility in the sense of [Camenisch & Michels,
2000] and anonymity in the sense of [Galbraith & Mao, 2003] imply the strong invisibility in the
sense of [Galbraith & Mao, 2003].
Besides, Kurosawa and Heng conduct in [Kurosawa & Heng, 2006] a thorough study on the un-
forgeability and invisibility notions of undeniable signatures in the two attack models, namely
chosen message attack and full attack. In particular, they show that unforgeability against a chosen
message attack (where the adversary is allowed to query adaptively the signing oracle) is equiva-
lent to unforgeability against a full attack (where the adversary is allowed to query adaptively both
the signing and the confirmation/denial oracles), and invisibility against a chosen message attack
is equivalent to invisibility against a full attack.
Different types of conversion. Traditionally, the convertibility property in undeniable signa-
tures refers to the possibility of converting an individual undeniable signature into an ordinary one
(selective conversion), or publish a universal receipt that turns all undeniable signatures into pub-
licly verifiable ones (universal conversion). Recently, convertibility in undeniable signatures has
been widened to cover further features. The first example is the time-selective conversion property
which was introduced in [Laguillaumie & Vergnaud, 2005] to circumvent the problem caused by
the universal conversion of undeniable signatures. In fact, after the signer has revealed the uni-
versal trapdoor, all (past and future) undeniable signatures will be publicly verifiable and thus he
cannot issue further undeniable signatures with his present key. As a consequence, he needs to
(in case he wants to issue new undeniable signatures) generate a new key pair which has to be
certified by an authority (PKI) and where the corresponding certificate needs to be generated by
all the verifiers. Time-selective conversion is a notion which supports the signer to universally
convert chronologically signatures pertaining only to a specific time period: given a time-selective
convertible undeniable signature σ for a time period p, it is computationally infeasible to determine
which signing secret key was used to generate σ; but with the knowledge of a matching universal
receipt for some time period p′ ≥ p, it is easy to determine whether σ is a valid time-selective con-
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vertible undeniable signature or not. Next, the gradual conversion was introduced in [El Aimani
& Vergnaud, 2007] to generalize the concept of time-selective convertible undeniable signatures to
event-selective convertible undeniable signatures where a signature becomes universally verifiable
if a specific event happens and makes the signer publish the corresponding receipt information.
In other words, gradual conversion enables the signer to gradually convert signatures achronously
(i.e. with time periods made completely independent of each other).
6.5 Applications
The first real life application that motivated the research on undeniable signatures is the limitation
of the proliferation of certified copies of a document issued by a given company. Later, Jakobsson
[Jakobsson, 1994] exhibited a situation where one can use undeniable signatures for blackmailing;
a malicious verifier can threaten the signer of leaking the validity of a given signature if the latter
does not consent to what the former asks. This situation can be avoided if the undeniable signature
scheme is well designed, namely if signatures are non-transferable.
Next, and almost a decade later, Yun and Lee provided two further applications of undeniable
multi-signatures, namely the joint copyright protection on digital content [Yun & Lee, 2004] and
the large scale electronic voting [Yun & Lee, 2005]. In fact, Digital watermarks have been proposed
as the means for copyright protection of multimedia data. Naturally, the confirmer of a watermark
wants to make sure that only the intended verifier can be convinced of the validity of the watermark
and thus the need for undeniable signatures. However, existing copyright protection schemes are
mainly focused on protection of single owners’ copyright. In case the digital multimedia contents is
made by co-workers, a joint copyright protection scheme is needed to provide equal right to them,
which explains the necessity of undeniable multi-signatures. Besides, existing voting schemes
assume that the voting center is trustful and untraceable channels exist between voters and the
voting center. To minimize the role of the voting center, the authors in [Yun & Lee, 2005] propose
a voting scheme where multiple administrators manage the voting protocol. Moreover, in the
voting and counting stages, ballots cannot be opened without the help of all administrators. Also,
before counting the ballot, the administrators must all verify the undeniable multi-signature on it.
Finally and due to the properties of undeniable signatures, voters can change their mind to whom
they vote in the registration stage. They can restart the voting process by simply rejecting the
signature confirmation protocol launched by the voting manager.
The last application of undeniable signatures that has been addressed in the literature is in the
area of Internet applications, or more precisely XML [Sun & Li, 2005]. XML or extensible markup
language has become an important universal language for the Internet-based business world. An
XML document can be generated from various resources with varying security requirements. In
order to ensure the integrity of the contents in the transactions, and at the same time maintain
privacy and confidentiality, security is increasingly important. The XML undeniable signatures,
proposed in [Yun & Lee, 2005], are designed for the security of XML document transactions. They
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guarantee the authentication, data integrity, and non-repudiation of the data they sign. Moreover,
they ensure that signatures cannot be verified without interaction with the signer. The goal of a such
work is to bridge the gap existing between XML technologies and data security theories in order
to provide a framework for the integration of security technologies to improve XML applications.
6.6 Constructions over special algebraic structures
Popular undeniable signatures present in the literature have the disadvantage of either having long
signatures, typically 1024 bits, or having operations for the signer that take cubic running time.
These advantages become more tangible for some real world applications, e.g. on a chip card or
a web server. Therefore, many attempts have been made to address the mentioned problems; we
sketch in this section the most important such contributions.
Signatures based on ideal arithmetic in quadratic order [Biehl et al., 2004]. These are signa-
tures constructed using imaginary quadratic fields. A quadratic field is an algebraic number field
of degree two over Q. It is easy to show that the map d 7→ Q(√d) is a bijection from the set
of all square-free integers d 6= 0, 1 to the set of all quadratic fields. If d > 0, the corresponding
quadratic field is called a real quadratic field, and for d < 0, it is called an imaginary quadratic field
or complex quadratic field. There has been a number of cryptographic primitives (e.g. the NICE
encryption scheme [Paulus & Takagi, 2000]) using such an algebraic structure; the technique used
in these systems is based on “switching” between ideals whose arithmetic is quadratic in the bit
length of the public key. As a consequence, the operations on the signer’s side in [Biehl et al., 2004]
are of quadratic complexity. The comparisons with the popular RSA-based undeniable signatures
show a major advantage of [Biehl et al., 2004] in terms of signature cost and length. However,
the major drawback lies in the conjectural security analysis of the scheme, which becomes more
improbable after the cryptanalysis of the NICE encryption scheme [Castagnos & Laguillaumie,
2009; Castagnos et al., 2009].
MOVA signatures [Monnerat & Vaudenay, 2004b,a; Monnerat et al., 2005]. These proposals
develop a general framework based on the notion of interpolation of group homomorphisms. In
this way, they define decisional and computational problems which generalize several fundamental
problems found in public key cryptography, e.g. (Bilinear) Diffie-Hellman, Quadratic Residuosity,
...
These group homomorphisms allow to express well known signatures, e.g. [Chaum & van Antwer-
pen, 1990; Gennaro et al., 2000] in a unified framework. Moreover, they allow to develop very
short signatures in a quite natural way, namely by instantiating the scheme with group homomor-
phisms with a range group of small size. The main criticism of these signatures is the resort to the
random oracle model.
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Signatures using Non-Abelian groups [Thomas & Lal, 2008]. Non-Abelian groups have been
considered as an alternative for doing public key cryptography. In fact, they provide a rich collec-
tion of hard problems like the conjugacy problem: given x, y ∈ (G, ·), decide whether x and y are
conjugates, i.e. whether ∃a ∈ G : x = aya−1. There are many illustrations of non-Abelian groups,
e.g. Braid groups, Thompson’s group, Polycyclic groups. The signature presented in [Thomas &
Lal, 2008] is based on the intractability of the conjugacy problem. The scheme therein does not
only suffer from the conjectural security, but also from the unreasonableness of the underlying as-
sumption; it is well known that there exists an efficient problem that solves the conjugacy problem
in Braid groups.
6.7 Recent trends
We summarize in the following section the main directions of research on undeniable signatures.
Revisiting previous constructions. There have been a number of works devoted to the analy-
sis of previous constructions of undeniable signatures. The first of such projects dates back to
2001 [Okamoto & Pointcheval, 2001] where the authors introduce a novel class of computational
problems, namely the gap problems. They further show how a particular instance based on the
Diffie-Hellman problems, namely the GDH problem, can serve to solve a more than 10-year old
open security problem: Chaum’s undeniable signature. Later, in [Ogata et al., 2005], the authors
improved the analysis in [Okamoto & Pointcheval, 2001], and showed that the security of the
FDH variant of Chaum’s scheme with NIZK confirmation and disavowal protocols is equivalent to
the CDH problem. They achieve this by introducing a new kind of adversarial goal called forge-
and-impersonate in undeniable signature schemes, classifying the security of the FDH variant of
Chaum’s undeniable signature scheme according to three dimensions, i.e. the goal of adversaries,
the attacks and the ZK level of confirmation and disavowal protocols, and finally relating each
security to some well-known computational problem.
The next two schemes that were revisited are those by Damga˚rd and Pederesen [Damga˚rd & Ped-
ersen, 1996] and by Michels et al. [Michels et al., 1996], which were addressed in [El Aimani,
2008] and [El Aimani & Vergnaud, 2007] and will be subjects of the two upcoming chapters resp.
Finally, we mention the claimed attack [Li et al., 2007] on Libert and Quisquater [Libert &
Quisquater, 2004]’s ID-based undeniable signature; the authors show that if a valid message-
signature pair has been revealed, an adversary can forge the signer’s signature on any arbitrary
message for which the signer has no way to deny it. This attack turns out to be flawed as the
authors confuse points on an elliptic curve with elements in Z×q , where q is the order of the group
formed by the elliptic curve points.
Generic constructions. The next direction of research was dedicated to the design of generic
constructions of undeniable signatures. The first result in this line is the MOVA construction [Mon-
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nerat & Vaudenay, 2004b,a; Monnerat et al., 2005] described earlier in Section 6.6. Next, there is
the result due to Galindo et al. [Galindo et al., 2006] where the authors propose a technique for
building identity based schemes with further properties. For instance, they provide a generic con-
struction for ID-based undeniable signatures from a digital and an undeniable signature schemes.
Later, the result in [Huang et al., 2007a] proposes a generic construction for universally-convertible
undeniable signatures; the construction is based on three building blocks: a strongly unforgeable
classic signature scheme, a selectively-convertible undeniable signature scheme and a collision-
resistant hash function. Finally, in [El Aimani, 2008, 2009a], we propose a generic construction
of convertible undeniable signatures (both selectively and universally) from any digital signature
scheme and any encryption scheme obtained from the hybrid encryption paradigm. We must also
cite the construction [Zhu, 2004] which realizes the “signature of an encryption” paradigm.
Efficient signatures with strong security properties. Alleviation or removal of the idealized
models and basing the security on popular and reasonable security properties was a tangible pur-
pose in the recent proposals of undeniable signatures. We note as examples [Huang et al., 2007b;
El Aimani, 2008, 2009a; Le Trieu et al., 2009, 2010; Schuldt & Matsuura, 2010; Huang & Wong,
2009]. It is worth noting that most of these proposals are based on the sign-then-encrypt paradigm.
Moreover, efficiency, which translates in having short signatures with small generation, verification
and conversion cost, was also a main intent in the recent proposals of undeniable signatures. All the
previously mentioned schemes achieve also these properties as their underlying encryption layer
relies on an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme. Finally, we note that it is was also desirable
recently to reach a minimal number of moves between the signer and the verifier of an undeniable
signature. The already mentioned signatures have constant nay four round confirmation/denial
protocols. Fewer moves have been achieved by [Kurosawa & Heng, 2005; Monnerat & Vaudenay,
2005] but at the expense of security; both constructions have recourse to the random oracle model
for the security analysis.
6.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we browsed quickly through the different realizations in the area of undeniable
signatures. We will continue in the next two chapters by having a closer look at two proposals,
namely [Damga˚rd & Pedersen, 1996] and [Michels et al., 1996]; we will disprove the conjecture
on the invisibility of the former and provide a recast of the underlying construction which achieves
strong security features. Moreover, we redefine the security model of the latter so that it captures
a new property, namely the gradual conversion, and we provide a formal security analysis of the
scheme in this new model.
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Chapter 7
Damga˚rd-Pedersen’s Undeniable Signatures
Revisited
Abstract. Damga˚rd-Pedersen’s [Damga˚rd & Pedersen, 1996] undeniable signa-
tures were proposed in 1996, and consist in first generating a provably secure variant
of ElGamal’s signature, e.g. the Modified ElGamal signature scheme [Pointcheval
& Stern, 2000], on the given message, then encrypting the message-key-dependent
part using either Rabin’s or ElGamal’s encryption. These signatures were proven
to have their unforgeability resting on the discrete logarithm problem. Concerning
invisibility, it is conjectured to rest on the factorization problem in case the Rabin
encryption is used, and on the DDH problem otherwise. This conjectural security
was reported recently in [Kurosawa & Takagi, 2006] as the authors used a similar
approach to devise their undeniable signatures.
In this chapter, we focus on the variant using ElGamal’s encryption; we disprove the
speculative invisibility in the model defined in [Damga˚rd & Pedersen, 1996], and
we provide a complete attack on the scheme in a very popular model. Besides, we
propose a fix to the scheme which allows to achieve very strong security features;
the security analysis is done in a more general framework where the refined scheme
is seen as a special instantiation of this framework.
Parts of the results in this chapter appeared in the publication [El Aimani, 2009a] in
the proceedings of Africacrypt 2009.
7.1 Damga˚rd-Pedersen’s undeniable signatures
7.1.1 The scheme
Let m ∈ {0, 1}⋆ be an arbitrary message, the scheme consists of the following procedures:
Setup (setup). On input the security parameter κ, generate a k-bit prime t and a prime p ≡
147
1. The prover computes s the decryption of (E1, E2) using ν.
Next, he chooses s′ R←− Z×t , computes and sends t1 =
(
gh(m)h−r
)s′
and
t2 = (E1α
ρ′ , s′E2β
ρ′ ) to the verifier
3. The verifier chooses b R←− {0, 1} and sends it to the prover.
4. If b = 0, the prover sends s′ and ρ′.
Otherwise, he sends ss′ and proves that t2 is an encryption of ss′.
5. If b = 0, the verifier checks that t1 and t2 are computed as in Step 1.
Otherwise, he checks the proof of decryption of t2:
It it fails, he rejects the proof.
Otherwise:
If the prover is confirming the signature, the verifier accepts if rss′ = t1.
If the prover is denying the given signature, the verifier accepts the proof if rss′ 6= t1.
Figure 7.1: Proof system for membership to the language {(E1, E2, r) ∈ Z×t × Z×t × Z×p |
∃ s ∈ Zt : DLα(β) = DLE1(E2 · s−1) ∧ gh(m)h−r = ( 6=)rs} Common input: (E1, E2, r, pk) and
Private input: ν
1 mod t. Furthermore, select a collision-resistant hash functionH that maps arbitrary-length
messages to Zt.
Key generation (keygen). Generate g of order t, x ∈ Z×t , and h = gx mod p. Furthermore,
select a generator α of Z×t and ν ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t−1}, and compute β = αν mod t. The public
key is pk = (p, t, g, h, α, β) and the private key is (x, ν).
Signature (sign). The signer first computes an ElGamal signature (s, r) on m, i.e. compute
r = gb mod p for some b R←− Z×t , then compute s as h(m) = rx + bs mod t. Next, he
computes an ElGamal encryption (E1 = αρ, E2 = sβρ) mod t, for ρ
R←− Zt−1, of s. The
undeniable signature on m is the triple (E1, E2, r).
Confirmation/Denial protocol (confirm/deny). To confirm (deny) a purported signature (E1, E2, r)
on a certain message m, the signer issues a ZKPoK of the language: (see Figure 7.1 ){
(E1, E2, r) ∈ Z×t × Z×t × Z×t | ∃ s ∈ Zt : DLα(β) = DLE1(E2 · s−1) ∧ gh(m)h−r = ( 6=)rs
}
7.1.2 Security analysis
The above algorithms/protocols are obviously complete. Moreover, the confirmation/denial pro-
tocols are proven to be sound and zero knowledge. Finally, the signatures are proven to be un-
forgeable if the underlying ElGamal signature is also unforgeable, and they are conjectured (by the
authors in [Damga˚rd & Pedersen, 1996]) to meet the following security notion if the DDH problem
is hard.
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Definition 7.1 (Signature indistinguishability). It is defined through the following game between
an attacker A (a distinguisher) and his challenger R.
Phase 1 after A gets the public parameters of the undeniable signature scheme, namely pk, from
R, he starts issuing status requests and signature requests. In a status request, A produces
a pair (m, z), and receives a 1-bit answer which is 1 iff z is a valid undeniable signature on
m w.r.t. pk. In a signature request, A produces a message m and receives an undeniable
signature z on it w.r.t. pk.
Challenge Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, he outputs a message m and receives a string z
which is either a valid undeniable signature on m (w.r.t pk) or a simulated signature, i.e. a
string randomly chosen from the signature space.
Phase 2 A resumes adaptively making the previous types of queries, provided that m does not
occur in any request, and that z does not occur in any status request. Eventually, A will
output a bit.
Let pr, resp. ps be the probability that A answers 1 in the real, resp. the simulated case. Both
probabilities are taken over the random coins of both A and R. We say that the signatures are
indistinguishable if |pr − ps| is a negligible function in the security parameter.
7.2 Negative Results
In this section, we provide evidence that the Damga˚rd-Pedersen signatures are unlikely to be in-
distinguishable under the DDH assumption. We prove in a first stage that if there exists a key-
preserving reduction, i.e. an algorithm launching the adversary over its own public key and other
freely chosen parameters, from the DDH problem to the distinguishability of the signatures (in
the sense of Definition 7.1), then there exists an efficient algorithm that solves the DDH problem.
Next, we provide an actual attack on this indistinguishability in a reasonable (and popular) security
model. Both attacks are based on the malleability of ElGamal’s encryption; given a ciphertext, one
can create another ciphertext for the same underlying message.
7.2.1 Impossibility results for key-preserving reductions
Lemma 7.1. Assume there exists a key-preserving reduction R that uses an indistinguishability
adversary A against the above scheme to solve the DDH problem. Then, there exists an efficient
meta-reduction M that solves the DDH problem.
As previously mentioned (Chapters 4 and 5), this lemma suggests that under the DDH assump-
tion, there exists no key-preserving reduction from the DDH problem to the distinguishability of
the signatures, and in case such an algorithm exists, then the DDH problem is easy thus rendering
the reduction useless.
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Proof. Let R be the key-preserving reduction that reduces the DDH problem to distinguishing the
Damga˚rd-Pedersen signatures in the sense of Definition 7.1. We will construct an algorithm M
that uses R to solve the DDH problem by simulating a distinguisher against the signatures.
Let (c1 = αa, c2 = βb) ∈ Z×t × Z×t be the DDH instance M is asked to solve. M acting
as a distinguisher of the signature will make a signature request on an arbitrary message m. Let
(E1, E2, r) be the answer to such a query. M will make now a status query on (c1 · E1, c2 · E2, r)
and the message m. (c1, c2) is a yes-Diffie-Hellman instance iff the result of the last query is the
confirmation that (c1 · E1, c2 ·E2, r) is a signature on m.
In this case, it does not seem obvious how to extend the above result to arbitrary reductions. For
instance, we cannot employ the technique of non-malleability of the key generator used previously
in Chapters 4 and 5. In fact, this would correspond in the current case to assume that the DDH
problem, w.r.t. a given public key pk, is difficult even when given access to a CDH oracle w.r.t.
any pk′ 6= pk, which is untrue.
7.2.2 An attack in another security model
In Definition 7.1, the adversary or distinguisher cannot issue status signatures on the challenge
message and an arbitrary signature which is different from the challenge signature. This model is
very frail because it prevents the signer from issuing many signatures on the same message; once
the status of a signature is known, then the status of all other signatures on the same message is also
known. Thus, a more realistic model will allow the adversary to issue status queries which involve
the challenge message. However, the scheme in question can be totally broken in the new setting
due to the fact that, given an ElGamal ciphertext, one can create another ElGamal encryption for
the same plaintext.
Lemma 7.2. The above undeniable signatures are not indistinguishable in the presence of an
adversary making status queries which comprise the challenge message.
Proof. Let A be an distinguisher against the above signatures, and let (E1, E2, r) be the challenge
signature on the challenge message m. A will simply choose r R←− Zt−1 and make the status query
on (αrE1, β
rE2, r) and m. The response to such a query is sufficient for A to conclude as the new
signature is valid on m iff the original one is also valid on m.
7.3 Positive Results
In the previous section, we provided evidence that the Damga˚rd-Pedersen undeniable signatures
are very unlikely to be indistinguishable under the DDH assumption. This can be explained by the
fact that they are not strongly unforgeable, i.e. given a signature on an arbitrary message, one can
create another signature on the same message without the help of the signer. Thus, the reduction
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R needs more than a list, maintaining the queries and their replys, in order to answer the status
queries made by the distinguisher. To repair these signatures, one can first compute the ElGamal
key βρ along with its encapsulation αr, then produce an ElGamal signature (s, r) on the message
in question concatenated with αρ, and finally encrypt s using βρ. The output undeniable signature
is (αρ, sβρ, r). It is easy to see that the provided repair is a special instance of the construction in
Section 4.2, and thus can be proven in a stronger security model (the resulting confirmer signatures
are proven to be SINV-CMA secure) than that provided in [Damga˚rd & Pedersen, 1996].
In the sequel, we exhibit another reduction from the anonymity of the construction to the
anonymity of its underlying building blocks. In fact, although SINV-CMA security implies ANO-
CMA security, however, the former rests on rather strong assumptions on the underlying building
blocks, namely the IND-CPA and INV-OT security of the used KEM and DEM resp.
Theorem 7.3. Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N4 and (ε, ǫ′) ∈ [0, 1]2, the construction depicted in Section
4.2 is (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-ANO-CMA secure if it uses a (t, ǫ′, qs)-EUF-CMA secure, an ANO-OT secure
DEM, and a (t+ qs(qv + qsc), ǫ2 · (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc)-ANO-CPA secure KEM.
Proof. Let A be an attacker that (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-ANO-CMA breaks the construction in Section
4.2, assumed to use a (t, ǫ′, qs)-EUF-CMA secure digital signature and an ANO-OT secure DEM.
We will construct an algorithm R that (t + qs(qv + qsc), ǫ2 · (1 − ǫ′)qv+qsc)-ANO-CPA breaks the
underlying KEM:
[Key generation] R gets the parameters of the KEM K from his challenger, namely the two
public keys K.pk0 and K.pk1 and the encapsulation/decapsulation algorithms. Then, he
chooses an appropriate ANO-OT secure DEM together with an EUF-CMA secure signature
scheme Σ. He will run Σ.keygen twice to obtain (Σ.pk0,Σ.sk0) and (Σ.pk1,Σ.sk1). Finally
he will set pk0 = (K.pk0,Σ.pk0) and pk1 = (K.pk1,Σ.pk1) as the challenge public keys for
A.
[confirmedSign queries] For a signature query on m regarding a public key pkb, b ∈ {0, 1}. R
first fixes a session key k together with its encapsulation c using K.pkb. Then he computes
a (digital) signature σ = (s, r) on c‖m using Σ.skb. Finally, he encrypts s (using k) and
outputs the result, together with r, to A. R will maintain a list Lb of the encapsulations c
and keys k used to generate the confirmer signatures with respect to the key pkb, b = 0, 1.
[confirm/deny queries] For a signature µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3) on m with respect to a given key pkb,
b ∈ {0, 1},R will look up the list Lb. If a record having as first component the encapsulation
µ1, thenRwill use the corresponding decapsulation, say k, to decrypt (µ1, µ2) in s. If (s, µ3)
is a valid digital signature on c‖m, R will run the confirmation protocol, otherwise, he will
run the denial protocol. R can issue such proofs of knowledge, without knowing the private
key of K, using the rewinding technique because the protocols are zero knowledge, thus
simulatable. In case µ1 does not appear in any record of Lb,R will issue the denial protocol.
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This simulation differs from the real one when the signature µ is valid and has not been
obtained from a signature query. Two cases: eithermwas never queried to the signing oracle,
then (m,µ) would correspond to an existential forgery on the confirmer signature scheme,
which would lead to an existential forgery on the underlying signature scheme, by virtue of
Theorem 4.8. The second case is when m has been previously queried to the signing oracle
in which case (m,µ) would correspond to an existential forgery on the underlying digital
scheme thanks to Remark 4.6. Hence, the probability that both scenarios do not happen is
at least (1 − ǫ′)qv because the underlying digital signature scheme is (t, ǫ′, qs)-EUF-CMA
secure by assumption.
[convert queries] R proceeds as above with the exception of issuing the converted signature
instead of the confirmation protocol, or the symbol ⊥ instead of the denial protocol. Here,
the probability thatA does not query a valid signature that has not been obtained from a sign
query is at least (1− ǫ′)qsc .
[Challenge] Eventually, A outputs a challenging message m⋆. R will pick a b′ R←− {0, 1} and
use his challenge (c⋆b , k⋆b ) (created w.r.t. K.pkb for some b ∈ {0, 1}) to compute a digital
signature σ⋆b′ = (s⋆b′ , r⋆b′), using Σ.skb′ , on c⋆b‖m⋆. Then, he encrypts the useful part of the
resulting signature (s⋆b′) using k⋆b and outputs the result, together with r⋆b′ , as a confirmer
signature µ⋆ on m⋆. Therefore, if b = b′, then µ⋆ is a signature on m⋆ with respect to pkb,
otherwise it is not a valid signature with respect to either key. If A has an advantage non-
negligibly different from that of an adversary in a real attack (as described in Definition 3.4),
then A can be used to used to break the ANO-OT security of the DEM; actually r⋆b′ reveals
by assumption no information about Σ.pkb′ .
[Post challenge phase] A will continue issuing queries to the signing, confirmation/denial, and
selective conversion oracles, with respect to the two keys pk0 or pk1, and R can answer as
previously. Note that in this phase, A might request the verification or selective conversion
of a confirmer signature (c⋆b ,−,−) on a message mi with respect to pkb, b = 0, 1. In this
case, R will simply issue the denial protocol in case of a verification query, or the symbol ⊥
in case of a selective conversion query. Following the same analysis above, the probability
that the simulation does not differ from the real execution is at least (1− ǫ′)qsc+qv .
[Final output] When A outputs his answer ba ∈ {0, 1}, R will output b′′ = b′ to his challenger
in case ba = b′, and b′′ = 1 − b′ otherwise. We clearly have ǫ = |Pr[ba = b′|b = b′] − 12 |.
The advantage of R is defined by:
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Adv(R) = (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
= (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
∣∣∣∣Pr[ba = b′, b = b′′] + Pr[ba 6= b′, b = b′′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
= (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
∣∣∣∣Pr[ba = b′, b = b′] + Pr[ba 6= b′, b 6= b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
= (1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
∣∣∣∣Pr[ba = b′|b = b′] Pr[b = b′] + Pr[ba 6= b′|b 6= b′] Pr[b 6= b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
(1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
2
∣∣∣∣Pr[ba = b′|b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
ǫ(1− ǫ′)qv+qsc
2
The last but one equation is due to the fact that Pr[b = b′] = 1
2
as b′
R←− {0, 1}, and to that
fact that Pr[ba 6= b′|b 6= b′] = 12 since the used DEM is ANO-OT secure.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we revisited the Damga˚rd-Pedersen [Damga˚rd & Pedersen, 1996] undeniable sig-
natures which had a conjectural security left open for over a decade. We disproved the invisibility
of these signatures in the model given in [Damga˚rd & Pedersen, 1996], and provided a complete
attack in a stronger model which is quite reasonable. Next, we proposed a fix to these signatures
so that they become invisible; interestingly, this repair turns out to be a special instantiation of the
construction provided in Section 4.2. Actually, even the confirmation/denial protocols provided
in [Damga˚rd & Pedersen, 1996] happen to be a special case of the confirmation/denial protocols
provided for the construction in Section 4.2. Moreover, we provided another analysis of the con-
struction in question which establishes its anonymity based on the anonymity of its components.
We conclude that the construction in Section 4.2 does not only capture the efficient realizations
of confirmer/undeniable signatures proposed recently, e.g. [Le Trieu et al., 2010; Schuldt & Mat-
suura, 2010], but also serves for analyzing the early schemes that have a speculative security.
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Chapter 8
Gradually Convertible Undeniable
Signatures
Abstract. In 1990, Boyar, Chaum, Damga˚rd, and Pedersen introduced in [Boyar
et al., 1991] convertible undeniable signatures which limit the self-authenticating
property of digital signatures but can be converted by the signer to ordinary signa-
tures. Six years later, Michels, Petersen, and Horster presented in [Michels et al.,
1996] an attack on the El Gamal-based seminal scheme of Boyar et al., and pro-
posed a repaired version without formal security analysis. In this chapter, we mod-
ify their scheme so that it becomes a generic one, and it provides an advanced
feature which permits the signer to universally convert achronously all signatures
pertaining to a specific time period. We supply a formal security treatment of the
modified scheme: we prove, in the generic group model, that the scheme is existen-
tially unforgeable and invisible under chosen message attacks, assuming reasonable
assumptions on the underlying constituents.
Parts of the results in this chapter appeared in the joint work [El Aimani &
Vergnaud, 2007] with Damien Vergnaud in the proceedings of ACNS 2007.
8.1 Gradually convertible undeniable signatures
8.1.1 Syntax
Let π ∈ N. A gradually convertible undeniable signature scheme US with π time periods consists
of the following procedures:
Setup (US.setup). This is an algorithm which takes an integer k as input, and outputs the public
parameters Parameters. κ is called the security parameter.
Signer key generation (US.skeygen). This algorithm takes the public parameters as input and
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outputs a pair (sks,pks), where sks is called the signing private key and pks the signing
public key.
Verifier key generation (US.vkeygen). This algorithm inputs the public parameters and outputs
a pair (skv,pkv), where skv is called the verifying private key and pkv the verifying public
key.
Signature (US.sign). This algorithm takes the public parameters, a message, an integer in [[1, π]],
and a signing private key as inputs and outputs a bit string.
Verification (US.verify). This algorithm, run by the signer, inputs the public parameters, a mes-
sage m, a bit string µ, an integer p ∈ [[1, π]], and a signing key pair (sks,pks) and outputs a
bit which is equal to 1 iff the bit string µ is a valid undeniable signature on m for the time
period p w.r.t. pks.
Confirmation/Denial protocols (US.{confirm, deny}). These are two-party protocols (P,V) be-
tween the signer P and a signature recipient V such that:
• P and V take as common input a message m, an integer p ∈ [[1, π]], a bit-string µ, a
signing public key pks, a verifying public key pkv, and the public parameters;
• P takes as private input sks the signing secret key corresponding to pks;
• V takes as private input skv the verifying secret key corresponding to pkv;
• (P,V) is a proof of the validity/invalidity of the purported signature µ on the message
m for the time period p w.r.t. the public key pks.
At the end of the protocols, the verifier V either accepts or rejects the proof.
Selective conversion (US.convert). This is an algorithm which takes as input the public parame-
ters, an integer in [[1, π]], a signing key pair and a bit string Υ (either a pair message/signature
or the empty string) and outputs a bit string.
Selective verification (verifyConverted). This is an algorithm that takes as input the public pa-
rameters, a message m, a bit string µ, an integer p ∈ [[1, π]], a signing public key pks, and a
bit string Λ and outputs a bit. If the bit output is 1 then the bit string Λ is said to be a receipt
of the validity of µ.
8.1.2 Security model
Standard properties
Let π be an integer. For all κ ∈ N, for all Parameters ∈ US.setup[κ], for all (pks, sks) ∈
US.skeygen[Parameters], for all m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and for all p ∈ [[1, π]]:
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1. The protocols US.confirm and US.deny are designated verifier proofs of membership for the
languages (respectively):
{(Parameters, m, µ, p,pks)
∣∣US.verify[Parameters, m, µ, p, (sks,pks)] = {1}}
{(Parameters, m, µ, p,pks)
∣∣US.verify[Parameters, m, µ, p, (sks,pks)] = {0}}
where (Parameters, m, µ, p,pks) ∈ US.setup[k]×{0, 1}∗2×[[1, π]]×US.skeygen[Parameters].
2. ∀µ ∈ US.sign[Parameters, m, p, sks] :
US.verify[Parameters, m, µ, p, (sks,pks)] = {1}.
3. ∀µ ∈ US.sign[Parameters, m, p, sks], ∀Λ ∈ US.convert[Parameters, p, (sks,pks), (m,µ)] :
US.verifyConverted[Parameters, m, µ, p,pks,Λ] = {1}
4. ∀µ,Λ ∈ {0, 1}∗ :
US.verifyConverted[Parameters,m, µ, p,pks,Λ] = {1} ⇒ US.verify[Parameters,m, µ, p, (sks,pks)] = {1}.
The first property captures the validity and the non-transferable property of the protocols
confirm and deny (i.e. the use of designated verifier proofs insures that a verifier will gain no
information in an execution of one of these protocols [Kudla & Paterson, 2005]). The last three
properties are the properties of correctness:
• a well-formed signature is always accepted by the algorithm verify;
• a receipt correctly constructed is always accepted by the algorithm verifyConverted;
• and if there exists a bit-string Λ which makes accepted a bit-string µ by the algorithm
verifyConverted, then µ is a valid signature.
Existential unforgeability
As previously mentioned, the standard notion of security for digital signatures was defined in
[Goldwasser et al., 1988] as existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks
(EUF-CMA). In [Laguillaumie & Vergnaud, 2005], the corresponding notion for time-selective
convertible undeniable signatures is defined along the same lines. The definition of resistance
to forgery for gradually convertible undeniable signatures that we propose is similar. In fact, we
suppose that the adversary has access to the universal receipts for every time period p ∈ [[1, π]] and
is allowed to query a signing oracle S for any message of its choice. As usual, in the adversary’s
answer, there is the natural restriction that the returned message/signature has not been obtained
from the signing oracle.
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Definition 8.1 (Unforgeability - EUF-CMA). Let π be a positive integer, letUS = (setup, skeygen,-
vkeygen, sign, verify, confirm, deny, convert, verifyConverted) be a gradually convertible undeni-
able signature scheme with π time periods and letA be a PPTM. We consider the following random
experiment, where κ is a security parameter:
Experiment Expeuf−cma
US,A (κ)
Parameters
R
←− US.setup(κ),
(pks, sks)
R
←− US.skeygen(Parameters)
(pkv , skv)
R
←− US.vkeygen(Parameters)
for j from 1 to π do
Λj ← US.convert(Parameters, j,pks, sks, ε)
(m⋆, µ⋆, p⋆)← AS(Parameters,pks,pkv, skv, {Λj}j∈[[1,π]])∣∣ S : (m, p) 7−→ US.sign(Parameters,m, p, sks)
return 1 if and only if the following properties are satisfied:
- US.verify[Parameters,m⋆, µ⋆, p⋆, (sks,pks)] = {1}
- m was not queried to S
We define the success of A via:
Succeuf-cmaUS,A (k) = Pr
[
Expeuf-cmaUS,A (k) = 1
]
.
Given (t, qs) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε, qs)-EUF-CMA adversary against US if,
running in time t and issuing qs signing queries,A has Succeuf-cmaUS,A (κ) ≥ ε. The scheme US is said
to be (t, ε, qs)-EUF-CMA secure if no (t, ε, qs)-EUF-CMA adversary against it exists. Finally, we
consider an undeniable signature scheme US with security parameter κ ∈ N, US(κ) is said to be
EUF-CMA secure if, for any polynomial functions t, qs : N → N and any non-negligible function
ε : N→ [0, 1], it is (t(κ), ε(κ), qs(κ))-EUF-CMA secure.
Remark 8.1. Note that the adversary in the above definition is not given the confirmation/denial
and selective conversion oracles. In fact, these oracles are useless for him as he has the universal
receipts {Λj}j∈[[1,π]] at his disposal.
Invisibility
We state the precise definition of invisibility under a chosen message attack (INV-CMA) which
captures the notion that an attacker cannot distinguish signatures based on their underlying mes-
sages. We consider an INV-CMA-adversary A that runs in two stages. In the find stage, it takes
as input a signing public key pks and outputs two different messages m⋆0 and m⋆1, and a time pe-
riod p⋆ together with some state information I. In the guess stage, A gets a challenge gradually
convertible undeniable signature µ⋆ formed by signing at random one of the challenge messages
for the time period p⋆ under pks, and it must say which message was signed. In both stages, the
adversary has access to a signing oracle S for pks. The attacker is also given the universal receipts
of the signer for all1 time period p ∈ [[1, π]] \ {p⋆}. The only restriction on A is that p⋆ should not
arise, as a time period, in any signature request.
1This is the main difference with time-selective convertible undeniable signatures from [Laguillaumie & Vergnaud,
2005] where these universal receipts were given only for p ∈ [[1, p⋆ − 1]].
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Definition 8.2 (Invisibility - INV-CMA). Let π be a positive integer, let US = (setup, skeygen,-
vkeygen, sign, control, confirm, deny, convert, verify) be a gradually convertible undeniable signa-
ture scheme with π time periods and let A be a PPTM. We consider the following random experi-
ment, for b ∈ {0, 1}, where k is a security parameter and b R←− {0, 1}:
Experiment Expinv-cma−b
US,A (κ)
Parameters
R
←− US.Setup(κ)
(pks, sks)
R
←− US.sKeyGen(Parameters),
(pkv, skv)
R
←− US.vkeygen(Parameters)
(m⋆0 ,m
⋆
1, p
⋆, I)
R
←− AS(find,Parameters,pks0,pks1)∣∣ S : (m, p ∈ [[1, π]] \ {p⋆}) 7−→ US.sign(Parameters,m, p, sks)
µ⋆ ← US.sign(Parameters,m⋆
b
, p⋆, sks)
for j from 1 to π do
Λj ← US.convert(Parameters, j,pks, sks, ε)
d← AS,Cv,V(guess,I, {Λj}j∈[[1,π]]\{p⋆})
Return d
We define the advantage Advinv−cmaUS,A (κ) of A via:∣∣∣∣Pr [Expinv−cma−bUS,A (κ) = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Given (t, qs) ∈ N2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε, qs)-INV-CMA adversary against US if,
running in time t and issuing qs signing queries, A has Advinv−cmaUS,A (κ) ≥ ε. The scheme US is
said to be (t, ε, qs)-INV-CMA secure if no (t, ε, qs)-INV-CMA adversary against it exists. Finally,
we consider an undeniable signature scheme US with security parameter κ ∈ N; US(κ) is said to
be INV-CMA secure if, for any any polynomial functions t, qs : N → N, and any non-negligible
function ε : N→ [0, 1], it is (t(κ), ε(κ), qs(κ))-INV-CMA secure.
Remark 8.2. Note that the adversary in the above definition is not given the confirmation/denial
and selective conversion oracles. In fact, these oracles are useless for him as he has the universal
receipts {Λj}j∈[[1,π]] \ {p⋆} at his disposal.
8.2 Hash functions and new security properties
Hash functions, as previously mentioned in this document, take messages of arbitrary length and
output a fixed length string. In cryptographic uses of a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ −→ H , these
properties are considered prerequisite:
• Preimage resistance: given h ∈ H , it should be computationally intractable to find a message
m such that H(m) = h.
• Collision-resistant: it should be computationally intractable to find two different messages
m1 and m2 such that H(m1) = H(m2).
In this section, we formulate the generalization of these security notions and study their properties.
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8.2.1 Definitions
The security proof of our variant of Michels-Petersen-Horster’s signatures makes use of new non-
standard variations of the preimage resistance and the collision resistance assumptions for hash
functions. These assumptions are of independent interest as they have interesting relations with
the classical ones. We call them random affine preimage resistance and random linear collision
resistance. Although stronger than the standard assumptions, they are quite realistic.
According to [Rogaway & Shrimpton, 2004], a hash function family is a family of functions
(Hk : Kk ×{0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}k)k∈N, where Kk is a finite non-empty set. We will write the first ar-
gument of Hk as a subscript, so that HK,k(m) = Hk(K,m). In the following, we denote elements
from {0, 1}k as the corresponding k-bits integers in binary representation and we will denote for
every integer N ∈ Z, HNK,k the map defined by: HNK,k :
{ {0, 1}∗ −→ ZN
m 7−→ HK,k(m) mod N.
The new security definitions can be quantified as follows:
Definition 8.3 (Random affine preimage resistance). Let n be an integer, let (Hk : Kk×{0, 1}∗ −→
{0, 1}k)k∈N be a hash function family, and let A be a PPTM. The success SuccraPre(n)H,A (k) of A
against the n-random affine preimage resistance of H = (Hk)k∈N is defined by:
max
K∈Kk
2k−1≤N<2k
α1,...,αn∈Z
∗
N
β1,...,βn∈Z
∗
N


Pr


K
R
←− Kk
(m, i, j)← A(K,α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βn)
m ∈ {0, 1}∗, (i, j) ∈ [[1, n]]2, i 6= j
αi + βjH
N
K,k
(m) = 0 mod N




.
An adversary A against the n-random affine preimage resistance of a hash function family
(Hk)k∈N can be transformed easily into an adversary against the classical preimage resistance
of (Hk)k∈N with success probability greater than SuccraPre(n)H,A (k)/n2 and time-complexity of A
increased by the time necessary to compute n modular multiplications modulo N . In particular,
the 1-random affine preimage resistance is equivalent to the classical preimage resistance.
Definition 8.4 (Random linear collision resistance). Let n be an integer, let (Hk : Kk×{0, 1}∗ −→
{0, 1}k)k∈N be a hash function family and let A be a PPTM. The success SuccrlColl(n)H,A (k) of A
against the n-random affine preimage resistance of H = (Hk)k∈N is defined by:
max
K∈Kk
2k−1≤N<2k
λ1,...,λn∈Z
∗
N

Pr

 K
R
←− Kk; (m,m
′, i, j)← A(K, λ1, . . . , λn)
m,m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗, (i, j) ∈ [[1, n]]2, m 6= m′
λi · HK,N (m) = λj · HK,N (m
′) mod N



 .
As for random affine preimage resistance, the 1-random linear collision resistance is equivalent
to the classical collision resistance. Unfortunately, the n-random linear collision resistance cannot
be reduced generically to the collision resistance for n ≥ 2.
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Remark 8.3. This security requirement is however reasonable since if the hash function fam-
ily underlying the protocol RSA-FDH [Bellare & Rogaway, 1993] does not satisfy it, then it
is existential forgeable against a one chosen-message attack: given an RSA public key (N, e),
the adversary can simply pick at random r1, . . . , rn ∈ ZN , compute λi = rei mod N for all
i ∈ [[1, n]], and try to find a random linear collision with parameters N, λ1, . . . , λn. If a collision
m,m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗, (i, j) ∈ [[1, n]]2 (such that λi ·HK,N(m) = λj ·HK,N(m′) mod N) is found, then
the adversary queries the signature σ on m to the signing oracle and can compute the signature of
m′ as σ′ = ri · σ · r−1j mod N .
8.2.2 Generic security
The best known general collision-finding attack against a hash function family is the so-called
birthday-attack. If we assume that the values of the hash-function family (Hk)k∈N are uniformly
distributed over {0, 1}k and that the generalization of the birthday attack2 against the random affine
preimage resistance and the random linear collision resistance of (Hk)k∈N is the best possible attack
(which is true in the random oracle model), then it is possible to give exponential lower bounds on
the minimum of n and of the number of hash function evaluations required to have non-negligible
probability of success. Indeed, for any integer N ≥ 2, and for (i, k) ∈ ZN , it is straightforward
[Stadje, 2002] that:
#{j ∈ ZN |i · j rem N ≤ k} = gcd(i, N)×
(⌊
k
gcd(i, N)
⌋
+ 1
)
.
Therefore if D denotes the product of two independent random variables uniformly distributed
over ZN , we have ∀k ∈ ZN
Pr(D ≤ k) = 1
N2
N−1∑
i=0
gcd(i, N)
(⌊
k
gcd(i, N)
⌋
+ 1
)
,
and consequently, D is close to the uniform distribution over ZN . The results from [Bellare &
Kohno, 2004] are sufficient to conclude.
2These attacks consist in picking messages m1, . . . , mr, computing hi = Hk(mi) mod N for i ∈ [[1, r]] and
γi,j = −hiβj mod N (resp. γi,j = hiλj mod N ) for j ∈ [[1, n]]. They are successful if there is a triple (i, j, ℓ) ∈
[[1, r]]× [[1, n]]2 (resp. a 4-tuple (i, i′, j, j′) ∈ [[1, r]]2 × [[1, n]]2) s. t. γi,j = αℓ (resp. γi,j = γi′,j′ and j 6= j′).
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8.3 Michels-Petersen-Horster’s convertible undeniable signa-
tures revisited
8.3.1 Description of the scheme
Let π be an integer. We describe in this section our variant of Michels-Petersen-Horster’s scheme.
It is parameterized by a prime order group generator [Bellare et al., 2001], a hash function family,
and two pseudo-random function families [Rogaway & Shrimpton, 2004].
Let G be a group of prime order q. A reduction function is a map that sends an element of
the group G [Brown, 2005; Stern et al., 2002] to an integer in Zq. In our security analysis, the
reduction function must satisfy the so called almost-invertibility: given an arbitrary integer in Zq,
then, with non-negligible probability, one can efficiently find one preimage.
Definition 8.5. Let F be a reduction function F : G → Zq. An almost-inverse of F is a proba-
bilistic algorithm G, possibly outputting⊥, such that:
Pr
b
R←−Zq
[G(b) ∈ G ∧ F (G(b)) = b] ≥ 1
3
.
A reduction function F is (δ, t)-almost-invertible with almost-inverse G if furthermore no distin-
guisher, running in time t, between D = {G(b) | b R←− Zq ∧G(b) ∈ G} and U = {a | a R←− G} can
get an advantage greater than δ.
The scheme US
Setup (US.setup): on input a security parameter κ, output a groupG of prime order q generated by
an element P , a reduction function F : G→ Zq , a hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → Zq, and two
pseudo-random functions H1 : Zq× [[1, π]]→ {0, 1}κ and H2 : {0, 1}κ×{0, 1}∗×G→ Zq.
The public parameters are (q,G, P, h,H1, H2).
Signer key generation (US.skeygen): the signer picks at random its secret key u, v R←− [[1, q−1]],
computes U ← uP and V ← vP , and sets (U, V ) as its public key.
Verifier key generation (US.vkeygen): the verifier picks at random its secret key w R←− [[1, q−1]],
computes W ← wP , and sets it as its public key.
Signature (US.sign): on message m and period p, the signer does the following:
• r R←− [[1, q − 1]], R← rP .
• ep ← H1v (p), d← H2ep(m,R), T ← dP . If F (T ) = 0, it tries with another value r.
• s← (F (T ) · d · h(m) · v − u · F (R)− 1)r−1 mod q.
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The signature is the tuple (R, T, s).
Verification (US.verify): to check the validity of a signature (R, T, s), the signer checks, using
his private key v, that:
(v · F (T ) · h(m))T = F (R)U + sR + P. (8.1)
Confirmation/Denial protocols (US.{confirm, deny}): the signer provides a designated verifier
proof of the equality/inequality of two discrete logarithms, namely F (R)U + sR+ P to the
base (F (T ).h(m))T and V to the base P (see Section 8.3.2).
Selective conversion (US.convert): there exist two types of conversions, namely:
• The gradual conversion of signatures corresponding to the time period p could be done
by releasing the value ep.
• The individual conversion can be achieved by releasing the value of d.
Selective verification (verifyConverted): the signature corresponding to the period p, once ep or
d is revealed, could be checked by any verifier using the equations: (d · F (T ) · h(m))V =
F (R)U + sR + P and T = dP .
8.3.2 Proofs of equality/inequality of discrete logarithms
Let G be a group with prime order q. To confirm or deny that a bit string is a signature in our
undeniable signature scheme, it is necessary to prove that a given quadruple (U1, V1, U2, V2) ∈ G4
is a Diffie-Hellman quadruple (or not), i.e. belongs to the set EDL(G) = {(x, U1, V1, U2, V2) ∈
Z×q ×G4, x = DLU1(V1) = DLU2(V2)} (or to the set IDL(G) = G4 \ EDL(G)). In our case, x, U1,
U2, V1, V2 correspond to d, P , F (T ) · h(m)V , T , and F (R)U + sR + P respectively.
To face blackmailing or mafia attacks against our undeniable signatures, we use interactive
designated verifier proofs, as introduced in [Jakobsson et al., 1996] by Jakobsson, Sako, and Im-
pagliazzo, in Chaum’s proofs of equality (cf. Fig. 8.1) and inequality (cf. Fig. 8.2) of discrete
logarithm of [Camenisch & Shoup, 2003]. The idea is to replace the generic commitment scheme
by a trapdoor commitment [Jakobsson et al., 1996] and using classical techniques, the proofs are
readily seen to be complete, sound, and above all non-transferable. The protocols involve a point
Y = yU1, where y is the secret key of the verifier, and the prover must be convinced that Y is
well-formed (in the registered public key model, the registration procedure is used to force the
users to know the secret-key corresponding to their public key).
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Protocol EDL.Prove
Common input: (U1, U2, V1, V2), Y
P’s input: x
V’s output: δ
¬ P C1, C2, C3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ V
(a, b, k)
R←− [[1, q − 1]]3
C1 ← kU1 ; C2 ← kU2
C3 ← aU1 + bY
¶ V r−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ P
r
R←− [[1, q − 1]]
­ P a, b, c−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ V
c← k − x(r + b) mod q
• V ’s execution ending
C˜1 ← cU1 + (r + b)V1
C˜2 ← cU2 + (r + b)V2
C˜3 ← aU1 + bY
if (C1, C2, C3) = (C˜1, C˜2, C˜3)
then δ ← Accept else δ ← ⊥
Protocol EDL.Fake
Common input: (U1, U2, V1, V2), Y
P’s input: y
V’s output: δ
¬ P C1, C2, C3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ V
(c, d, k)
R←− [[1, q − 1]]3
C1 ← cU1 + dV1 ; C2 ← cU2 + dV2
C3 ← kU1
¶ V r−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ P
r
R←− [[1, q − 1]]
­ P a, b, c−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ V
b← d− r mod q ; a← k − by mod q
• V ’s execution ending
C˜1 ← cU1 + (r + b)V1
C˜2 ← cU2 + (r + b)V2
C˜3 ← aU1 + bY
if (C1, C2, C3) = (C˜1, C˜2, C˜3)
then δ ← Accept else δ ← ⊥
Figure 8.1: Interactive designated verifier proof of membership of the language EDL(G)
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Protocol IDL.Prove
Common input: (U1, U2, V1, V2), Y
P’s input : x
V’s output : δ
¬ P C0, C1, C2, C3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ V
(a, b, k0, k1, k2)
R←− [[1, q − 1]]5
C0 ← k0(V2 − xU2)
C1 ← k1U1 − k2V1
C2 ← k1U2 − k2V2
C3 ← aU1 + bY
¶ V r−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ P
r
R←− [[1, q − 1]]
­ P a, b, c, d−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ V
c← k1 − xk0(r + b) mod q
d← k2 − k0(r + b) mod q
• V ’s execution ending
C˜1 ← cU1 − dV1
C˜2 ← C0 + cU2 − (r + b)V2
C˜3 ← aU1 + bY
if (C1, C2, C3) = (C˜1, C˜2, C˜3) ∧C0 6= OG2
then δ ← Accept else δ ← ⊥
Protocol IDL.Fake
Common input: (U1, U2, V1, V2), Y
P’s input: y
V’s output: δ
¬ P C0, C1, C2, C3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ V
(c, d, k1, k2)
R←− [[1, q − 1]]4
C0
R←− G \ {OG} ; C1 ← cU1 − dV1
C2 ← C0 + cU2 − k1V2
C3 ← k2U1
¶ V r−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ P
r
R←− [[1, q − 1]]
­ P a, b, c, d−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ V
b← k1 − r mod q ; a← b− k2y mod q
• V ’s execution ending
C˜1 ← cU1 − dV1
C˜2 ← C0 + cU2 − (r + b)V2
C˜3 ← aU1 + ybY
if (C1, C2, C3) = (C˜1, C˜2, C˜3) ∧ C0 6= OG2
then δ ← Accept else δ ← ⊥
Figure 8.2: Interactive designated verifier proof of membership to the language IDL(G)
8.4 Security analysis
We first note that the property of non-transferability is fulfilled by our scheme as a direct conse-
quence of the use of designated-verifier proofs in the confirm/deny protocols. Further, we state that
our scheme resists existential forgeries and that signatures are invisible. Both security reductions
stand in the generic group model [Shoup, 1997].
8.4.1 The generic group model
As mentioned in Subsection 1.3.4, a generic group infers the presence of “encodings” of the group
elements instead of explicit formulas. More specifically, given an additive group G with prime
order q and non-identity element P , one can define a map σ : Zq → S ⊂ {0, 1}⋆ such that the
bit-string σ(i), i ∈ Zq , represents the group element iP .
A generic algorithm A will then consult the group G’s oracle for queries of type (−→i ,−→α ),
where −→i refers to the set of considered group elements given by their encodings σ(i), i ∈ −→i (A
does not know necessarily the i’s), whereas −→α denotes the set of exponents. The oracle will re-
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spond to such a query with a randomly selected bit-string representing the encoding of the element
(
∑
αi∈
−→α ,i∈
−→
i
(iαi))P .
We can give an interpretation of the oracle’s behavior regarding such a type of queries using
polynomials over Fq. In fact, let L = [z0, z1, z2, z3, . . . , zn+3] be the sequence of queries’ answers
where n denotes the total number of queries to the group oracle. We use an interpretation similar
to that in [Stern et al., 2002]; the oracle will maintain, in addition to the outputs list L, a further
list of polynomials Fi(X, Y ) over Fq, which we denote by F . The lists are updated as follows:
• PolynomialsF0, F1, F2, F3 are set to F0 = 0, F1 = 1, F2 = X and F3 = Y which correspond
to the neutral element OG, the generator P , and the public keys U and V respectively. The
corresponding bit-strings are z0, z1, z2, z3 respectively.
• At the ℓ-th query (−→i ,−→α ), the polynomial Fℓ is defined as
∑|−→α |
j=1
−→α jF−→i j . If Fℓ is already
listed as Fh, then Fℓ is marked and the corresponding answer to Fh is returned. Otherwise,
zℓ is selected at random from S, recorded together with its corresponding polynomial Fℓ in
L and F respectively and then returned to A.
It is easy to see that the simulation driven by this interpretation is similar to that of the regular
algorithm provided that all answers corresponding to the new polynomials are distinct and that no
non-zero polynomial Fi − Fj , where i and j range the n + 4 polynomials indices in F , vanishes
at (X, Y ) = (u, v). In these conditions, we call the sequence of encodings L a safe sequence. We
measure the probability of such a sequence using the following lemmas [Stern et al., 2002]:
Lemma 8.1 (Schwartz-Zippel). Let P be a non-zero affine bivariate polynomial in Fq[X, Y ], then:
Pr
x,y∈Fq
[P (x, y) = 0] ≤ 1/q.
Lemma 8.2. If n2 ≤ q then the probability of unsafe sequences is upper-bounded by (n+ 4)2/q.
Proof. The proof is similar to [Stern et al., 2002], however, we exhibit it since our generic model
is slightly different.
We first note that the probability that the sequence of encodings L is constituted by distinct bit-
strings zi’s (corresponding to new queried polynomials Fi) is exactly
∏n+3
i=1 (1 − iq ). Thus the
probability that the zi’s are not all distinct is:
1−
n+3∏
i=1
(1− i
q
) ≤ 1− (1−
n+3∑
i=1
i
q
) ≤ (n+ 3)(n+ 4)
2q
.
Now, once the list L is set, we use Lemma 8.1 to bound the probability that, among the queried
polynomials Fi, there exist non-identical polynomials Fi and Fj evaluating to the same value at
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the point (u, v), or equivalently, there exists a non-zero polynomial Fi − Fj vanishing at (u, v).
Since there are at most
(
n+ 4
2
)
possible polynomials, such a probability is upper-bounded by(
n + 4
2
)
/q = (n+ 3)(n+ 4)/2q.
Summing up the two probabilities, we get the announced result.
Remark 8.4. All the polynomials Fℓ are affine bivariate, i.e. of the form aX + bY + c. Moreover,
in case one of the private keys u or v is revealed, for instance v in the universal conversion, the
polynomials Fℓ in play become affine univariate (of the form aX + b where the indeterminate X
refers to the public key U).
Finally, a security proof in this model assures the absence of an adversary who behaves generi-
cally with respect to the given group. However, a security proof in the generic model does not rule
out the existence of a successful adversary for a specific group [Dent, 2002; Stern et al., 2002].
8.4.2 Resistance to forgery
The theorem below states that our variant of Michels-Petersen-Horster’s scheme is EUF-CMA-
secure in the generic group model assuming the preimage resistance, the random affine preimage
resistance and the random linear collision resistance of the underlying hash function family.
Theorem 8.3. Let A be an EUF-CMA-adversary in the generic group model, operating in time
t, after n group queries and m signing queries, such that m ≪ n2 and n ≫ 1, with success
probability Succeuf-cmaUS,A .
There exist adversaries B, C, and D operating in time t′ against the n-random affine preimage
resistance, the n-random linear collision resistance, and the preimage resistance of the underlying
hash function (respectively) such that:
t′ ≤ t+ 5nτG lnn+m(τH1 + τh + 5 lnn(τG + τH2) + τF )
and
5 · SuccraPre(n)h,B + SuccrlColl(n)h,C + 6 · n2SuccPre(n)h,D ≥
Succeuf-cmaUS,A
9
− 12n4/q − 6mn2δG − 12mn3/q
where δG is the advantage of an adversary playing a distinguisher for G, and τG, τF , τH1 , τH2 and
τh are the running times for G, F , H1, H2, and h respectively.
The EUF-CMA-adversary A will output a valid signature σ⋆ = (R⋆, T ⋆, s⋆) on a message m⋆
for the time period p⋆ with success probability Succeuf-cmaUS,A . In our security analysis, this event is
divided into sub-events according to whether R⋆ or T ⋆ were created during the simulation by a
signature query or by a group query.
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In the lists used to maintain the group oracle, a group element created during a group query
will have a “group” tag, while the tags “signR” and “signT” will correspond to elements created in
a signature query. In fact, a signature query on a message m for the time period p will be answered
by a triple (R, T, s), where R, T ∈ G, hence the need to specify whether the element was created
as an R or a T .
Remark 8.5. The procedure that adds a new element zℓ to the list will be denoted Record(zℓ‖Fℓ‖tl),
where Fℓ and tℓ are the corresponding polynomial and tag respectively.
The different forgeries output by A will be classified as follows:
• Type 0: Tag(R⋆) = group, Tag(T ⋆) = group,
• Type 1: Tag(R⋆) = group, Tag(T ⋆) = signR,
• Type 2: Tag(R⋆) = group, Tag(T ⋆) = signT,
• Type 3: Tag(R⋆) = signR, Tag(T ⋆) = group,
• Type 4: Tag(R⋆) = signR, Tag(T ⋆) = signR,
• Type 5: Tag(R⋆) = signR, Tag(T ⋆) = signT,
• Type 6: Tag(R⋆) = signT, Tag(T ⋆) = group,
• Type 7: Tag(R⋆) = signT, Tag(T ⋆) = signR,
• Type 8: Tag(R⋆) = signT, Tag(T ⋆) = signT.
We denote εθ the probability that the forgery σ⋆ = (R⋆, T ⋆, s⋆) output by A is of type Type θ (for
θ ∈ {0, . . . , 8}). We have:
8∑
θ=0
εθ = Succ
euf-cma
US,A
The adversaries B, C, and D against the n-random affine preimage resistance, the n-random
linear collision resistance, and the preimage resistance of the underlying hash function respectively
will simulate the group and signing oracles according to the alleged kind of forgery returned by
A. More precisely, adversary C will use the forgery to find a random linear collision if it is of type
Type 5, D will exploit a forgery of type Type 0 to break the preimage resistance and finally, the
adversary B will utilize all the remaining cases to find a random affine preimage.
Finally, in our unforgeability proof, we assume that B, C and D have revealed the private key v
(universal conversion) so thatA is able to check the validity of the answers to his signature queries.
It follows that the confirmation/denial oracles are useless for him. Also, the adversaries B, C, and
D will manipulate affine univariate polynomials during the group oracle simulation, i.e. they will
receive queries of type (a, b) corresponding to the polynomial aX + b.
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Remark 8.6. The reductionR (anyone of the adversaries B, C orD) will forceA to return a tuple
(R⋆, T ⋆, s⋆) such that R⋆ = 0G when the forgery is of Type 4 and F (T ⋆) = 0 when it is of Type 8.
Therefore, the reduction must guess correctly when the forgery is of the given type, then simulate
the group and signing oracles accordingly. In these cases, The adversary A will fail to return a
valid forgery, thus ǫ4 = ǫ8 = 0, granted that the reduction doesn’t abort, i.e. provides a perfect
simulation of the group/signing oracles. We will denote the probability that the reduction fails in
the above cases by Pr[R aborts]. Theses latter quantities will be deduced from the overall success
of R according to the following elementary lemma:
Pr[A ∧ ¬B] ≥ Pr[A|¬B]− Pr[B]
Proof. Let (R⋆, T ⋆, s⋆) be the forgery output by A on the message m⋆ for the time period p⋆. Due
to the similarities in the reduction’s behavior, we will detail only the case where the forgery is of
type Type 2 and give a sketch of the other cases.
Description of B. B picks uniformly at random an integer θ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} which is
his guess for the type of the forgery output by A. In the following simulation, we suppose that A
returns a forgery of type Type 2 and that θ = 2 (B has correctly guessed the forgery’s type).
The forgery produced by A satisfies the following equation3 :
a− b · F (R⋆) = (ad− bc) · v · F (T ⋆) · h(m),
where R⋆ = aU + bP and T ⋆ = cU + dP . Since T ⋆ was generated during a signature query as a
“T ” (Tag(T ) = signT ), we have c = 0 (the verification of the signature involves the verification of
equation 8.1 and of T = dP ). Hence, the equation turns out to be a−b·F (R) = a·d·v ·F (T )·h(m)
or
1− b
a
· F (R) = d · v · F (T ) · h(m).
Thus, in order to find a random affine preimage, B must plug the values α and β in answers to the
group and to the signature queries (respectively). More precisely, he must answer group queries
(a, b) by R such that 1− b
a
·F (R) = α. Similarly, signature queries must be answered by (R, T, s),
such that −d · v · F (T ) = β:
Game 0. We consider an EUF-CMA-adversary A in the generic group model. In any game
Game i, we denote Si the event “(R⋆, T ⋆, s⋆) is a valid forgery of type Type 2 and θ = 2”.
By definition, we have Pr[S0] = ε2/9.
3this follows from the verification equation 8.1.
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Game 1. We use the interpretation described above for the generic oracle which considers a safe
sequence L. This game differs from the previous one only on unsafe sequences. Using the
Lemma 8.2 we get:
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ≤ (n+ 4)2/q.
Game 2. In this game we modify the simulation of the group oracle. On query (ai, bi) such that
the corresponding polynomial Fi(X) = aiX + bi is new, B does the following:
• ctr← 04
• Repeat
Pick the next αi in the instance of the random affine preimage problem raPre(n);
Compute ri ← (1− αi)aib−1i ;
Compute R˜i ← G(ri) ;
ctr← ctr + 1;
Until (R˜i 6= Fail) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn);
• Pick Ri R←− S;
• Return Ri;
The event S2 differs from the previous one if R˜i remains undefined. Since the experiments
are mutually independent (ai and bi are uniformly distributed), we may use a lemma from
elementary probability theory [Stern et al., 2002, Lemma 5] to bound the corresponding
probability by 1/n2. The overall probability when i ranges the set of queries indices is then
1/n. Hence, we have:
Pr[S2] ≥ (1− 1/n) Pr[S1].
Game 3. In this simulation, the group oracle replaces Ri from the previous game by R˜i. It
executes - Record(Ri‖aiX + bi‖group) and returns the new value of Ri as a response to
the oracle query. Since the inputs to G are uniformly distributed (αi is picked at random),
we can use n times the almost-invertibility of F (the so-called hybrid technique) to bound
the probability of S3:
|Pr[S3]− Pr[S2]| ≤ nδG.
Game 4. In this game, B simulates the signing oracle. On query (mj , pj) it does the following:
• Compute ep ← H1v (pj) ;
• Pick Rj R←− S;
• Compute dj ← H2ep(mj , Rj);
• ctr← 0;
4In the remaining of the chapter, ctr denotes a counter ranging from 0 to 5 lnn.
170
• Repeat
Pick the next βj in the instance of raPre(n);
Compute tj ← −d−1j v−1βj;
ctr← ctr + 1;
Until (G(tj) 6= Fail) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn);
• Tj ← G(tj);
• Pick aj R←− Z∗q ;
• Compute sj ← −F (Rj) · a−1j ;
• Return (Rj , Tj, sj);
This game differs from the previous one if G(tj) remains undefined, which occurs with
probability less that m/n2, or if Tj is distinguished from a uniformly random string in S,
in which case the probability is upper-bounded by mδG (using the same hybrid technique).
Thus:
Pr[S4] ≥ (1−m/n2) Pr[S3]−mδG.
Game 5. In this game, B adds the element T to the list, maintained by the group oracle, using
the command Record(Tj‖dj‖signT). This game differs from the previous one if leads to
inconsistencies in the simulation of the group oracle, namely when dj (as a polynomial)
collides with another polynomial in F . Since Rj was drawn uniformly at random from S,
and dj is value ofH2ep at (mj , Rj), the probability of having such a collision is upper-bounded
by n/q:
|Pr[S5]− Pr[S4]| ≤ mn/q.
Game 6. In this game B computes bj ← aj(βjh(mj) − 1)F (Rj)−1 and adds Rj , together with
its corresponding polynomial Fj(X) = ajX + bj to the lists maintained by the group oracle
by executing the command Record(Rj‖ajX+ bj‖signR). Again, due to the randomness of
aj , the difference between the previous game is:
|Pr[S6]− Pr[S5]| ≤ mn/q.
Game 7. In this game, B exploits the forgery (R⋆, T ⋆, s⋆) returned by A. We have supposed that
Tag(R⋆, T ⋆) = (group, signT) and B generated the correct θ, thus, there exist i, j such that
R⋆ = Ri, T
⋆ = Tj and 1 − aibiF (Ri) = αi and −dj · v · F (Tj) = βj . The equation satisfied
by the forgery turns out to be αi+βjh(m) = 0. B would then find a random affine preimage
with success probability:
Succ
raPre(n)
h,B ≥ (1−m/n2)(1− 1/n)(ǫ2/9− (n+ 4)2/q)− (n−m/n+m)δG − 2mn/q
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Procedure:
¬ In signature queries (mj , pj): create Rj such that bj = 0.
­ Reject the forgery since R⋆ = OG (see 8.3.1)
Group queries (ai, bi): Do as in 8.4.1.
Signature queries (mj , pj):
• Compute ep ← H1v(pj) • ctr← 0
• Repeat:
pick Rj
R
←− S
compute dj ← H2ep (mj , Rj)
compute tj ← d
−1
j v
−1h(mj)
−1
ctr← ctr + 1
Until (G(tj ) 6=⊥) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn)
• Pick aj
R
←− Zq
•Record(Rj‖ajX‖signR) •Record(Tj‖dj‖signT)
• Compute sj ← F (Rj)a−1j mod q
• Return (Rj , Tj , sj)
Final output:
a1j − b
1
jF (R
1
j ) = (a
1
j b
2
j − a
2
j b
1
j )F (R
2
j ) · v · h(m
⋆).
or a1j = b
1
j = 0 thus R1j = 0G. The forgery is then rejected.
Advantage and time (ǫ′ and t′) of B:
Pr[R aborts] ≤ n2/q +mδG + 2mn/q
and
t4 ≤ t+ n+m(τH1 + 5 lnn(τG + τH2) + τh + τF )
(a) Type 4: Tag(R⋆, T ⋆) = (signR, signR)
Procedure:
¬ Reject the forgery since F (Tj) = 0 (see 8.3.1)
Group queries (ai, bi): Do as in 8.4.1.
Signature queries (mj , pj):
• Pick Rj
R
←− S
• Compute ep ← H1v(pj)
• Compute dj ← H2ep (mj , Rj)
• ctr← 0
• Repeat: pick aj , bj
R
←− Zq
compute tj ← (aj − bj · F (Rj))a−1j d
−1
j v
−1h(mj)−1
ctr← ctr + 1
Until (G(tj ) 6=⊥) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn)
•Record(Rj‖ajX + bj‖signR)
•Record(Tj‖dj‖signT)
• Compute sj ← F (Rj)a−1j mod q
• Return (Rj , Tj , sj)
Final output:
−djF (Tj) = 0 thus F (Tj) = 0, so reject the forgery.
Advantage and time of B:
Pr[R aborts] ≤ n2/q +mδG + 2mn/q
and
t8 ≤ t+ n+m(τH1 + τH2 + τh + 5τG lnn+ τF )
(b) Type 8: Tag(R⋆, T ⋆) = (signT, signT)
or5
Succ
raPre(n)
h,B ≥ ǫ2/9− n2/q − (n +m)δG − 2mn/q
and time
t2 ≤ t+ 5n lnn+m(τH1 + τH2 + 5τG lnn+ τh + τF ).
We refer to Appendix for the treatment of forgeries of of Type 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8. We provide in Figures
8.3(a), 8.3(b),8.3(c),8.3(d),8.3(e), and 8.3(f) the behavior of B when processing the forgeries of
Type 4, 8, 1, 3, 6, 7 resp. We will consider that to the group query (ai, bi), B will respond with
Ri, and to the signature query on (mj , pj), he will answer (Rj, Tj , sj), where Rj = ajU + bj and
Tj = cjU + dj .
Description of C. C will provide a simulation which exploits a forgery (R⋆, T ⋆, s⋆) of the type
Type 5. Hence C will simulate the group oracle in the standard way described in 8.4.1. Further-
more, it will plug the λj’s (instance of the random linear collision problem) in answers to signature
queries such that the returned signature (Rj , Tj, sj) satisfies dj · v · F (Tj) = λj . In this way, the
returned forgery (R⋆, T ⋆, s⋆) = (Ri, Tj, s⋆) will satisfy the following:
5In the proofs that follow, we consider that m≪ n2 and n≫ 1, in order to simplify the expressions.
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Procedure:
¬ In group queries (ai, bi):
• plug αi in aibi − F (Ri).
­ In signature queries (mj , pj):
• create Rj such that bj = 0,
• plug βj in aj · v · F (Rj).
Group queries (ai, bi):
• ctr← 0
• Repeat
pick the next αi in the raPre(n) instance
compute ri ← (
ai
bi
− αi)
ctr← ctr + 1
Until (G(ri) 6= Fail) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn)
• Record(Ri = G(ri)‖aiX + bi‖group)
• Return(Ri)
Signature queries (mj , pj):
• Compute ep ← H1v (pj)
• ctr← 0
• Repeat
pick Rj
R
←− S
compute dj ← H2ep (mj , Rj)
compute tj ← d−1 · v−1 · h(m)−1
e ctr← ctr + 1
Until (G(tj ) 6= Fail) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn)
• Record(Tj = G(tj)‖dj‖signT)
• Pick the next βj in the raPre(n) instance
• Compute aj ← βj · v−1 · F (Rj)−1
• Record(Rj‖ajX‖signR)
• Compute sj ← −F (Rj) · a
−1
j
• Return(Rj , Tj , sj)
Final output:
ai − biF (Ri) = −ajbi · v · F (Rj) · h(m)
or
αi =
ai
bi
− F (Ri)
= −aj · v · F (Rj) · h(m
⋆)
= −βjh(m⋆)
Advantage and time of B:
Succ
raPre(n)
h,B ≥ ǫ1/9− n
2/q − (m+ n)δG − 2mn/q. and
t1 ≤ 5n lnn+m(τH1 + τh + 5 lnn(τH2 + τG) + τF ).
(c) Type 1: Tag(R⋆, T ⋆) = (group, signR)
Procedure:
¬ In group queries (ai, bi):
• plug βj
αi
in −bi · v · F (Ri).
­ In signature queries (mj , pj):
• create Rj such that bj = 0.
Group queries (ai, bi):
• ctr← 0
• Repeat
pick the next (αi, βj) in the raPre(n) instance
compute ri ← −bi−1 · v−1 ·
βj
αi
ctr← ctr + 1
Until (G(ri) 6= Fail) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn)
• Record(Ri = G(ri)‖aiX + bi‖group)
• Return(Ri)
Signature queries (mj , pj):
• Compute ep ← H1v(pj)
• ctr← 0
• Repeat
pick Rj
R
←− S
compute dj ← H2ep (mj , Rj)
compute tj ← d−1 · v−1 · h(m)−1
ctr← ctr + 1
Until (G(tj ) 6= Fail) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn)
• Record(Tj = G(tj)‖dj‖signT)
• Pick aj
R
←− S
• Record(Rj‖ajX‖signR)
• Compute sj ← −F (Rj) · a−1j
• Return(Rj , Tj , sj)
Final output:
aj = ajbi · v · F (Ri) · h(m⋆)
or
1 = bi · v · F (Ri) · h(m⋆)
= −
βj
αi
· h(m⋆)
Advantage and time of B:
Succ
raPre(n)
h,B ≥ ǫ3/9− n
2/q − (m + n)δG − 2mn/q
and
t3 ≤ τ + 5nτG lnn+m(τH1 + 5 lnn(τG + τH2) + τh + τF ).
(d) Type 3: Tag(R⋆, T ⋆) = (signR, group)
1− bi
ai
F (Ri) = dj · v · F (Tj)h(m⋆) = λj · h(m⋆)
= di · v · F (Ti)h(mi)
= λi · h(mi)
The second equation follows from 1 − bi
ai
F (Ri) = di · v · F (Ti) · h(mi) corresponding to the
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Procedure:
¬ In group queries (ai, bi):
• plug −βi in ai · F (Ri) · v.
­ In signature queries (mj , pj):
• plug αj in F (Tj).
Group queries (ai, bi):
• ctr← 0
• Repeat
pick the next βi in the raPre(n) instance
compute ri ← −βia−1i v
−1
ctr← ctr + 1
Until (G(ri) 6= Fail) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn)
• Record(Ri = G(ri)‖aiX + bi‖group)
• Return(Ri)
Signature queries (mj , pj):
• Compute ep ← H1v (pj)
• ctr← 0
• Pick Rj
R
←− S
• compute dj ← H2ep (mj , Rj)
• Repeat
pick the next αj in the RaPre(n) instance
compute Tj ← G(αj)
ctr← ctr + 1
Until (G(αj) 6= Fail) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn)
• Record(Tj = G(αj)‖dj‖signT)
• Pick aj
R
←− Zq
• Compute bj ← ajF (Rj)−1(1 + dj · v · F (Tj) · h(mj))
• Record(Rj‖ajX + bj‖signR)
• Compute sj ← −F (Rj) · a
−1
j
• Return(Rj , Tj , sj)
Final output:
−djF (Tj) = −djai · v · F (Ri) · h(m⋆)
or
F (Tj) = ai · v · F (Ri) · h(m
⋆)
αj = −βi · h(m
⋆)
Advantage and time of B:
Succ
raPre(n)
h,B ≥ ǫ6/9− n
2/q − (m+ n)δG − 2mn/q
and
t6 ≤ τ + 5τG lnn+m(τH1 + τH2 + τh + τF + 5τG lnn)
(e) Type 6: Tag(R⋆, T ⋆) = (signT, group)
Procedure:
¬ In signature queries (mj , pj):
• plug αj in F (Tj),
• plug −βj in ajF (Rj)v.
Group queries (ai, bi): Do as in 8.4.1.
Signature queries (mj , pj):
• Compute ep ← H1v (pj)
• Pick Rj
R
←− S
• Compute dj ← H2ep (mj , Rj)
• ctr← 0
• Repeat
pick the next αj in the RaPre(n) instance
compute Tj ← G(αj)
ctr← ctr + 1
Until (G(αj ) 6= Fail) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn)
• Record(Tj = G(αj)‖dj‖signT)
• Pick the next βj in the RaPre(n) instance.
• Compute aj ← −βj · v · F (R)−1
• Compute bj ← ajF (Rj)−1(1 + dj · v · F (Tj) · h(mj))
• Record(Rj‖ajX + bj‖signR)
• Compute sj ← −F (Rj) · a
−1
j
• Return(Rj , Tj , sj)
Final output:
−djF (Tj) = −djai · v · F (Ri) · h(m⋆)
or
F (Tj) = ai · v · F (Ri) · h(m
⋆)
αj = −βi · h(m
⋆)
Advantage and time of B:
Succ
raPre(n)
h,B ≥ ǫ7/9− n
2/q −mδG − 2mn/q
and
t7 ≤ τ + n+m(τH1 + τH2 + τh + 5τG lnn+ τF )
(f) Type 7: Tag(R⋆, T ⋆) = (signT, signR)
equality fulfilled by the signature (Ri, Ti, si) on the query (mi, pi). It is worth noting that mi 6= m⋆
since the attacker A is not allowed to return a forgery on a message he has previously queried.
More precisely, on the signature query (mj , pj), C does the following:
• Compute ep = H1v (pj);
• Pick Rj R←− S;
• Compute dj = H2ep(mj, Rj);
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• ctr← 0;
• Repeat
pick the next λj in the instance of the random linear collision problem rlColl(n);
compute tj ← λj · d−1j · v−1;
ctr← ctr + 1;
Until (G(tj) 6= Fail) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn);
• Compute αj = (1− λjh(mj))F (Rj)−1;
• Pick aj R←− Z×q ;
• Compute bj = aj · αj ;
• Compute sj = (dj · v · h(mj) · F (Tj)− 1) · b−1j ;
• Record (Rj ||ajX + bj ||signR) ;
• Record (Tj ||dj||signT) ;
• Return (Rj , Tj , sj);
It is easy to conclude that this simulation, together with the above forgery returned by the attacker
will lead C to a random linear collision in time t5:
t5 ≤ t + n+m(τH1 + τH2 + τh + τF + 5τG lnn)
with success probability
Succ
rlColl(n)
h,C ≥ ǫ5/9− n2/q −mδG − 2mn/q
Description of D. D exploits a forgery (R⋆, T ⋆, s⋆) where Tag(R⋆, T ⋆) = (group, group) (i.e. a
Type 0 forgery) to find a preimage of a certain value, say a. The equation satisfied by the forgery
is:
ai − biF (Ri) = (aibj − ajbi)F (Rj) · v · h(m).
To simulate the group oracle, D selects in advance i, j ∈R [[1, n]]. If i < j, then on the i-th query
(ai, bi), D will select Ri ∈R S and record it using Record(Ri‖aiX + bi‖group). On the j−th
query (aj, bj), compute Rj ← G(a · (ai − biF (Ri))(aibj − ajbi)−1v−1). With probability at
least 1/n2, D would have chosen the correct i, j and the success of having Rj 6=⊥ is at least 1/3
(almost invertibility of F and randomness of a). If 6 j < i, D will proceed in a similar manner.
The remaining queries (aℓ, bℓ), ℓ 6= i, j, will be answered exactly as in 8.4.1.
To answer the signature queries (mj , pj), D does the following:
6In case i = j, we will have ai − biF (Ri) = 0, from which D won’t learn anything. In order to prevent such a
case, D must insure that F (Ri) 6= aibi for the i-th query (ai, bi), which is satisfied with probability at least 1− 1/q.
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• Compute ep ← H1v (pj);
• Pick Rj , Tj R←− S;
• Compute dj ← H2ep(mj , Rj);
• Compute αj = F (Rj)−1(1− dj · v · F (Tj) · h(mj));
• Pick aj R←− Z×q ;
• Compute bj = ajαj ;
• Compute sj ← (dj · v · tj · h(mj)− 1)b−1j ;
• Record(Rj‖ajX + bj‖signR);
• Record(Tj‖dj‖signT);
• Return (Rj , Tj , sj);
• Compute ep ← H1v (pj);
• Pick Rj R←− S;
• Compute dj ← H2ep(mj , Rj);
• ctr← 0;
• Repeat
pick aj , bj
R←− Zq ;
compute tj ← (aj − bj · F (Rj))a−1j d−1j v−1h(mj)−1;
ctr← ctr + 1;
Until (G(tj) 6=⊥) ∪ (ctr = 5 lnn);
• Compute sj ← (dj · v · tj · h(mj)− 1)b−1j ;
• Record(Rj‖ajX + bj‖signR);
• Record(Tj = G(tj)‖dj‖signT);
• Return (Rj , Tj , sj);
We have:
Succ
Pre(n)
h,D ≥
ǫ0
54n2
− 2n2/q −mδG − 2mn/q.
and
t0 ≤ t+ n+m(τH1 + τH2 + τh + τF + 5τG lnn).
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8.4.3 Invisibility
Theorem 8.4. Let A be an INV-CMA-adversary operating in time t, after n group queries and m
signing queries, with advantage ǫ = Succinv-cmaUS,A , such that n≫ 2.
There exists an adversaryB, operating in time t′ and attempting to break the pseudo-randomness
property of H1, after m queries (to H1), with success probability SuccprfH1,B such that:
t′ ≤ t + n+m(τH2 + τh + 2τF )
and
Succ
prf
H1,B1
≥ Succ
inv-cma
US,A
2
− n
2
2q
−mn/q
where τF , τH2 and τh are the running time for F , H2 and h respectively.
Proof. Let B be the adversary attempting to break the pseudo-randomness of H1 using an INV-
CMA-adversaryA against the above undeniable signatures. A operates as previously in the generic
group model, and the polynomials Fℓ manipulated by B are also affine univariate, i.e. of the form
aX+b, however the indeterminate refers to the public key V . In fact, B does not know v (otherwise
his task would be easy), but is allowed to choose the private key u.
Let m⋆0, m⋆1, and p⋆ be the challenge messages and the challenge time period resp. B will
forward p⋆ to his own challenger as a challenge seed and will receive a string e⋆ which is either
the result of applying H1v to p⋆ or a uniformly chosen random string from the corresponding space.
B will then form the challenge signature µ⋆ = (R⋆, T ⋆, s⋆), using e⋆, on the message m⋆b for
b
R←− {0, 1}. If e⋆ = H1v (p⋆), then µ⋆ is valid signature on m⋆b , otherwise it is an invalid signature
on both m⋆0 and m⋆1. Thus, the answer of A will suffice B to conclude.
More precisely, B will proceed as follows:
Game 0. Let m⋆0, m⋆1 and p⋆ be the challenge messages and the challenge time period resp. B will
form an undeniable signature µ⋆, following the standard signing algorithm, on m⋆b for some
b
R←− {0, 1}. We denote by S0 be the event “A returns the bit b” and we use a similar notation
Si in any Game i. By definition, we have Pr[S0] = ǫ+ 12 .
Game 1. B uses the interpretation described above which considers a safe sequence in order to
simulate the group oracle. We get:
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ≤ (n+ 4)2/q
Game 2. In this game, B simulates the signing oracle. Let (m, p) be the signing query where m
denotes the message to be signed and p 6= p⋆ denotes the time period. A signature (R, T, s)
on m for the time period p should satisfy:
(d · F (T ) · h(m))V = F (R)U + sR + P
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where T = dP and d = H2ep(m,R) and ep = H1v (p).
Thus if we write R = aV + bP , we get:
d · F (T ) · h(m) = s · a,
0 = uF (R) + s · b+ 1.
Thus, (R, T, s) should satisfy:
ab−1(uF (R) + 1) = −d · F (T ) · h(m).
As a consequence, B will do the following:
• request his challenger for ep = H1v (p),
• pick R, T R←− S and compute d = H2ep(m,R),
• pick b R←− Z×q and compute a = −b · d · F (T ) · h(m) · (uF (R) + 1)−1,
• execute Record(T‖d‖signT) and Record(R‖aX + b‖signR).
The difference between the previous game is when the introduction of R and T along with
their polynomials leads to inconsistencies in simulating the group oracle, i.e. collisions with
polynomials in F . The probability that these collisions occur is upper-bounded by 2n/q,
thus:
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ 2mn/q
Game 3. In this game, B simulates the challenge signature generation; he proceeds exactly as in
Game 2. The difference is when the created R⋆ and T ⋆ (elements of the challenge signature)
lead to inconsistencies with the group oracle:
|Pr[S3]− Pr[S2]| ≤ 2n/q
Game 4. In this game, B simulates the verification and conversion oracles. Since verification
and conversion queries can occur only with respect to time periods p 6= p⋆, B can request
his challenger for the conversion receipt ep = H1v (p) for the time period p, and simulate
perfectly the verification/conversion oracles. We clearly have Pr[S4] = Pr[S3].
Game 5. In this game, we modify the challenge signature generation. In fact, after A outputs
m⋆0, m
⋆
1, and p⋆ , B outputs p⋆ to his own challenger as a challenge seed, and gets a challenge
bit-string e⋆, which is either H1v (p⋆), if some b′
R←− {0, 1} is 1, or a random string from the
given space otherwise. B produces then the challenge signature µ⋆ = (R⋆, T ⋆, s⋆) on m⋆b
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using e⋆, i.e. proceeds exactly as the standard algorithm with the exception of computing d⋆
as H2e⋆(m
⋆
b , R
⋆). Note that when e⋆ is a random string, then µ⋆ is not a valid signature on
neither m⋆0 nor m⋆1. Clearly:
Pr[S5] = Pr[ba = b|b′ = 1]
and
Pr[ba 6= b|b′ = 0] = 1
2
At the end of the simulation, if A outputs ba = b, then B will respond b” = 1, i.e. e⋆ is indeed
H1v (p
⋆), otherwise he responds b” = 0. We have:
Succ
prf
H1,B =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b” = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Pr[b” = 1, b′ = 1] + Pr[b” = 0, b′ = 0]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Pr[b” = 1|b′ = 1] Pr[b′ = 1] + Pr[b” = 0|b′ = 0] Pr[b′ = 0]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
|Pr[b” = 1|b′ = 1] + Pr[b” = 0|b′ = 0]− 1|
=
1
2
|Pr[ba = b|b′ = 1] + Pr[ba 6= b|b′ = 0]− 1|
=
1
2
∣∣∣∣Pr[S5]− 12
∣∣∣∣
≥ ǫ
2
− n
2
2q
−mn/q
Moreover,
t′ ≤ t + n+m(τH2 + τh + 2τF )
8.5 Conclusion
We properly defined security notions for convertible undeniable signatures that support the addi-
tional property of achronous gradual conversion. Adapting the scheme proposed by Michels, Pe-
tersen, and Horster in 1996, we realized the first scheme featuring this useful notion of conversion.
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In addition, we gave the first security analysis of the Michels-Petersen-Horster protocol, thereby
addressing a problem left open since 1996. We have modified this scheme such that it becomes a
generic one, which allows to use it for instance in the setting of elliptic curves (and therefore of-
fers attractive practical advantages in terms of signature length and performances). In this context
and in comparison with the time-selective convertible undeniable signatures from [Laguillaumie
& Vergnaud, 2005], the computational costs for the confirmation/disavowal protocols and the con-
version algorithms are much smaller.
180
Conclusion
In this thesis, we were interested in signatures with controlled verification, more specifically un-
deniable and confirmer signatures. We actually focused on how to produce these signatures from
basic cryptographic primitives such as digital signatures, encryption, and commitment schemes.
In fact, we noticed that even the monolithic realizations of these signatures are built upon popu-
lar primitives, which results in security and efficiency analyses similar to those of the underlying
components, but still indispensable to carry out. Our main purpose was to understand then bridge
the gap between these realizations and the known generic constructions of such opaque signatures.
To analyze the generic constructions of confirmer signatures, we used the famous meta-reduction
tool; such a tool was mainly applied to achieve impossibility results, e.g. disproving equivalence
between complexity assumptions or separating results between idealized and standard models. In
our study, we used meta-reductions to show that the popular generic constructions cannot achieve
secure confirmer signatures without using strong encryption as a building block, which engen-
ders expensive confirmer signatures with limited efficient instantiations. This is actually due to
an inherent weakness in these constructions that consists in the possibility of creating confirmer
signatures without the help of the signer. After identifying the weaknesses in the popular generic
constructions, comes the task of annihilating these weaknesses at cheap costs and without com-
promising the security. Fortunately, this was doable by simply binding the digital signature - these
generic constructions require always the computation of a digital signature - to the resulting con-
firmer signature. The outcome of this tweak was tremendous as it made the constructions rest on
very cheap encryption, and consequently led to short confirmer signatures with small generation,
verification, and conversion costs. Another important consequence of this slight change consists
in allowing homomorphic encryption in the design, which translates in efficient confirmation and
denial protocols.
The immediate prospect of such an analysis is its extension to other opaque or privacy-preserving
mechanisms/signatures, e.g. group signatures, designated verifier signatures, or anonymous cre-
dentials. In fact, most such mechanisms involve a digital signature on some message and an en-
cryption layer that ensures the privacy. Hence the possibility of applying the same techniques
in order to allow cheap and useful encryption in the design, and thus achieve constructions with
many efficient instantiations. The long-run prospect consists in systematically applying the meta-
reduction tool in other cryptographic realizations in order to spot the potential flaws in the design,
and later repair these flaws and improve the resulting constructions.
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